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PREFACE 
To e f f e c t i v e l y  a d d r e s s  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  a v i o n i c s  and c o n t r o l  
system Val i d a t i o n ,  NASA-Langl ey Research Center has conceived and sponsored a 
s e r i e s  o f  w o r k i n g  g r o u p  m e e t i n g s  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  i d e n t i f y i n g  and address- 
i n g   c r i t i c a l   i s s u e s   r e l a t e d   t o   t h e   v a l i d a t i o n   p r o c e s s .  The f i r s t  working  group 
meet ing i n  t h i s  s e r i e s ,  Working  Group I, was h e l d  i n  March 1979. 
Working  Group I prov ided a f o r u m  f o r  t h e  exchange o f  i d e a s  on f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  a v i o n i c s  and cont ro l   sys tem Va l  i d a t i o n .  The s t a t e  o f  t h e  a r t  i n  
f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  c o m p u t e r  v a l i d a t i o n  was examined i n  o r d e r  t o  b e g i n  t h e  e s t a b -  
l i s h m e n t  o f  a framework f o r  f u t u r e  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  v a l i d a t i o n  r e s e a r c h  f o r  
f a u l  t - t o l e r a n t  a v i o n i c s  and fl i g h t  c o n t r o l  systems. The r e s u l t s  o f  Working 
Group I and t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  A v i o n i c s  I n t e g r a t e d  R e s e a r c h  L a b o r a t o r y  
(AIRLAB)  by  NASA-Langley  Research  Center  provided  impetus f o r  a second  working 
group meeting. 
The o b j e c t i v e  o f  Working  Group I 1  was t o  i d e n t i f y ,  b e g i n n i n g  w i t h  t h e  
ideas provided by Working Group I, s p e c i f i c  Val ida t ion  tasks  wh ich  cou ld  bene-  
f i t  subs tan t i a l l y   f rom  the   ex i s tence   o f  AIRLAB. To prov ide  an i n i t i a l   f o c u s ,  
Val  i d a t i o n  i s s u e s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t w o  f a u l  t - t o l e r a n t  c o m p u t e r s  c u r -  
ren t l y  be ing  des igned  and devel  oped under  the sponsorship of  NASA-Langl ey 
Research  Center,  namely,  SIFT and FTMP, w e r e   c o n s i d e r e d .   P a r t i c u l a r   v a l i d a t i o n  
tasks  fo r  these computers  were i d e n t i f i e d  a t  a prel iminary  Working  Group I 1  
m e e t i n g   h e l d   a t   t h e   R e s e a r c h   T r i a n g l e   I n s t i t u t e   ( R T I )   i n  September. The t a s k s  
generated a t  t h i  s meeting  served as a s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  t h e  l a r g e r  Working 
Group I I meet i  ng h e l d  a t  NASA-Langley Research Center i n  October. 
The a c t i v i t i e s  o f  Working  Group I 1  d u r i n g  t h e  two-day  session i n  October 
cen te red   a round   the   p rev ious l y   de f i ned   va l i da t i on   t asks .  These tasks  were 
p a r t i t i o n e d  i n t o  t h r e e  m a j o r  c a t e g o r i e s :  
1. C o n f i r m a t i o n   o f   S y s t e m   R e l i a b i l i t y  
2. F a u l t   P r o c e s s i n g   V e r i f i c a t i o n  
3. F a u l t   P r o c e s s i n g   C h a r a c t e r i   z a t i o n  
Working  Group I 1  a t t e n d e e s  e v a l u a t e d  t h e  p r e l  i m i n a r y  p r o p o s e d  t a s k s  i n  e a c h  o f  
these  areas and proposed  addi t ional   tasks.  
The Working  Group I 1  meet ing was conceived and sponsored by personnel  at  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 M o t i v a t i o n   f o r   t h e   P r o b l e m  
I n  1979  commercial a i r  c a r r i e r s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  p a i d ,  on the  average, 
a n   i n c r e a s e   o f  70% i n  t h e i r  annual   fuel  b i l l   o v e r   t h e   p r e v i o u s   y e a r .   T h i s  
s t a t i s t i c  h i g h l i g h t s  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  e n e r g y  e f f i c i e n t  a i r c r a f t .  
Under t h e  s p o n s o r s h i p  o f  NASA-Langley, t h e  ACEE Energy E f f i c i e n t  T r a n s p o r t  
Technology e f f o r t  has  been e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e  t e c h n o l o g y  r e q u i r e d  t o  
s u p p o r t  t h i s  e f f o r t .  
New low-drag  aerodynamic  structures show g rea t  p romise  fo r  l ower ing  fue l  
consumption.  However,  as a consequence o f  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r e ,  w i n g  and t a i l  de- 
s igns  show s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  l o a d i n g  and  decreases i n  s t a b i l i t y  t h a t  
must  be a l l e v i a t e d  b y  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  s e n s o r s ,  a c t u a t o r s ,  and d i g i t a l  e l e c -  
t r o n i c s   t o   d y n a m i c a l l y   a l t e r   c o n t r o l   s u r f a c e s   i n   f l i g h t .   I n   c e r t a i n   f u t u r e  
d e s i g n s  t h i s  a c t i v e  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  w i  11  be c r u c i a l  t o  fl i g h t ;  i t s  use w i  11 not 
be  op t i ona l  and no  manual o v e r r i d e  o r  backup w i  11 be empl oyed.  Thus, the de-  
ve l  opment o f  h i g h  i n t e g r i t y ,  a c t i v e  c o n t r o l  systems  technol  ogy i s  an i n t e g r a l  
p a r t  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  Energy Ef f i c ien t  Transpor t  Techno logy  e f -  
f o r t .  The Val i da t i on   p rocess   mus t ,   o f   necess i t y ,   be  a p a r t  o f  t h i s  e f f o r t .  
1.2 C u r - r e n t  S t a t u s  o f  t h e  V a l i d a t i o n  P r o c e s s  
Whi le  a g rea t  dea l  o f  work  has gone on i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  f a u l  t - t o 1  e r a n t  s y s -  
t e m  d e s i g n ,  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  v a l i d a t i n g  u l t r a - r e l i a b l e  s y s t e m s  i s  j u s t  b e g i n n i n g  
t o  be  addressed. The c u r r e n t  s t a t e  o f  t h e  a r t  i s  g i v e n  i n  summary form i n  
Sect ions 1.4.1 th rough 1.4.3 o f  t h i s  r e p o r t .  
1.3 Fault-To1 erant Systems Techno1 ogy Devel opment 
The development o f  a c t i v e  c o n t r o l  systems  has many f a c e t s ,  and t h e  scope 
o f   t h i s   r e p o r t   i s  1 i m i t e d  t o  t h e  d e v e l  opment o f  t h e  t e c h n o l  ogy r e q u i  r e d  t o  sup- 
p o r t  t h e  f a u l  t - t o l e r a n t  s y s t e m ' s  a s p e c t  o f  a c t i v e  c o n t r o l s .  Much o f  t h e  work 
repo r ted  takes  the  even  na r rower  v iew  o f  t echno logy  deve lopmen t  fo r  f au l t -  
to lerant   computer   systems.   Th is  i s  a r e a s o n a b l e  l i m i t a t i o n  i n i t i a l l y ,  and it 
i s  a n t i c i p a t e d  t h a t  many usefu l  ex tens ions  can read i l y  be  made l a t e r .  
The development o f   f a u l   t - t o 1   e r a n t  systems technol ogy i nvo l  ves  design, 
assessment, v a l i d a t i o n ,  and maintenance of  an exper ience base fo r  cand ida te  
systems.  NASA-Langley  has, f o r   s e v e r a l   y e a r s ,   s u p p o r t e d   t h e   d e s i g n   o f   t w o  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e   f a u l t - t o l e r a n t   c o m p u t e r  systems - SIFT and FTMP. These  systems 
r e p r e s e n t  d i s t i n c t  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  a system which must 
" p r o v i d e  f l i g h t  c r u c i a l  f u n c t i o n s  w i t h  a f a i l u r e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  l e s s  t h a n  
a t  1 0  hours." 
L 
A p r o t o t y p e  v e r s i o n  o f  each o f  these sys tems wil b e  d e l i v e r e d  t o  NASA- 
Langley i n  1980 f o r  assessment  and v a l i d a t i o n .  The knowledge  gained  f rom  these 
systems wil be  used  as an experience base t o  be  re ta ined  and d i  ssemi nated f o r  
understanding i n  the development o f  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  systems. 
It i s  env is ioned  tha t   the   assessment ,   va l ida t ion ,  and experience  base 
a c t i v i t i e s  wil be  supported  by a s p e c i a l i z e d  f a c i l i t y ,  t h e  A v i o n i c s  I n t e g r a t e d  
t h e   c a p a b i l i t y   t o :  
- Research Laboratory, which has been defined by NASA-Langley and wil p r o v i d e  - 
1) deve lop   the   techno logy  and m e t h o d o l o g y   r e q u i r e d   t o   i n t e g r a t e  
a v i o n i c  and c o n t r o l  f u n c t i o n s  f o r  a i r c r a f t  o f  t h e  1990 's  and 
beyond , 
2 )  eva lua te  and s tudy   cand ida te   sys tem  a rch i tec tu res ,  
3) Val i da te   imp lemen ta t i on   t echno log ies ,  and 
4) e s t a b l i s h  a da ta   base  o f   per fo rmance,   re1   iab i l i t y ,  and exper iment 
s t a t i s t i c s .  
1.4 Faul t -Tolerant   Systems  Val idat ion  Technology  Development  
One o f  t h e  most important and c h a l l e n g i n g  a s p e c t s  o f  f a u l  t - t o l e r a n t  s y s -  
tems  development i s  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  p r o c e s s .  The v a l i d a t i o n   p r o c e s s   c o m p r i s e s  
t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  r e q u i r e d  t o  i n s u r e  t h e  agreement  of t h e  s y s t e m  r e a l i z a t i o n  w i t h  
t h e   s y s t e m   s p e c i f i c a t i o n .   T h i s   e f f o r t   i s   s i g n i f i c a n t  and requ i res   t he   deve lop -  
ment o f  technology i n   i t s  own r i g h t .  
V a l i d a t i o n  i s  n o t  a new problem. Va l  i d a t i o n  t e c h n i q u e s  e x i s t  and have 
been a p p l i e d  t o  many d i g i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c  a v i o n i c s  and c o n t r o l  systems p r e s e n t l y  
i n  use,  such as the   F- I11   redundant  Mark I 1  a v i o n i c s ,  t h e  B - I  redundant  avion- 
i c s ,  t h e  F-18 quad r e d u n d a n t  d i g i t a l  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l ,  t h e  F-8 t r i p l e x  d i g i t a l  
f ly-by-wire  system, and t h e  Space S h u t t l e  quad redundant   av ion ics  and c o n t r o l  
backup  system. 
V a l i d a t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been a p a r t  o f  t h e  d i g i t a l  system 
l i f e  c y c l e  shown i n  F i g u r e  1.1. App l ied   t o   av ion i cs   sys tems   (as  shown i n  
F i g u r e  1.2) , t h i s  p r o c e s s  i n c l u d e s  some v e r y  f a m i l  i a r ,  c o n c r e t e ,  and t r u s t e d  
tasks  , such as bench tests ,  "hot -bench ' '  tests ,  ground tests  i n  t h e  a i r c r a f t  , 
and fl i g h t  t e s t s  i n  e x p e r i m e n t a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s .  
None o f  t he  tasks  o f  t he  pas t  can  be  summar i l y  d i sm issed  as  i napprop r ia te  
t o  t h e  problem a t  hand, b u t  ' r a t h e r  a more p rec i se ,  sys temat i c ,  d i sc ip l i ned ,  and 
extens ive approach must  be evolved to  incorporate and  augment e x i s t i n g  t e c h -  
niques. The p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  d i s t i n g u i s h  u l  t r a - r e 1  i a b l e  s y s t e m s  Val i d a t i o n  a r e  
s u m a r i z e d  i n  T a b l e  1.1. 
The s t a t e  o f  t h e  a r t  o f  v a l i d a t i o n  was d iscussed as a p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
agenda o f  Working Group I ( r e f .  1) , an e a r l   i e r  NASA-Langley-sponsored e f f o r t .  
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The r e s u l t s  o f  t h a t  d i s c u s s i o n  a r e  summarized  here  as  prel iminary t o  t h e  frame- 
work o f  v a l i d a t i o n  p r e s e n t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2.0 o f  t h i s  r e p o r t .  
Th is  recap i s  presented i n  a f o r m  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  model s o f  S e c t i o n  
2.0 and, i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  w h i c h  f o l l o w s  i s  keyed t o  F i g u r e  2.5 
(The  Proposed  Val i d a t i o n  Taxonomy). Tab le  1.2  shows the  th ree  p r imary  ca tego-  
r i e s  used. i n  Working Group I t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  a r t  o f  v a l i d a t i o n  and 
re1  a tes  them t o  t h e  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s  used i n  t h i s  r e p o r t .  
1.4.1 Log ica l   P roo fs  
The theo ry  o f  p rov ing  i s  be ing  adequa te l y  add ressed  and i s  n o t  t h e  p r e s e n t  
1 im i ta t i on .   Accu ra te  and f o r m a l   s t a t e m e n t s   o f   s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  and environmental  
assumpt ions   su i tab le   f o r   p roo f   t echn iques  may t a k e  weeks t o  w r i t e .  P r o o f  t e c h -  
n iques  a re  mos t  o f ten  app l  i ed  to  the  Val i d a t i o n  o f  s o f t w a r e  a t  t h e  u p p e r  1 eve1 
o f  i t s  h i e r a r c h i c a l  d e s c r i p t i o n .  However, some use o f   p r o v i n g  has  been made 
wi th  hardware when approp r ia te  fo rma l  1 anguage d e s c r i p t i o n s  e x i s t .  
Au tomat ic  p roo f  genera t ing  methods  ex is t  fo r  cer ta  
problems. More p o w e r f u l  i n t e r a c t i v e  p r o v i  ng t e c h n i  ques 
r e q u i   r e   h i g h l y   s k i  11 ed personnel and a 1 arge commitment 
Work on proof  techniques i s  expected t o  c o n t i n u e  and wi 
i n  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  p r o c e s s .  
i n  r e s t r i c t e d  c l a s s e s  o f  
a re  a1 so a v a i l  ab1 e b u t  
o f  computer resources. 
11  be u s e f u l  as a t o o l  
1.4.2 A n a l y t i c a l  Models 
The t e r m  " a n a l y t i c a l  m o d e l s "  i s  used  here t o  d e f i n e  t h a t  c a t e g o r y  o f  
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  p r o c e s s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  a n a l y z i n g  o r  p r e d i c t i n g  
s y s t e m   p e r f o r m a n c e   o r   r e l i a b i l i t y .   P r o o f   t e c h n i q u e s  and s imu la t ion /emula t ion  
may r i g h t f u l l y  f i t  w i t h i n  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  b u t  a r e  c a t e g o r i z e d  s e p a r a t e l y  and 
a r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  e x c l u d e d  f r o m  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n .  O f  i n t e r e s t  h e r e  i s  t h e  d e f i -  
n i t i o n  o f  f a u l t s  ( a  f a u l t  model ) and t h e  a n a l y s i s  o r  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  a system's 
response (a system 'model ) t o   t h i s   f a u l t  model. 
Work i s  p r o g r e s s i n g  t o  u n i f y  p e r f o r m a n c e  and r e 1  i a b i l  i t y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
i n t o  a s i n g l e  model , c r e a t i n g  what i s   c a l l  ed a "per fo rmab i l  i t y "  model. The 
o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  e s t i m a t e  a s y s t e m ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  p e r f o r m  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  
f a u l t s .  The major  enhancement  provided  by t h i s  model i s  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
" a b i l i t y  t o  p e r f o r m "  i n  t e r m s  o f  a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l s  o f  d e g r a d a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
t h e  more common, r e s t r i c t i v e ,  and by now unreasonable,  pass and f a i l  l e v e l s .  
The CARE I 1 1  r e l i a b i l i t y  e s t i m a t i o n  program  takes a more t r a d i t i o n a l  p o i n t  
o f  view: 
"The o b j e c t  o f  CARE I 1 1  i s  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  of r e l i a b i l i t y  
f o r  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  a v i o n i c  systems w i t h  f a i l u r e  p r o b a b i l  i- 
t i e s  o f  l e s s  t h a n  10-9 a t  10 hours." 
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I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  e s t i m a t i n g  s y s t e m  f a i l u r e  r a t e  and conf idence 
i n t e r v a l  ( s t a t e d  as: the  system  has a f a i l u r e  r a t e  o f  no  more t h a n  X w i t h  a 
c o n f i d e n c e  i n t e r v a l  o f  Y )  f r o m  component f a i  1 u r e  r a t e s  and c o n f i d e n c e  i n t e r v a l  s 
i s  unsolved. I n   a d d i t i o n ,   t h e   f a i l u r e   p r o b a b i l i t y   o f   l e s s   t h a n   i s  so 
s t r i n g e n t   t h a t   e v e r y t h i n g   i s   i m p o r t a n t .   A s s u m p t i o n s ,  model  approximations,  and 
c o m p u t a t i o n a l  r o u n d - o f f  e r r o r s  a l l  s e r i o u s l y  i m p a c t  t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
r e s u l t s   , o b t a i n e d .  
CARE I 1 1  p r o p o s e s  t o  accommodate a much more r e a l  i s t i c  f a u l t  model than 
previous  programs, i n c l  ud i ng : 
1) t i m e - d e p e n d e n t   f a i l u r e   r a t e s ,  
2) d e s i g n   e r r o r s ,  as w e l l  as, 
3)  i n t e r m i t t e n t  and t r a n s i e n t   f a u l t s .  
The system model a l s o  accommodates a more   mean ing fu l   se t   o f   f au l t   hand l i ng  
mechanisms, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  o f :  
1) t i m e   f r o m   f a u l t   o c c u r r e n c e   t o   e r r o r   o c c u r r e n c e ,  
2 )  t i m e  f r o m  e r r o r  o c c u r r e n c e  t o  e r r o r  d e t e c t i o n ,  
3 )  t i m e   f r o m   e r r o r   d e t e c t i o n   t o   f a u l t   i s o l a t i o n ,  and 
4)  t i m e   f r o m   f a u l t   i s o l a t i o n   t o  system  recovery. 
While  recent  improvements i n  sys tem mode l i ng  a re  s ign i f i can t ,  many d i f f i -  
c u l t i e s  remain. Some o f  t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  i n  t h e  m o d e l i n g  o f  f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  systems w i t h  u l t r a - r e l i a b i l i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a r e :  
1. H a n d l i n g   l a r g e   s t a t e  spaces  which r e s u l t   f r o m   t h e  complex  systems  and 
f a u l t  model s. 
2. F a u l t  1 atency - t h i s  i s  an i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  s i n c e  c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  f a u l t s  
may be much more  damaging  than  any f a u l t  a l o n e .  A system's  response 
t o  f a u l t s  o c c u r r i n g  b e f o r e  r e c o v e r y  f r o m  t h e  l a s t  f a u l t  i s  complete 
must  be  studied. 
3. Coverage - i t  i s  impor tan t   t o   be   ab le   t o   assess   t he   deg ree   t o   wh ich  
t h e  f a u l t  model i s   i n  agreement w i th  observed rea l  i ty .  
4. Unexpected  events - some s t r a t e g y  i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  d e a l  i n g  w i t h  e v e n t s  
no t   p red ic ted .   I n   t hese   sys tems   unp red ic ted   even ts   a re   no t   i ns ign i f i -  
cant .  
5. F a i l u r e   s t a t i s t i c s  - a c o n t i n u e d   e f f o r t   i s   r e q u i r e d   t o   o b t a i n   s t a t i s -  
t i c s  c o n c e r n i n g  a c t u a l  component and system f a i l u r e  mechanisms and 
ra tes .  
6. F a u l t   d e s c r i p t i o n s  - the   cu r ren t   unders tand ing  and d e s c r i p t i o n   o f  
f a u l t s  i s  a t  t h e  c i r c u i t  and 1 o g i c  1 evel  . It i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  d e v e l o p  
and understand how these  low-1  eve l  f au l t  mechanisms can be f a i t h f u l  l y  
modeled i n  te rms  o f  h ighe r  l eve l  sys tem behav io r .  
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1.4.3 Exper imenta l   Tes t ing  
I n  t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n ,  t h e  t e s t i n g  o f  a phys i ca l  dev i ce  and t h e  t e s t i n g  o f  a 
s imu la ted   o r   emu la ted   ve rs ion   o f   t he  same d e v i c e  i s  c o n s i d e r e d .  T e s t i n g  i s  t h e  
s i n g l e  m o s t  f r e q u e n t l y  a p p l i e d  t o o l  o f  V a l  i d a t i o n  f o r  b o t h  h a r d w a r e  and s o f t -  
ware. It i s  d e f i n e d  as the   p rocess   o f   app ly ing  a s e t  o f  i n p u t s  ( s e l e c t e d  t o  
r e v e a l  f a u l t s  b e l o n g i n g  t o  a p r e d e f i n e d  f a u l t  model ) t o  a u n i t  and t h e n  compar- 
i n g   t h e   r e s u l t s   p r o d u c e d   t o  a r e f e r e n c e   o f   t h e  good response.  There i s  no 
c o h e r e n t   t h e o r y   o f   t e s t i n g .   T h a t   i s ,   i n   g e n e r a l ,  we c a n n o t ,   f o r  an a r b i t r a r i l y  
d e f i n e d  u n i t  and f a u l t  model , d e f i n e  p r e c i s e l y  how t o  g e n e r a t e  o r  e v a l  u a t e  t e s t  
d a t a  t o  i n s u r e  a f a u l  t - f r e e  u n i t .  We a r e  1 e f t  w i t h  a g r e a t  many  ad hoc  ap- 
proaches f o r  t r e a t i n g  r e s t r i c t e d  cases.  Even when a u n i t  passes a t e s t ,  we can 
o n l y  make weak i n f e r e n c e s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  u n i t ' s  t r u e  c o n d i t i o n .  
The c o s t   o f   t e s t i n g  depends  upon t h e   c o s t   o f :  1) g e n e r a t i n g   i n p u t   t e s t  
p a t t e r n s ,  2) s t o r i n g  t h e s e  p a t t e r n s  as references,  and 3) t h e  l e n g t h  o f  t i m e  
r e q u i r e d   t o   r u n   t h e   t e s t .  The p r a c t i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  c o s t  i s  one o f  t h e  p r i -  
m a r y  d e f i c i e n c i e s  o f  t e s t i n g ,  s i n c e  e v e n  r e l a t i v e l y  s i m p l e  n e t w o r k s  may r e q u i r e  
enormous  numbers o f   t e s t   p a t t e r n s .   " S t a n d a r d   t e s t s   f o r   c o m m e r c i a l  LSI d e v i c e s  
r a r e l y  r e s u l t  i n  g r e a t e r  t h a n  95% coverage (wi th  coverage here meaning the 
percentage o f  nodes i n  t h e  c i r c u i t  t h a t  t r u l y  change s t a t e  d u r i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  
t h e  t e s t ) ,  because t h e  c o s t  o f  h i g h e r  c o v e r a g e  i s  p r o h i b i t i v e .  S i m i l a r  s t a t e -  
ments  can  be made w i t h   r e s p e c t   t o   s o f t w a r e   t e s t i n g   p r o c e d u r e s . "   C u r r e n t   i n d u s -  
trial p r a c t i c e  i s  t o  a c c e p t a n c e - t e s t  components a t  3% a c c e p t a n c e  q u a l i t y  l e v e l  
(AQL) a t  95% c o n f i d e n c e  f o r  s t u c k - a t  f a u l t s .  
A n o t h e r  s e r i o u s  l i m i t a t i o n  t o  t e s t i n g  i s  o u r  i n a b i l i t y  t o  d e s c r i b e  f a u l t s  
a t  an a b s t r a c t  l e v e l ,  w h i l e  r e t a i n i n g  a p r o p e r  a b s t r a c t i o n  o f  t h e i r  t r u e  p h y s i -  
ca l   behav io r .  A t  t h e   p r e s e n t   t i m e ,   t h e   m o s t   f r e q u e n t l y   a p p l i e d   f a u l t  model i s  
t h e  permanent  stuck  node  model.  This i s  n o t  always a use fu l   o r   accu ra te  model 
and t h e r e  i s  a need t o  c o n s i d e r  a more r e a l  i s t i c  f a u l t  model.  This includes 
t h e  need t o  i d e n t i f y  e q u i v a l e n t  c l a s s e s  o f  f a u l t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  l a r g e  
number o f  cases which need t o  be considered. The 1 i m i t a t i o n  o f  s o l  i d  f a i l u r e s  
i s  no   l onger   p rac t i ca l .   The re  i s  a p r e s s i n g   n e e d   f o r  a mean ing fu l   and  t rac ta -  
b l e  model f o r  i n t e r m i t t e n t  and t r a n s i e n t  b e h a v i o r .  
P h y s i c a l  f a u l t  i n s e r t i o n  has l o n g  been  used t o   p r o v i d e   i n f o r m a t i o n  and 
c a l i b r a t i o n  f o r  i n p u t  t e s t  p a t t e r n  and d iagnost ic  program coverage evaluat ion.  
If t h e  t r e n d  c o n t i n u e s  t o w a r d  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  and i f  phys ica l  
f a u l t  i n s e r t i o n  i s  t o  c o n t i n u e  as an app l icab le  techn ique,  then unders tand ing  
1 o w - l e v e l  f a u l t  mechanisms a t  t h e  i n t e r f a c e  o f  h i g h e r  l e v e l  model s i s  impera- 
t i ve .   S imu la t ion /emula t ion   have  long   been used  as t o o l s   t o   a t t a c k   t h e   p r o b l e m  
o f  e v a l u a t i n g  f a u l t  c o v e r a g e  c a p a b i l  i t y .  S imula t ion /emul  a t ion  model s t y p i c a l l y  
t a k e  much l o n g e r  t o  r u n  t h a n  s i m i l a r  t e s t i n g  on p h y s i c a l  u n i t s  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  
s u f f e r  more s e v e r e l y  f r o m  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  l o n g  e x e c u t i o n  t i m e s  t h a n  
o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  t e s t i n g .  
The most p o t e n t i a l l y  f r u i t f u l  work i s  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  d e s i g n  f o r  t e s t a b i l -  
i t y .  The i d e a  i s  t h a t  t h e  t e s t i n g  problem, i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  i n c r e a s e d  complex- 
i t y  and i n t e g r a t i o n ,  c a n n o t  b e  s o l v e d  w i t h o u t  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  t e s t i n g  f e a t u r e s  
i n t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d e s i g n .  There  are no t h e o r e t i c a l  r e s u l t s  w h i c h  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
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impact   des ign and t h e  same i s  t r u e  f o r  t e s t a b i l i t y  d e s i g n .  However, i n  t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  t h e r e  a r e  a f a i r  number o f  d e t a i l e d  s u g g e s t i o n s  and " t r i c k s "  t h a t  
can  ease  problems i f  t h e y  a r e  c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  a p p l i e d .  
I n  summary, t h e r e  a r e  some u s e f u l  t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  f i n d i n g  t e s t  i n p u t  p a t -  
t e r n s  f o r  r e a s o n a b l y  s m a l l  n e t w o r k s  when t h e  f a u l t  model  used i s  t h e  s o l  i d  
s tuck  node  type.  Test ing i s  w i d e l y  used, p r i m a r i l y  because we have some i n t u i -  
t i o n  i n  i t s  use and because it i s  a v e r y   c o n c r e t e   a c t i v i t y .   T e s t i n g   a l o n e ,  
however, provides a very  weak b a s i s  f o r  systems  Val i d a t i o n  when u l t r a -  
r e l i a b i l i t y  i s  r e q u i r e d .  
1.4.4 Fau l  t -To le ran t  Systems  Val i d a t i o n  T e c h n o l o g y  
Development Summary 
The preced ing   d iscuss ion   p resents  more ques t ions   than i t  answers, and 
r i g h t l y  so, s i n c e  many o f  t h e  r e a l  i s s u e s  a r e  b e i n g  c l a r i f i e d  o r  d e f i n e d  f o r  
t h e  v e r y  f i r s t  t i m e .  T h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  work a v a i l a b l e  t h a t  d e a l s  w i t h  d e f i n i n g  
f a u l t s  i n  a meaningful  way. No t rea tment  i s  o f f e r e d  f o r  v e r i f y i n g  what  speci- 
f i c a t i o n s  a r e  f a u l t - f r e e ,  and very l i t t l e  h e l p  i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
d e s i g n   f a u l t s .   I n   a d d i t i o n ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  how v e r y   i m p o r t a n t   s o f t w a r e   f a i l u r e s  
are, and y e t  t h e r e  i s  o n l y  t h e  s m a l l e s t  b e g i n n i n g  b e i n g  made t o  d e v e l o p  a model 
f o r  t h e s e  f a i l u r e s .  D e s i g n i n g  w i t h  v e r i f i c a t i o n  i n  m i n d  may be  one o f  t h e  most 
f r u i t f u l  avenues f o r  work, and r e s u l t s  have  begun t o  appear i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  
E f f o r t  wil be requ i red  on  many d i f f e r e n t  f r o n t s  i f  one i s  t o  f i e l d  t h e  systems 
foreseen. The p r e s e n t a t i o n   i n   S e c t i o n  2.0 c r e a t e s  a model t h a t  can  be  used t o  
p l a n  f u t u r e  d e v e l o p e n t s .  T h i s  model u n i f i e s  many o f  t h e  d i s j o i n t  c o n c e r n s  
b r i e f l y  d i s c u s s e d  h e r e  and g i v e s  a framework f o r  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  
I f  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  p r o c e s s  f o r  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  s y s t e m s  i s  n o t  d i f -  
f e r e n t  i n  i t s  b a s i c  d e f i n i t i o n  o r  i n t e n t ,  t h e n  how wil it b e  d i f f e r e n t ?  The 
answer  can  be  framed a t  two  leve ls .  A t  t h e  m o s t  p r i m a r y  l e v e l ,  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  
i s  a consequence o f  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  A t y p i c a l   r e l i a b i l i t y   r e q u i r e m e n t   f o r  a p resent   genera t ion   sys-  
tem i s :  
a p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  c a t a s t r o p h  
o f  10-6 a t  90 minutes 
A t y p i c a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  t h e  n e x t  
a p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  c a t a s t r o p h  
o f   a t 1 0   h o u r s
c f a i l u r e  
g e n e r a t i o n  o f  s y s t e m s  i s :  
c f a i l u r e  
A second l e v e l  o f  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  t h e  c o m p l e x i t y  o f  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  p r o c e s s  i s  a 
consequence o f  t h i s  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  
r e a l i z a t i o n s  o f  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  systems wil be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  more com- 
p l e x  t h a n  e x i s t i n g  systems.  Present  systems t y p i c a l l y  employ  from  one t o  f o u r  
processors i n  a b a s i c a l l y   s t a t i c   c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  The next  generat ion  systems 
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wil employ many more  processors and dynamic  recon f igu ra t i on  s t ra teg ies ,  a l l ow-  
i n g  a w i d e  v a r i e t y  o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  f o r  n o r m a l ,  as we l l  as f a u l t y ,  
c o n d i t i o n s  . 
These two a t t r i b u t e s ,  a  demanding  re1 i a b i l i t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  and the  a t ten -  
dan t  sys tem rea l i za t i on  comp lex i t y ,  have  a tremendous  impact and compound t h e  
impor tance   o f   t he   va l i da t i on   p rocess .  The use o f  l i f e t e s t i n g  i s  o u t  o f  t h e  
q u e s t i o n ,   s i n c e   a n y   r e a l   f a i l u r e   i s  an ext remely  rare  event .  The use o f  t e s t -  
i n g  f o r  i n d u c e d  f a i l u r e s  as  a s t ra tegy  i s  a l so  i nadequa te  because  no t e s t  can 
b e  d e s i g n e d  f o r  e v e n t s  t h a t  a r e  u n f o r e s e e n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  c r i t i c a l i t y  o f  
the   in tended  app l i ca t ion ,   passenger   car ry ing   commerc ia l   av ia t ion ,   c rea tes  a 
s t r o n g  d e s i r e  f o r  s y s t e m  Val i d a t i o n  a t  a v e r y  h i g h  l e v e l  o f  c o n f i d e n c e .  T h i s  
d e s i r e ,  c o u p l e d  w i t h  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  t a s k ,  i l l u m i n a t e s  t h e  
importance o f  d e v e l o p i n g  t e c h n o l o g y  f o r  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  f l i g h t  c r u c i a l  d i g i t a l  
e l e c t r o n i c  systems. 
1.5 Report  Scope  and-Organizat& 
Working Group I i d e n t i f i e d  g e n e r a l  f a u l  t - t o 1  e r a n t  a v i o n i c s  and c o n t r o l  
systems va l i da t i on   i ssues .   Work ing  Group I 1  focused on s p e c i f i c   v a l i d a t i o n  
t a s k s  and e s t a b l i s h e d  a framework f o r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h .  T h i s  document  draws 
upon t h e  raw in format ion produced at  these work ing groups and se ts  as ob jec-  
t i v e s  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f :  
1. a general framework f o r  t h e  Val i d a t i o n  o f  u l  t r a - r e 1  i a b l  e f a u l t -  
t o 1   e r a n t   d i g i t a l   e l e c t r o n i c   s y s t e m s  , 
2. a s e t  o f  s p e c i f i c  t a s k s  f o r  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  r e p r e s e n t a -  
t i v e   u l   t r a - r e 1  i able   fau l   t - to1   e ran t   computer   sys tems - S I F T  and FTMP, 
and 
3. a se t   o f   research   t asks   t o   suppor t  an o n g o i n g   e f f o r t   i n   t h e   d e v e l o p -  
ment o f   techno1 ogy f o r  f au l   t - t o1   e ran t   sys tems  Val i d a t i  on. 
Sec t i on  2.0 rev iews  the  eva lua t i on  o f  t he  va l i da t i on  p rocess  and presents  
a general framework f o r  Val i d a t i o n  t e c h n o l o g y  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  t h e  W o r k i n g  Group 
I 1  meet ing.   This  general  model i s  t h e  framework w i t h i n   w h i c h   t h e   s p e c i f i c  
t a s k s  f o r  S I F T  and FTMP v a l i d a t i o n  a r e  summarized i n  S e c t i o n  3.0. Throughout 
the  p rocess  o f  de f i n ing  and o r d e r i n g  t h e  Val i d a t i o n  t a s k s ,  it was c l e a r  t h a t  a 
number o f  i m p o r t a n t  r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  s u p p o r t  t h i s  t e c h n o l o g y .  
Sec t i on  4.0 i d e n t i f i e s  r e s e a r c h  t a s k s  i n  t w o  m a j o r  c a t e g o r i e s  - t h o s e  i n  sup- 
p o r t  o f  v a l i d a t i o n  and t h o s e  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  c o m p u t i n g ,  and 
recommends s p e c i f i c  e f f o r t s  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  r e q u i  r e d  
t o   s u p p o r t  Val i d a t i  on o f   f a u l   t - t o 1   e r a n t  systems which w i  11 be p a r t   o f   t h e  
a c t i v e  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  e n e r g y  e f f i c i e n t  a i r c r a f t  o f  t h e  f u t u r e .  The Ap- 
pendices o f  t h i s  r e p o r t  i n c l u d e :  ( I )  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  t e r m s ,  ( 1 1 )  t a s k  d e s c r i p -  
t i ons  genera ted  by Working Group I 1  , ( I  11) t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t a s k  r a t i n g s  made by 
the  work ing  g roup  pa r t i c i pan ts ,  and (IV) a l i s t   o f  Working  Group 11 attendees. 
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2.0 TOWARDS A VALIDATION METHODOLOGY  FOR FAULT-TOLERANT 
AVIONICS COMPUTERS 
2.1 Trad i t iona l   Methods  
A t r a d i t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  t o  r e l i a b i l i t y  v a l i d a t i o n  i s  t h e  l i f e t e s t i n g  method 
i n  which  one  takes n s t a t i s t i c a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  c o p i e s  of the  sys tem under  tes t  
(SUT) a n d   t e r m i n a t e s   t h e   t e s t   a f t e r  r (1  < r < n)  systems  have  fa i led.   Using 
the  accumula ted  t ime on  tes t  Try  one can aer ive  a p o i n t  e s t i m a t e  and con- 
f i d e n c e  i n t e r v a l s  f o r  t h e  mean l i f e ,  o r  MTTF, of the  system. These s t a t i s t i c a l  
techniques a1 so a1 1 ow one t o   c a l   c u l   a t e   c o n f i d e n c e   i n t e r v a l  s for   system  re1 i a- 
b i l i t y  f o r  a n y  g i v e n  m i s s i o n  t i m e .  F o r  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  t e c h n i q u e s  
used i n  l i f e t e s t i n g , s e e  ref. 2. 
It shou ld  be  c lear  tha t  the  accumula ted  t ime on t e s t  Tr inc reases  as 
t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  o r  MTTF., o f  t h e  SUT inc reases .   Fo r   f i xed  r and n, t h i s  
i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  w i d t h  o f  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  i n t e r v a l s  f o r  MTTF, o r  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  
of SUT, i n c r e a s e s   w i t h  Tr. I n  o t h e r  words, i f  one d e s i r e s  a f i x e d  w i d t h  
o f  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  i n t e r v a l ,  one  has t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  number n o f  systems under 
t e s t .  It f o l l  ows t h a t  t h e  number o f  sys tems  requ i red   to   be   pu t   under   tes t   in -  
c r e a s e s  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  w i t h  t h e  r e 1  i a b i l  i t y  o f  t h e  system being tested.  Fur-  
thermore ,  the  va l ida t ion  prob lem i s  compounded because t h e  c o s t  o f  an i n d i v i d -  
ua l  copy  o f  t he  sys tem a1 so i n c r e a s e s  r e m a r k a b l y  w i t h  i t s  r e 1  i a b i l  i t y .  Thus , 
t h e  c o s t  o f  v a l i d a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  more t h a n  p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  w i t h  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  system  under t e s t  ( s e e  F i g u r e  2.1). 
2.1.1 R e l i a b i l i t y  V a l i d a t i o n  o f  a Simplex  System 
W i t h  t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  mind, l e t  us c o n s i d e r  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  v a l i d a t i o n  
o f   c o n v e n t i o n a l  simp1 ex  (nonredundant)  systems. Such sys tems  a re   charac ter ized  
b y  r e l a t i v e l y  l o w  l e v e l s  o f  r e l i a b i l i t y  and,  hence, t h e  c o s t  o f  v a l i d a t i o n  i s  
w i t h i n  reason. If one  assumes t h a t  t h e  t i m e  t o  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  system i s  expo- 
n e n t i a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  w i t h  t h e  f a i l u r e  r a t e  X ( o r  MTTF = l /X) , the system can 
be  modeled as a two-s ta te  Markov cha in  as shown i n  F i g u r e  2.2. Note   t ha t   t he  
s t a t e  1 abel ed 1 imp1 i e s  t h a t  t h e  s y s t e m  i s  w o r k i n g  p r o p e r l y ,  w h i l e  s t a t e  0 i n -  
d ica tes   the   sys tem has  malfunct ioned. The' system i s  i n i t i a l i z e d  t o  s t a t e  1 and 
a f t e r  a random i n t e r v a l  o f  t i m e ,  ends  up i n  t h e  - f a i l u r e  s t a t e  0. 
For  such a convent iona l   s imp lex   sys tem,   the   va l ida t ion   p rocess   cons is ts   o f  
on ly  two s teps :  
1 )  o b t a i n i n g  a p o i n t  e s t i m a t e  and c o n f i d e n c e  i n t e r v a l  s f o r  t h e  f a i l u r e  
r a t e  X ( o r  t h e  MTTF/or t h e  s y s t e m  r e l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a s p e c i f i e d  d u r a -  
t i o n )  + and 
2 )  t e s t i n g  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  e x p o n e n t i a l  l y  d i  s t r i   b u t e d  1 i fet imes.  
B o t h  o f  t h e s e  s t e p s  a r e  w e l l  w i t h i n  t h e  r e a l m  o f  s t a t i s t i c a l  l i f e t e s t i n g  t e c h -  
n i  ques . 
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2.1.2 Reliability Validation of  Redundant Systems 
Next, 1 e t  us consider a redundant system designed to  provide greater 1 ev- 
e l s  of r e l i ab i l i t y ,  e.g., a two-unit  standby  sparing system. One unit i s  
placed into operation, while the other unit i s  kept  in a standby status. For 
the purpose of re1 iabil  i ty analysis,  the system can be  modeled by a three-state 
Markov chain a s  shown in  Figure 2.3. State i implies  that i (= 0,1,2) units 
are in proper working order. x i s  the  fa i lure  ra te  of  an individual  unit and c 
i s  t h e  coverage  parameter associated with the reconfiguration mechanism. The 
s tar t ing s ta te  of the system i s  2 and t he  f a i lu re  s t a t e  i s  0. If a fau l t  oc- 
curs  in  s ta te  2 and i t   i s  covered, then the system goes t o  s t a t e  1. If a f a i l -  
ure  occurs  in s t a t e ' l ,  then  the system as a whole ul t imately fai ls .  I t  should 
be noted t h a t  the  fa i lure  of a single unit does not  necessarily imply system 
fail ure, and that  for  a covered faul t ,  the  system goes through two s ta tes  
before reaching the fail ure state. This s tandby unit feature of a redundant 
system increases system re1 iabil  i ty  over a simplex system consisting of only 
one unit. 
Two methods for reliabil i ty estimation (or validation) are presently 
available. One method uses conventional 1 i f e t e s t i  ng techniques which t reat  the 
system as  a black box,  disregarding i ts  internal  s t ructure .  In particul a r ,  the 
re1 i abi l  i ty  model of Figure 2.3 i s  not  used. Because of the increased re1 i a -  
b i l i t y  of the system, the cost of validation increases (see Figure 2 .1) .  
The second validation method ut i l izes  the rel iabi l i ty  model  of Figure 2.3. 
To eval uate system re1 iabi l  i t y  using t h i s  model , one needs the values of the 
fa i lure  ra te  X of an individual unit and coverage c of the reconfiguration 
mechanism.  These parameters ( a n d  t he i r  confidence  intervals)  are  to be e s t i -  
mated by conducting a 1 i f e t e s t  on these units. (Note the distinction between 
the  l i fe tes t  of a unit and t he  l i f e t e s t  of a standby sparing system composed of 
these units. I n  particular,  the cost  of the former i s  l i ke ly  to  be  much l e s s  
t h a n  t h a t  of the  la t te r . )  To estimate  the coverage  parameter, fault-insertion 
experiments are used. 
2.1.3 Inadequacy of Traditional Methods 
To achieve ul tra-high re1 iabi 1 i t y ,  extensive use of standby sparing and 
automatic reconfiguration i s  made t o  increase the probability t h a t  a system 
will pass t h r o u g h  many "good" states before finally reaching the failure state. 
Because of the high 1 eve1 of redundancy, system re1 i abil i t y   i s  pushed t o  hi t h -  
e r to  unachievable  levels. However, applying traditional  lifetesting  techniques 
implies  unreasonably high validation costs (see Figure 2 . 1 ) .  Due to the high 
cost  of system design and construction, i t   i s  usually difficult  to have avail- 
able the number  of copies needed to  obtain s ta t is t ical ly  s ignif icant  resul ts  
from l i fe tes t ing .  For example, only one  copy  of each.of the SIFT and FTMP sys- 
tems i s  under construction. If one were to  use a 1 i f e t e s t  fo r  re1 iabil  i ty  
validation, then the sample s i z e  i s  n = 1. Since  the  expected  time  until 
t h e  f i r s t  (and only) system fa i lu re  would  be rather long, on the order of lo8 
hours , i t  i s  c l e a r l y  i n f e a s i b l e  t o  conduct such a t e s t  from the standpoint of 
time needed. Furthermore, even i f  one completed such a test  hypothetically,  
s t a t i s t i ca l  confidence in the results of the tes t  would  be negligible due to  
the small sample s ize ,  n = r = 1. 
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2.2 Proposed Val idation Methodology 
2.2.1 Discussion Leading to  the  Proposed Methodology 
The above discussion clearly imp1 ies   that   the   t radi t ional  1 i f e t e s t i  ng ap- 
proach must be abandoned when validating ultra-high reliabil i ty systems. The 
problem of validating such systems i s  re la t ively unexplored, as pointed out by 
Hi1 1 i e r  and Lieberman ( re f .  3 ) :  
"Statist ical  estimation of  component [or subsystem] 
r e l i a b i l i t y  i s  well i n  hand, b u t  estimation of sys- 
tem re1 iabi l  i ty  from component d a t a  i s  vir tual ly  an 
unsol ved probl em .Ii 
In  searching for an a1 ternative technique to traditional 1 i f e t e s t i  n g ,  we note 
t h a t  one shortcoming of the traditional method i s  i t s  "black box" approach 
which ignores the internal structure of SUT, and i s  based on experimental t es t -  
i n g  followed by s ta t is t ical  analysis .  W i t h  u l t ra-high rel iabi l i ty  systems, one 
cannot  afford t o  ignore  the  internal  structure of the system. I t  i s  believed 
t h a t  a validation methodology of such systems must be based on a judicious com- 
bination of experimental testing, analytic modeling, and logical  proofs. 
Having decided t h a t  the internal structure of SUT must be an integral p a r t  
of the validation process, one has t o  determine further the level at  which the 
system structure will be considered. Green  and  Bourne ( r e f .  4 )  suggest t h a t  
the system should be broken down hierarchically u n t i l  a level i s  reached where 
all the necessary measurement data i s  either available o r  can be collected. I t  
i s  f e l t  t h a t  an analyt ical  re l iabi l i ty  model (e.g., a Markov model) provides 
just enough detail  of the system structure  for  our  purposes. Such models en- 
able one to abstract  the states and the  s ta te  transitions of a complex system 
i n t o  a re la t ively small and,  hence, manageable g raph  structure.  I t  i s  also 
believed that data can be collected to estimate the parameters characterizing 
such a model. T h u s ,  the selection of a Markov r e l i a b i l i t y  model to drive the 
validation  process i s  consistent w i t h  the  suggestions by Green and Bourne. I t  
should be noted tha t  Markov models  have  been  used for  system re l i ab i l i t y  pre- 
diction for a long time; however, using such models for rel iabi l i ty  val idat ion 
i s  bel ieved t o  be  new. 
For the purpose of this exposit ion,  let  us assume t h a t  the Markov model  of 
Figure 2.3 i s  a proper abstraction of t he  r e l i ab i l i t y  behavior of the system 
under t e s t .  This model can be characterized by  two parameters: 1) the fai l  ure 
ra te  X of an individual u n i t ,  and 2 )  the coverage parameter c of the dynamic 
reconfiguration mechanism. In order t o  predict system rel iabi l i ty ,  these two 
parameters must  be known. Therefore,  experimental  data (presumably from an 
extensive l ifetesting) on the fai lures  of the individual u n i t  must be obtained. 
Applying statist ical  techniques,  p o i n t  estimate and confidence intervals on the 
fa i lure  ra te  X can then be obtained. Similarly, fault injection simulation ex- 
periments must be conducted t o  make inferences on the coverage parameter c. 
10 
More complex systems (and hence more  complex models) require more param- 
e t e r s  t o  be estimated. These parameter types can be placed into two classes: 
1) Parameters associated with the faul t-occurrence behavior of the sub- 
systems, e.g., the failure rate X i n  Figure 2.3.  
2 )  Parameters associated with the faul t-hand1 i ng (or faul t-processi ng)  
behavior of the system, e.g., the coverage parameter c in Figure 2.3.  
If one examines a complex faul t - t o1  erant system such as SIFT ( r e f .  5)  or 
FTMP ( ref .  6) (see Figure 2.4  for  a re1 i abi l   i ty  model ) , i t  appears that fault- 
handling o f  the system i s  characterized by more t h a n  one parameter. Fault- 
handling i s  composed of phases such as fault-detection, fault-location, and 
system reconfiguration. To predict system re l i ab i l i t y ,  mean detection time, 
mean location time, and mean reconfiguration time must f i r s t  be estimated 
from experimental  data. In addition, coverage associated w i t h  each of these 
phases must also be inferred from experimental data. 
Once the above parameters have  been estimated within the desired confi- 
dence l imits ,  the re l iabi l i ty  of the SUT can be estimated using an available 
package such as ,  CAST, ARIES, CARSRA, SURF, CARE,   CARE 11,  or CARE 111. This, 
in essence, provides us with a three-step reliabil i ty estimation procedure as  
f 01 1 ows : 
1. Estimate  parameters (i  .e. ,  failure rates) associated with the fault-  
occurrence behavior of the subsystems. 
2 .  Estimate  parameters  (e.g.,  coverage)  associated  with  the  fault- 
handling behavior of the system. 
3 .  Estimate system re l i ab i l i t y  using  the  analytical  reliability model. 
Further examination of the reliabil i ty estimation procedure above, how- 
ever,  reveals a major weakness. I t  i s  assumed t h a t  the  analytical   reliabil i ty 
model - i s a proper abstraction of system behavior. This may not necessarily be 
true. Any Val idat i  on methodol ogy for  ul tra-hi g h  re1 i abi 1 i ty  systems should 
identify and c r i t i c a l l y  examine a l l  assumptions in the formulation and the so- 
l uti on of the re1 i abi l i t y  model . These assurnpti ons should ei ther  be verified 
by a 1 ogical proof ( i f  poss ib le ) ,  or simul ation/emul ation/physical experiments 
must be defined to test  the validity of the  assumptions. In  the event that 
some of these assumptions do not  hold t o  be true in l ight of experimental evi- 
dence, preparations must  be  made t o  modify appropriately the reliability model. 
In general, three classes of assumptions are made in the formulation and 
the solution of the  re l iab i l i ty  model. 
1) Structural Assumptions - A r e l i a b i l i t y  model i s  an abstraction of 
e i ther  a 1 ower level model or the physical system i t s e l f .  Such a model struc- 
t u r e  i s  usual ly  a directed graph consi st ing of a se t  of nodes and a set  of 
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arcs. (See  Figures 2.2-2.4.) Each  node i n  the model represents a s e t  of 
s t a t e s  i n  a lower level model ( i  .e., a projection). Similarly, each arc i n  the 
model represents a se t  of s ta te  t rans i t ions  i n  the lower 1 evel model. I t  must 
be  proved t h a t  these abstractions are done correctly.  Wens1 ey e t  a1 . ( r e f .  5)  
have outlined a proof procedure t o  show t h a t  a given abstract  model i s  a cor- 
rect structural abstraction of another lower 1 evel model . This proof procedure 
i s  expected t o  become standard and avail able for use by the computing community 
as a whole. In  addition, one may look toward automata theory  for  help. Should 
the answer of this proof procedure be negative, however, then the reliabil i ty 
model must be modified , resulting perhaps i n  a model w i t h  a larger number of 
s t a t e s  and s ta te  t rans i t ions .  
2 )  Assumptions Regarding the Faul t-Occurrence Behavior - A f a u l t  model 
consists o f  a postulated class of faults, the corresponding failure rates 
(which occur as  labels of certain arcs i n  the  re l iab i l i ty  model), and the 
description of the stochastic process of each fa i lure  c lass .  An attempt must 
be made n o t  t o  miss any cr i t ical  faul t  types i n  the f a u l t  model . This assump- 
t ion appears t o  be neither testable ( i n  a f ini te  fashion)  , nor provable. More 
discussion i s  needed on this issue.  Of related importance i s  whether two or 
more d is t inc t  f a u l t  types have  been  combined i n t o  a single f a u l t  c lass  i n  the 
model . T h i  s assumption  should be provable by structural  methods described 
under (1) above. The result  of expanding one fault  class  into  several i s  an - 
expansion i n  the  s ta te  space and the number of s ta te  t rans i t ions .  The reason 
fo r  a f iner  c lass i f icat ion may  be due t o  a significant difference i n  detection, 
location and reconfiguration times associated w i t h  the f a u l t s  i n  question. 
The second type of assumpti on i n  a fau l t  model i s  the average fail ure rate 
o f  each f a u l t  class.. Such an assumption can be tested by s t a n d a r d  re1 iab i l  i ty  
l i f e t e s t s  of the  associated subsystem. However, i t  i s  presumed tha t  t h i s  
e f fo r t  r e l i e s  on MIL-STD-217B-type expressions, and assumption for  fa i lure  ra te  
computations and the experience t h a t  has gone i n t o  the formulation of such a 
standard. I f  a check reveals t h a t  the computation of fa i lure  ra tes  i s  i n  
error ,  the change can be easily absorbed i n t o  a r e l i a b i l i t y  model since the 
fa i lure  ra tes  appear as parameters. 
The t h i r d  type of assumption i n  a f a u l t  model i s  the nature of the 
stochastic f a i  1 uie process. ' This is  usually assumed t o  be a Poisson process 
(or equivalently, the assumption of an exponential time-to-failure distribu- 
t ion) . .  Since the failure here refers t o  the fai lure  of a subsystem (such  as a 
processor), the assumption may  be s t a t i s t i ca l ly  t e s t ed  i f  resul ts  of a l i f e t e s t  
on the subsystem are ava i l  ab1 e. 
3 )  Assumptions on the  Fault-Handling  Behavior - As mentioned ea r l i e r ,  
mean time and coverage of each phase of  the f a u l t - h a n d l i n g  process must  be 
estimated;  This can be done by conducting fault-injection experiments on the 
simulation/emulation/physical version of  the SUT. Since the value of the cov- 
erage parameter i s  known t o  have a significant effect  on system re l i ab i l i t y  
( r e f .  7 )  , coverage must be measured carefully and estimated w i t h i n  a small con- 
fidence interval . 
Various phases of the recovery process (detection, 1 ocatiori, reconfigura- 
t i o n ,  etc.)  have associated d is t r ibu t ions  since the corresponding times are 
12 
random va r i ab le s .  The usual assumption i s  t h a t  of an exponential  di  s t r i  bu t i  on. 
This assumption can be verified by means  of measurements conducted on the 
pro to type  or  on f au l t - in j ec t ion - type  simul a t ion fol lowed by s t a t i s t i c a l  tests. 
If  the above  ver i f ica t ion  results i n  the unfortunate conclusion of a nonexpo- 
n e n t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  the r e l i a b i l i t y  model becomes a non-Markovian  model. 
In sumnation, the results of v a l i d a t i o n  tes ts  could be a more complex 
re1  iab i l  i t y  model due t o  e i ther  a growth i n  the s t a t e  s p a c e  o r  a non-Markovi an 
model.  Research e f f o r t s  must, t h e r e f o r e ,  be  focused on how to   dea l  w i t h  these 
two p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  A poss ib le   ana ly t ica l   approach   to  the s t a t e  growth  problem 
is  t o  l o o k  i n t o  the method o f  s t a t e  a g g r e g a t i o n  ( r e f .  8),  o r  the technique  of  
near-complete  decomposition  (ref.  9 ) .  A poss ib l e   app roach   t o  the handling  of 
nonexponent ia l  d i s t r ibu t ions  is t o  use the Coxian  methods  of  stages  (ref.  10). 
The three techniques suggested here a r e  used rout inely i n  queueing  theore t ic  
models f o r  computer system performance analysis (refs.  11,12,13,14).  
2.2.2 D e t a i l s  of the Proposed  Flethodology 
As discussed i n  the previous  sec t ion ,  the u l t r a - h i g h  r e l i a b i l i t y  r e q u i r e -  
ments of  fau l  t - to1  e ran t  computers  for  d ig i ta l  f l  i g h t  control  appl i c a t i o n s  pre- 
c lude  the use o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  l i f e t e s t s  f o r  the purposes   of   val idat ion.  A v a l i -  
dation methodology for such systems must be based on a judicious combinat ion of  
log ica l   p roofs ,   ana ly t ica l   model ing ,  and experimental  testing. 
Analytical  models  enable us t o  a b s t r a c t  the s t a t e s  and s t a t e  t r a n s i t i o n s  
of a complex  system  into a r e l a t i v e l y  small  manageable  graph  structure. Such 
graph  models  can be used t o  p r e d i c t  the a spec t s  of the behavior of the system 
under  study. A logical  proof may be  used t o  show t h a t  the ana ly t i ca l  model i s  
indeed a proper   abstract ion  of  the real  system.  Both the logical  proof and the 
t r a c t a b l e  a n a l y t i c a l  model are  based on cer ta in   a tomic  assumptions  regarding 
system  behavior. These assumptions must be tested by exerc is ing  a simul a t i o n /  
emu1 a t ion  of  the  sys tem (or  a physical  prototype, i f  avai 1 ab1 e ) .  
T h u s ,  logical   proofs ,   analyt ical   models ,  and exper imenta l   t es t ing   a re  
three c a t e g o r i e s  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  a r e  i n t e g r a l  p a r t s  o f  a v a l i d a t i o n  method- 
ol ogy (see Figure 2.5) .  These three categories  apply not  only in  the Val ida-  
t i o n  o f  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  b u t  a l s o  i n  the va l ida t ion  o f  o the r  sys t em a t t r ibu te s ,  
such  as i t s  performance,   safety,  etc.  However, most  of  our  discussion here i s  
r e s t r i c t e d  t o  the v a l i d a t i o n  of  sys tem re l iab i l i ty .  
The logical  proof  procedures  have been co l lec ted  toge ther  under  Task 1-2 
i n  the l i s t  o f  v a l i d a t i o n  t a s k s  g i v e n  i n  t a b l e  3 . 1  o f  th i s  r epor t .  As d i s -  
cussed i n  the previous  sec t ion ,  i t  needs t o  be shown t h a t  the chosen analyt ical  
r e l i a b i l i t y  model i s  a p rope r  abs t r ac t ion  of the system under  considerat ion.  
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  g i v e  a logical proof of this f a c t  a s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  i n  refer-  
ence 5. This i s  descr ibed  herein a s  Task 1-2. Besides th i s  proof ,  i t  i s  a l s o  
proposed that  a proof of correctness of system design (hardware/software) , a s  
we1 1 as the proof t h a t  the system scheduler  per forms accord ing  to  i t s  des ign ,  
be presented . 
13 
Wi th in  the  ac t i v i t y  l abe led  ana . l y t i ca1  mode ls ,  t he  deve lopmen t ,  re f i ne -  
ment,  and s o l u t i o n  o f  r e l i a b i l i t y  models i s  i n c l u d e d  and i d e n t i f i e d  as  Task 1-1 
i n  S e c t i o n  3.0. C u r r e n t l y ,  Markov  models  are i n  use, b u t  a l t e r n a t i v e  model 
t ypes ,  such  as  Pe t r i  ne ts  shou ld  be  i nves t i ga ted .  
The t h i r d  m a j o r  c a t e g o r y  o f  a c t i v i t y  r e f e r s  t o  e x p e r i m e n t a l  t e s t i n g  on t h e  
simulat ion/emulation/physical v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  s y s t e m  t o  be v a l i -  
dated.  Thi s category  i s   f u r t h e r   d i v i d e d   i n t o   f o u r   s u b c a t e g o r i e s .  The f i r s t  
c a t e g o r y  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  f a u l t - o c c u r r e n c e  b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  sub- 
systems  comprising  the  system  under  test.  Examples  of  such  subsystems  are  the 
i nd i v idua l   p rocesso rs ,  memories,  devices,  etc. I f  adequate l i f e t e s t s  can  be 
c o n d u c t e d ,  t h e n  t h e  f a i l u r e  r a t e  and t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  t i m e s  t o  f a i l u r e  
o f  a subsystem may be i n f e r r e d   u s i n g   s t a t i s t i c a l   t e c h n i q u e s .   E q u i v a l e n t l y ,  
re1  iab le  s tandards  such as MIL-STD-217B may be  used. No t a s k  has  been de f i ned  
a l o n g  t h e s e  l i n e s  i n  S e c t i o n  3.0. 
The nex t  subca tegory  under  exper imen ta l  t es t i ng  re fe rs  to  the  Val i d a t i o n  
o f  t h e  f a u l t - h a n d l i n g  b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  s y s t e m .  T h i s  has  been  adequately  covered 
by  Tasks  11-7 t o  11-13 i n  S e c t i o n  3.0 o f  t h i s  r e p o r t .  S i n c e  such  Val i d a t i o n  
e x p e r i m e n t s  r e q u i r e  s t a t i s t i c a l  methods i n  d e s i g n i n g  s u c h  e x p e r i m e n t s  ( t h a t  i s ,  
p reprocess ing)  and i n  a n a l y z i n g  d a t a  c o l l e c t e d  f r o m  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  ( t h a t  i s ,  
pos tprocess ing) ,  a separa te  Task  1-3  has  been d e f i n e d  t o  s u p p o r t  such s t a t i  s t i -  
c a l   a c t i v i t i e s .  Task  1-3 p rov ides  a b r i d g e   b e t w e e n   t h e   a n a l y t i c a l   r e l i a b i l i t y  
model  (Task  1-2)  and  experimental  test ing  (Task Group 11).  
The t h i r d  s u b c a t e g o r y  u n d e r  e x p e r i m e n t a l  t e s t i n g  r e f e r s  t o  Val i d a t i o n  o f  
t h e  f a u l t - f r e e  b e h a v i o r  o f  the  system  (Tasks 11-1 t o  11-6). These t e s t s ,  t o -  
g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  p r o o f  o f  d e s i g n  c o r r e c t n e s s  ( T a s k  I - Z ) ,  increase our  conf idence 
t h a t  t h e  s y s t e m  does n o t  s u f f e r  f r o m  any design/documentation/implementation/ 
r e a l  i z a t  i on fl aws . 
Since we a r e   c o n s i d e r i n g   u l   t r a - h i g h   r e 1   i a b i l  i t y  systems regarding which 
almost no p r a c t i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e  e x i s t s ,  we should expect many l l surpr i  ses .I' Ex- 
p l o r a t o r y  t e s t i n g  ( T a s k  Group  111) i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  p r o p o s e d  t o  u n c o v e r  f u t u r e  
s u r p r i  ses. 
The se t  o f  s teps  needed i n   t h e  Val i d a t i o n  o f  s y s t e m  r e 1  i a b i l  i t y  are pre- 
sented i n  f l o w c h a r t  f o r m  i n  F i g u r e  2.6. 
As p o i n t e d  o u t  e a r l i e r ,  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  i s  d r i v e n  by t h e  r e l i -  
a b i l i t y  model. The r e 1  i a b i l  i t y  model s t r u c t u r e  i s  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  s y s t e m  
d e s c r i p t i o n ,   w h i c h   i t s e l f   i s   t h e   o u t p u t   o f   t h e   s y s t e m   d e s i g n   p r o c e s s .   F a u l t  
occurrence behavior  o f  the subsystems i s  t h e  second s e t  o f  i n p u t s  needed f o r  
t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  model. A c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  t h i s  f a u l t  o c c u r -  
rence behavior  may be i n f e r r e d  f r o m  l i f e t e s t s  c o n d u c t e d  on the subsystems. 
A l te rna t ive ly ,  s tandards ,  such as  MIL-STD-2176 or  past  exper ience,  may be  used 
t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  f a u l t  o c c u r r e n c e  b e h a v i o r .  A t h i r d  s e t  o f  i n p u t s  needed t o  
e x e r c i s e  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  model i s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  f a u l t  h a n d l i n g  
b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  s y s t e m .  T h i s  i n v o l v e s  c o n d u c t i n g  f a u l t - i n j e c t i o n  t y p e  e x p e r i -  
ments and a n a l y s i s   o f   r e s u l t i n g   d a t a   u s i n g   s t a t i s t i c a l   t e c h n i q u e s .  The charac- 
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ter izat ion of the fault-handling behavior encompasses estimation of coverage 
and mean times associated w i t h  various phases of the fault-handling process 
(e.g., detection, isolation, reconfiguration, etc..).  
Since the re1 i abil i t y  model i s  an abstraction of the dynamic behavior of 
the system, i t  i s  extremely desirable to present a proof t h a t  the model i s  a 
proper abstraction of the system behavior. 
The postulated fault model  may not have covered all possible fault types. 
Exploratory testing i s  needed to  uncover any surprises and t o  observe system 
response to inputs outside the design envelope. 
Once the three sets of inputs are available for the r e l i ab i l i t y  model, i t  
can be eval  uated  numerically  using  avai 1 ab1 e re1 iabil  i ty  analysis packages , 
such as CARE 111, when i t  becomes available. The resulting reliability predic- 
t ion needs t o  be checked against the design requirements. If the predicted 
r e l i a b i l i t y  i s  found working, a system redesign needs to  be undertaken. 
2.3 Future Work 
From the discussion in Section 2.2,  three topics on which future work i s  
needed are clearly evident. 
( A )  Investigation of r e l i ab i l i t y  models other t h a n  the  classical 
Markovian model s. 
(B )  Solution of r e l i ab i l i t y  models w i t h  a large s ta te  space. 
( C )  Dealing  with  nonexponential dis t r ibut ion of times to  fa i lure  and 
similarly nonexponential distributions in the phases of faul t -  
handling process (e.g., detection time, location time, etc.). 
I n  addition, the following topics need further research. 
( D )  Most Markovian model s assume t h a t  successive events are independent. 
Methods  of tes t ing  th i s  assumption and methods  of modifying the reli-  
abi 1 i t y  model , in  case of dependence, are needed. 
( E )  Quantitative methods  of software reliability estimation and predic- 
t ion are needed. 
(F)  A Val idation methodology t h a t  no t  only addresses the question of 
r e l i a b i l i t y  Val idation, b u t  also encompasses the validation of 
safety,  performance, and economics of the system i s  needed (refs .  
15,16). 
Further discussion of these topics is  presented i n  Section 4.0 of t h i s  
re port .  
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3.0 PRELIMINARY TASKS  FOR SIFT/FTMP RELIABILITY VALIDATION 
A pr imary object ive of  Working Group I 1  was t o  i d e n t i f y  s p e c i f i c  t a s k s  
which should be conducted i n  s u p p o r t  o f  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  c o m p u t e r  Val i d a t i o n  
research. I n  o r d e r  t o  p r o v i d e  a f o c u s  f o r  t h e s e  e f f o r t s ,  S I F T  and FTMP were 
used  as  example f a u l t - t o l e r a n t   c o m p u t e r s   ( r e f s .  17,18). T h i s   s e c t i o n   d e s c r i b e s  
t h e  s e t  o f  s p e c i f i c  t a s k s  w h i c h  were i d e n t i f i e d  by work ing  g roup  pa r t i c i pan ts .  
No c l a i m s  a r e  made as t o  t h e  s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e s e  t a s k s .  However, t h e  need f o r  
t hese  tasks  was a f f i rmed  by  one  o r  more p a r t i c i - p a n t s  -o f  Working Group 11. 
The proposed  tasks  have been c l a s s i f i e d   i n t o   f o u r   m a j o r   c a t e g o r i e s .  These 
a r e  : 
1. C o n f i r m a t i o n   o f  System R e l i a b i l i t y  
2. F a u l t   P r o c e s s i n g   V e r i f i c a t i o n  
3. F a u l t   P r o c e s s i n g   C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
4. Other  Tasks 
The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h i s  r e p o r t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  
proposed tasks i n  t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s  and b r i e f l y  d e s c r i b e  t h e  t a s k s  p r o p o s e d .  
These t a s k s  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  t e c h n i q u e s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2.0, 
F i g u r e  2.5. 
3.1 Con f i   rma t i  on o f  System Re1 i a b i  1 i t y  
The u l   t r a - h i g h   r e 1   i a b i l  i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t s   o f   f a u l   t - t o 1   e r a n t   c o m p u t e r s   f o r  
d i g i t a l   f l i g h t   c o n t r o l   a p p l i c a t i o n s   p r e c l u d e   t h e  use o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  l i f e t e s t s  
f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  v a l i d a t i o n .  The method o f  Val  i d a t i o n  must  be  based on a 
c r i t i c a l  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  m o d e l s  f o r  r e 1  i a b i l  i t y  p r e d i c t i o n .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  an 
at tempt  should be made t o  examine a l l  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  made i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  
and t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  model , exper iments  must  be  des igned to  tes t  the  va l id -  
i t y  o f  the  assumpt ions  wherever  poss ib le  (o r  a p r o o f  must  be  given, i f  poss i -  
b l e )  , and f i n a l l y ,  p r e p a r a t i o n s  must  be made t o  change t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  model i f  
2 )  F a u l t  
3 )   F a u l t  
V e r i  f i c a t  
t he -  i n i t i a l  assumpt ions  a re  nega ted  by  exper imen ta l  resu l t s .  
Three  major   aspects   o f  a r e l i a b i l i t y  model a r e  i d e n t i f i e d  and t r e a t e d  
separa te ly :  
1) Re1 i a b i l  i t y  Model S t r u c t u r e  
Model ( t y p e s   o f   f a i l u r e ,   a s s o c i a t e d   f a i l u r e   r a t e s  and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s )  
Hand l ing  Behav io r  (coverage,  de tec t ion  loca t ion ,  
r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  t i m e s ,  e t c . )  
i o n  t h a t  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  model s t r u c t u r e  i s  a p roper  abs t rac t  i o n  
o f  t h e  a c t u a l  s y s t e m  may be performed- using a c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  l o g i c a l  p r o o f  and 
exper iment  proof.  The f a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n   s u b g r o u p   c o n c e n t r a t e s  on 
e x p e r i m e n t s  t o  v e r i f y  and parameter ize the assumpt ions i n  t h e  f a u l t  h a n d l i n g  
b e h a v i o r   f o r  a f i x e d   ( g i v e n )   f a u l t  model. The f a u l t   c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n   g r o u p  
a t t e m p t s  t o  i d e n t i f y  new f a u l t  c l a s s e s  and, hence,  extend the fau l t  model .  
. .  
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Thus, a1 1 the '  th ree  c lasses  o f  tasks  ( represented  by  th ree  groups)  a re  s t rong ly  
re la ted .  F igu re  3.1  sumnar izes  the  proposed  ver i f icat ion  process.  
As shown i n  F i g u r e  3.1, t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  p r e d i c t i o n  i s  based on a r e l i a -  
b i l  i t y  model (e.g., a Markov  model). The f o r m u l a t i o n  and s o l u t i o n  o f  t h i s  
model i s  c l e a r l y  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p ,  i d e n t i f i e d  as  Task 1-1 i n  Table 3.1. A r e l i a -  
b i l i t y  t h e o r i s t  f o r  model f o r m u l a t i o n  and a n u m e r i c a l  a n a l y s t  f o r  model so lu -  
t i o n  s h o u l d  be a v a i l a b l e .  
S ince model p r e d i c t i o n s  a r e  based on assumptions  regarding  system  behav- 
i o r ,  t h e s e  a s s u m p t i o n s  m u s t  b e  c r i t i c a l l y  examined f o r  v a l i d a t i o n .  
The s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  model wil be  confirmed  by a p roo f  wh ich  
wil show t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  system i s  a p r o p e r  r e f i n e m e n t  o f  t h e  r e 1  i . a b i l  i ty  
model (Task  1-2). The comp lex i t y   o f   t he   sys tem  under   cons ide ra t i on  wil d i c -  
t a t e  t h a t  t h e  above p r o o f  be s t r u c t u r e d  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a h i e r a r c h y  of proofs. 
The assumpt ions  regard ing  the  fau l t -handl ing  behavior  wil be va l i da ted   by  
conduct ing exper iments on e i ther  the actual  system or  on an e m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  
system. S t a t i s t i c a l   d e s i g n   o f   t h e   e x p e r i m e n t s  and a n a l y s i s   o f   t h e   r e s u l t i n g  
exper imenta l   da ta  wil be  performed i n  Task 1-3. The r e s u l t i n g   d a t a  may r e -  
q u i r e  a change i n  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  model and subsequent ly a new p r e d i c t i o n  o f  
system  re1 i abi  1 i ty. 
The tasks  summarized i n  Tab1 e 3.1 have been recommended by  Working  Group 
I I a t t e n d e e s   f o r  Val i d a t i n g   u l   t r a - r e 1   i a b l e   f a u l   t - t o l e r a n t   c o m p u t e r s ,   s u c h   a s  
SIFT and FTMP. These p a r t i c u l a r   t a s k s   a d d r e s s   c o n f i r m a t i o n   o f   s y s t e m   r e l i a b i l -  
i t y  t h r o u g h :   1 )   r e l i a b i l i t y   m o d e l i n g   s t r u c t u r e s ,  2 )  f a u l t   m o d e l i n g ,  and 
3 )   f au l t   hand l i ng   behav io r   ana lys i s .  
3.2 kit P r o c e s s i n g   V e r i f i c a t i o n  
Th is  sec t i on  desc r ibes  the  exper imen ts  des igned  fo r  f au l t  p rocess ing  ve r i -  
f i c a t i o n   ( t a b l e   3 . 2 ) .  The e x p e r i m e n t s   i d e n t i f i e d   a r e  based  on t h e   f o l l o w i n g  
s y s t e m  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s :  
app l   i ca t i on   so f tware  
execu t i ve  so f tware  
I 
I 
mu1 ti processo r   f unc t i ona l  i t y  a p p l   i c a t i o n   s o f t w a r e  
on  un i   processor  
execut ive   so f tware  
on  un i   processor  
I 
machine operat ion ( ISP)*  
i 
ha rdware   ( l og i c ,  power  supply,  etc.) 
* I n s t r u c t i o n  S e t  P r o c e s s o r  
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The correctness of each of the sections mentioned above (e.g., application 
software,  executive, . . .) can  be investigated by tes t ing and formal proce- 
dures. An ideal  combination of tes t ing and formal procedure i s  t o  prove the 
design and test the implementation. A t  the  present  time, proof of correctness 
of a design i s  i n  i t s  infancy; testing for design and implementation verifica- 
t ion and also specification measures i s  suggested. 
There are  thir teen experiments which  have  been identified to test  the sys- 
tem.  These thirteen experiments fa l l   in to  two classes: 
1. Functional  Testing: The idea behind t h i s  s e t  of t e s t s  i s  t o  exer- 
cise each integral pa r t  of the system (e.g., single processor, single 
processor  executive  routine,  etc.). This will  provide a certain 
degree of confidence that the system is  performing i t s  basic func- 
tional  operations  correctly. This set  of tes ts  is  s t ructured t o  
reveal design errors (e.g. , wrong specif icat ion) ,  physical fau l t s  
(e.g., short pins) ,  e tc .  
2. Fault  Processing  Tests:  This  set of t e s t s  i s  designed t o  exercise  the 
f au l t  hand1 ing capabili ty of the system within i t s  design objectives. 
There are two sources t h a t  can expose the system (or different parts 
o f  the system) to  error :  
a. hardware f au l t s  - I t  i s  proposed t h a t  fau l t s  be injected a t  the 
- single stuck pins 
- stuck  logic 
- whole chip 
- common  mode 
- power supply 
- clock 
fol l  owi ng hardware 1 evel s: 




- design error 
b. software  design  errors - These types of errors include: 
s t r e s s  
time 
i nconsi s tent  d a t a  
wrong d a t a  . 
The f i r s t  
t i  onal i t y   t e s t  
fication area. 
six  experiments  explained  in this  sect ion belong t o  the 
ing and the next experiments belong to  the  fau l t  process 
func- 
i ng veri- 
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3.3 Fault Processi ng Characterization 
Exploratory testing i s  required in order t o  establ ish the bounds within 
which the system can possibly  operate. I t  i s  not  expected that the system will 
t o l e ra t e  a l l  of the test  conditions of this  c lass .  On the contrary, the system 
will be frequently  driven  into anomalous conditions. I t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
the tasks enumerated i n  this section (table 3 . 3 )  t h a t  provis ion must be  made fo r  
the machine or system under t e s t   t o  be re in l t ia l ized  a f te r  a nonsurvivable event, 
and for  a data f i l e   t o  be off-loaded from i ts  memory i n t o  a faci l i ty  data  bank. 
The da ta  f i les  would contain sequences of  syndromes perceived by the system 
during the course of t h i s  t e s t ing ,  and the concomitant configuration changes. 
Their value would  be to exhibit the consequences of the test conditions as seen 
a t  the various abstract levels at which  syndrome d a t a  i s  available. 
Another character is t ic  of these tasks is  the abil  i ty to modulate the in- 
tensi ty  o r  severity of t he  t e s t s  in some respect. This is  desirable in order 
t o  permit some quantification of the vulnerability of the unit under t e s t .  
Metaphorically, this would yield a logical shmoo plot for the probable operating 
region. 
The t e s t  r e su l t s  must be carefully scrutinized i n  order t o  detect lapses 
in the design, either because the design may  be too  f rag i le ,  o r  because the 
design intent i s  not  met. The la t te r  s i tua t ion  corresponds to  what has  been 
referred t o  as a "surprise." I t  i s  e a s i e r  t o  find surprises when the system 
does not  otherwise f a i l .  Here instead,  the system consis tent ly  fa i ls ,  and sur- 
prises must  be searched for  by winnowing  postmortem d a t a .  Excessive f r ag i l i t y ,  
meanwhile, may feed back to the design of future systems. 
I t  may be noted t h a t  most of the tasks of this  c lass  c losely resemble 
other  tasks in which the system recovery  hypothesis i s  being substantiated. I t  
i s  believed, however, t h a t  the diversity in object.ives between such other tasks 
and these  tasks  sufficiently  warrants  the  separate  categories. The probing 
nature of tasks in this category allows degrees of freedom not  useful in the 
other, and which might therefore be overlooked i f  the two categories were t o  be 
combined fo r  convenience. I t  i s  also true t h a t  these tes ts  need not  be as ex- 
haustive o r  as accurate as the others,  for a rough characterization of the 
shmoo i s  q u i t e  adequate. 
3.4  Other Tasks 
During the course of Working Group I I ,  several tasks were proposed which 
do not c l ea r ly  f i t  i n to  e i the r  of the first  three categories.  In some cases, 
these tasks spanned more t h a n  one of the previously defined categories. In 
other cases, the recommended tasks deal w i t h  indirectly related,  b u t  highly 
relevant, areas such a s  instrumentation. These tasks are summarized in  Table 
3.4 .  
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4.0 SUMMARY 
The p r e c e d i n g  c h a p t e r s  o f  t h i s  r e p o r t  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e ,  b r e a d t h ,  
and d i f f i c u l t y  o f  t h e  systems va l ida t ion   p rocess .   For   severa l   years ,  NASA- 
Langley  Research  Center has p rov ided  leadersh ip  and f u n d i n g  i n  an  ongoing 
e f f o r t  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e  t e c h n o 1  ogy r e q u i r e d  t o  s u p p o r t  t h i s  p r o c e s s .  The working 
g roup  mee t ings  repo r ted  he re  a re  the  mos t  recen t  s teps  i n  th i s  deve lopmen t  
e f f o r t .  The c h a l l e n g e  o f  v a l i d a t i n g  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  u l  t r a - r e 1  i a b l e  sys- 
tems can best be met i f  t h o s e  w i t h  r e l e v a n t  e x p e r i e n c e  and u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  
v a l i d a t i o n  o f  p r e s e n t  systems  can  be  used  as  resources t o  address  the  ques- 
t i o n s :  
1) What i s  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  a r t  i n  systems Val  i d a t i o n ?  
2) What are  the  impor tant   unanswered  quest ions i n  systems 
3 )  How can w most e f f e c t i v e l y   p r o c e e d ?  
Val i d a t i o n ?  
Whi le i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  d i v e r s e  community o f  p r e s e n t  e x p e r t s  i s  a 
powerful   asset,  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  how they  can  bes t  be  d i rec ted  to  p roduce  a use- 
f u l  p r o d u c t .  The working  group  format was s e l e c t e d  as t h e  v e h i c l e  most 1 i k e l y  
t o  u t i l i z e  t h i s  a s s e t  e f f e c t i v e l y .  
The w o r k i n g  g r o u p  a c t i v i t y ,  a l o n g  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  f o l l o w - u p  e f f o r t ,  has 
p r o d u c e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  s y s t e m s  V a l  i d a t i o n  
technology. The most i m p o r t a n t   o f   t h e s e   c o n t r i b u t i o n s   a r e   r e p o r t e d   i n   t h i s  
document. They are:  
1. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,   c r i t i c i s m ,   r e v i e w ,  and r e f i n e m e n t   o f  a v a l i d a t i o n  
framework and r e l i a b i l i t y  v a l i d a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  ( S e c t i o n  2.0). 
2. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n   o f   t a s k s  and f a c i l i t i e s   r e q u i r e d   t o   v a l i d a t e   t h e  
u l t r a - r e 1  i a b l e  specimen, f a u l  t - t o l e r a n t  c o m p u t e r s ,  S I F T  and FTMP 
( S e c t i o n  3.0 and Appendix  11). A s i g n i f i c a n t  number o f   t h e s e   t a s k s  
were reviewed by the working group at tendees (Appendix 111).  
The taxonomy o f  t h e  Val i d a t i o n  p r o c e s s  w i t h  i t s  t h r e e  p r i m a r y  c l a s s e s  o f  
a c t i v i t y ,  p r o o f  methods;  analyt ic  methods; and exper imenta l   methods  (F igure 
2.5) , a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  v i e w  o f  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  Va l  i d a t i o n  p r o c e s s  
( F i g u r e  2.6) a r e   i m p o r t a n t   c o n t r i b u t i o n s .  These models  are a b a s i s  f o r  b o t h  
present  understanding and . f u t u r e   p l a n n i n g   e f f o r t s .  It i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  a 
d i v e r s e  g r o u p  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  has had t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  see and r e a c t  t o  t h i s  
model ,   thus  prov id ing an impor tan t   fo rm  o f   peer   rev iew.   Th is   rev iew  p rocess  i s  
one o f  many r e q u i r e d  t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e s e  m o d e l s .  I n  a d d i -  
t i o n ,  a candidate  set  o f  s p e c i f i c  e x p e r i m e n t s  ( 2 3  i n  number) have  been  reviewed 
and evaluated; and w h i l e  no fo rma l  vo te  o f  con f i dence  was t a k e n ,  t h e  c r e d i b i l -  
i t y  and impor tance of  these exper iments i s  e l e v a t e d  b y  t h e i r  e x p o s u r e  t o  r e v i e w  
and informal  assessment. The cand ida te   exper imen ts   s t imu la ted   add i t i ona l   t asks  
i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e   p a r t i c i p a n t s .  The t o t a l   c o l l e c t i o n   o f   t a s k s   p r o v i d e s  a sub- 
s t a n t i a l  and r e a s o n a b l e   b a s i s   f o r   f u t u r e   p l a n n i n g .  They a r e   t h e   p r i m a r y   b a s i s  
f o r  t h e  recommendations made i n  t h e  n e x t  s u b s e c t i o n .  
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The development of a validation technology i s  an ongoing, never ending, 
ac t iv i ty  and concepts requiring future devei opment surfaced in abundance d u r i n g  
the working group. I t  became apparent that  even the most  mundane and well- 
understood validation tasks often depend upon assumptions and estimations that 
need further research effort. Special attention was given by  many people t o  
the identification of specific research projects required t o  support future 
validation  technology development. The proposed e f fo r t s  vary a great  deal  in 
t he i r  importance and level of effor t .  Many of the  tasks  focus on fault-  
tolerant computing technology, while others address Val idation technology; 
s t i l l  o thers  a re  a mixture of the two. Any editing activity by necessity 
applies the bias of the editor. The original , unedited task recommendations 
are,  therefore,  given  in Appendix I1  so t h a t  they may be preserved beyond the 

















" V a l  i d a t i o n  Methods f o r  F a u l t - T o l e r a n t  A v i o n i c s  and Contro l  Systems ,I' 
Working  Group  Meeting No. 1, 12-14  March  1979,  Sponsored  by  NASA-Langley 
Research  Center, Hampton, VA. 
Bain, L. J., S t a t i s t i c a l  A n a l y s i s  of R e l i a b i l i t y  and L i f e - T e s t i n g  Models. 
New York, NY: Marcel  Dekker,  Inc., 1978. 
H i l l i e r ,  F. S. and G. J. Lieberman,  Operations  Research. San Francisco, 
CA: Holden-Day,  Inc. , 1974. 
Green, A. E. and A. J. Bourne, Re1 i a b i l  i t y  Technology. New York, NY: 
Wi ley- In te rsc ience,  1972. 
Wensley, J. e t  a l .  , "SIFT:  Design and Ana lys i s  of  a Fau l t -To le ran t  Compu- 
t e r  f o r  A i r c r a f t  C o n t r o l  ,I' Proceedings of  t h e  IEEE,  October 1978, PP. 
1240-1255. 
Hopkins, A L. e t  a l .  , "FTMP - A H igh ly  Re1 i a b l e  F a u l t - T o l e r a n t  M u l t i -  
p r o c e s s  f o r  A i r c r a f t  , I '  Proceedi  ngs-of -  the IEEE, October 1978, pp. 
1221-1239. 
Arnold, T. F., "The  Concept o f  Coverage  and I t s  E f f e c t  on t h e  R e l i a b i l i t y  
Model of a Repa i rab le  System," I E E E  Transac t ions  on  Computers.  Vol. C-22, 
March  1973, pp. 251-254. 
Chandy, K. M. and C. H. Sauer,  "Approximate  Methods fo r   Ana lyz ing   Queue ing  
Network  Models o f  Computer  Systems," ACM Computing  Surveys,  Vol.  10, No. 3 
(September 1978) , pp. 281-318. 
Cour to is ,  P. J., Decomposabil i ty:  Queueing and Computer  System App l ica-  
t i o n s .  New York, NY: Academic Press, 1977. 
Cox, D. R. , "The Use of Complex P r o b a b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  T h e o r y  o f  S t o c h a s t i c  
Processes,"  Proc.  Cambridge.  Philosophical  Society,  Vol. 51- (1955), pp. 
313-319. 
Chandy, K. M. and R. T. Yeh, Current  Trends i n  Programming  Methodology, 
Vol. 111: Software  Modeling.  Englewood C l i f f s ,  New Jersey:   Prent ice-  
Hal 1 , 1978. 
K1 e in rock ,  L. , 
vol  umes (1975, 
Kobayashi , H., 
1978. 
New York, NY: Wil ey- In te rsc ience,  2 
Modeling and Analysis.  Reading, MA: Addisson-Wesley, 
T r i v e d i ,  K. S. , "Ana ly t i c  Mode l ing  of Computer  Systems," I E E E  Computer, 
October 1978. 
22 
15. Tr ived i ,  K. S., "Designing  Linear   Storage  Hierarchies  So As To Maximize 
R e l i a b i l i t y  S u b j e c t  t o  Cost and Performance Constraints," Proceedings 1980 
In t e rna t iona l  Symposium on Computer Architecture, La Baule,  France. 
16.  Meyer, J.,  "Computation-Based Re l i ab i l i t y   Ana lys i s ,  IEEE Transac t ions  on 
Computers,  Vol. C-25, No. 6 ,  June 1976, pp. 578-584. 
17. Hopkins , A. L.,  e t  a l . ,  "FTMP - A Highly Re1 i a b l e  Faul t -Toleran t  Mu1 t i  - 
processor  for  Ai rcraf t , "  Proceedings  of  the IEEE, pp. 1221-1239,  October 
1978. 
18. Wensley, J . ,  et a l .  , "SIFT:  Design and Analysis  of  a Fault-Tolerant 
Computer fo r  A i rc ra f t  Con t ro l  , I '  Proceedings of the IEEE, pp.  1240-1255, 
October 1978. 
23 
APPENDIX I - DEFINITIONS AND REFERENCE CODE 
REFERENCE CODE 
Note: The f o l l o w i n g  i s  a p r e l i m i n a r y ,  n o n e x h a u s t i v e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  t e r m s  w h i c h  
r e l a t e  t o  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  computer   va l ida t ion .   Bo th   hardware-or ien ted  and 
s o f t w a r e - o r i e n t e d  d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  i n c l u d e d  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e .  





Correctness  Proof  
Error (Hardware Genesis)  
I E E E  S t a n d a r d  D i c t i o n a r y  o f  E l e c t r i c a l  
and E l e c t r o n i c  Terms. 
I n t e r i m  IEEE Technical  Committee on 
Fau l  t -To le ran t  Comput ing  D ic t ionary  
o f  Terms. 
"Sof tware  Engineer ing  Terminology"  - 
D r a f t ,  23 March  1978  by R. Poston  and 
H. Hecht - Terminology  Task  Group Sub- 
committee on Sof tware Engineer ing 
Standards - Technical  Committee on 
Sof tware  Engineer ing,  I E E E  Computer 
Soc ie ty .  
"Data and Analys is  Center  for  Sof tware 
(DACS) Glossary - A B i b 1  i o g r a p h y  o f  
Sof tware  Eng ineer ing  Terms,"  Compiled 
by Ms. S h i r l e y  G l o s s - S o l e r ,  Rome Air 
Deve lopmen t  Cen te r / IS IS I ,  Gr i f f i ss  AFB, 
N.Y.  
S t r u c t u r e d  Proqramminq  Series,  Vol. 15, 
Val i d a t i o n   a n d - V e r i f i c a t i o n  S t u d y ,  
R. L.  Smith, May 1375, RADCTR-74-300. 
DEFINITIONS 
Technique o f  p r o v i n g  m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  t h a t  
a given program i s  c o r r e c t  w i t h  a g iven 
s e t  o f  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  The process  can 
be accomplished  by  manual  methods o r  by 
program v e r i f i e r s  r e q u i r i n g  manual i n t e r -  
a c t i o n .  (SPS) 
Any discrepancy between a computed, 
observed,  or  measured quant i ty  and t h e  
t i m e  s p e c i f i e d ,  o r  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  c o r r e c t  
va lue  or   condi t ion.   ( IEEE  Std.   100-1972)  
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Error (Software Genesis) 
Fai 1 ure 
Fault  (Hardware Genesis) 
Fault   (Software Genesis) 
Faul t To1 erance 
In t e rmi t t en t  Fau l t  
Stuck  Faul t /Stuck  Fai lure  
An e r r o r  i s  an a c t i o n  which results i n  
sof tware   conta in ing  a f a u l t .  The a c t   o f  
making  an e r r o r  includes omiss ion  or  mis- 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of user requirements i n  
the sof tware  subsys tem spec i f ica t ion .  
I n c o r r e c t  t r a n s l a t i o n  o r  o m i s s i o n  o f  a 
requirement on the des ign  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
and  programming e r r o r s .  (SET) 
The te rmina t ion  of  the a b i l i t y  o f  an item . 
t o  perform i t s  required func t ion .  (IEEE 
S t d .  100-1972) 
A phys ica l  condi t ion  tha t  causes  a device, 
component, o r  e l emen t  t o  f a i l  t o  pe r fo rm 
i n  a required manner; f o r  example, a 
s h o r t - c i r c u i t  o r  a broken wire. (IEEE 
S t d .  100-1972) 
A f a u l t  i s  a manifestat ion of  an e r r o r  i n  
program  code. The f a u l t  i s  ev ident  when 
e n t r y  of  some i n p u t  d a t a  r e s u l t s  i n  the 
program f a i l i n g  t o  perform the requi red  
func t ion .  Note: f a u l t  and bug a r e  the 
same t h i n g .  (SET) 
The capaci ty  of  a computer,  subsystem,  or 
program to  wi ths t and  the e f f e c t s  o f  inter-  
n a l  f a u l t s ;  the number of errors  produc-  
i n g  f a u l t s  a computer,  subsystem,  or  pro- 
gram can  endure  before normal func t iona l  
c a p a b i l i t y  i s  impaired. (IEEE/FTC) 
A t empora ry   f au l t .  (IEEE S t d .  100-1972) 
A f a i l u r e  i n  which  a d i g i t a l  s i g n a l  i s  
permanently  held  in  one  of i t s  b i n a r y  
s t a t e s .  (IEEE S t d .  100-1972) 
25 
V a l i d a t i o n  
V e r i f i c a t i o n  
The process o f  de te rm in ing  whe the r  execu t -  
ing  the  system  ( i .e. ,   sof tware,   hardware, 
user  procedures,  personnel i n  a user  
env i ronment )  causes  any  opera t iona l  d i f -  
f i c u l t i e s .  The process  inc ludes  ensur ing 
t h a t  s p e c i f i c  p r o g r a m  f u n c t i o n s  meet t h e i r  
requ i rements   and  spec i f i ca t ions .   Va l ida-  
t i o n  a l s o  i n c l u d e s  t h e  p r e v e n t i o n ,  d e t e c -  
t i on ,  d iagnos is  recove ry  and c o r r e c t i o n  
o f  e r r o r s .   E d i t o r i a l  Comment: V a l i d a t i o n  
i s  more d i f f i c u l t  t h a n  t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
process since i t  invo lves  ques t ions  o f  
the completeness o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
and  environment  informat ion.   There  are 
both manual- and computer-based valida- 
t i o n   t e c h n i q u e s .  (SET) 
Computer  program v e r i f i c a t i o n  i s  t h e  
i t e r a t i v e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  
o r  n o t  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  each step o f  t h e  
computer  p rogram acqu is i t ion  process  fu l -  
f i l l s   a l l  requi rements lev ied by the pre-  
v ious  s tep.  These steps  are  system 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
and  code v e r i f i c a t i o n  (SET) 
NOTE TO READER: There i s  a l a c k  o f  c o n s i s t e n c y  i n  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  t e r m s  
" f a i l u r e , "  " f a u l t  , ' I  and " e r r o r . "  Cons ider  the  fo l low ing :  
(1) t h a t  a f a i l u r e  i s  an event, 
( 2 )  t h a t  a f a u l t  i s  a c o n d i t i o n   ( o r   s t a t e ) ,  and 
(3 )  t h a t  an e r r o r  i s  a  datum. 
Then the  fo l l ow ing  s ta temen ts  app ly  to  bo th  ha rdware  and sof tware:  
A f a i l u r e  i s  t h e  e v e n t  when something  causes a dev ice,  component,  system, 
a l g o r i t h m ,  e t c .  t o  change i t s  s t a t e  f r o m  one i n  which it performs i t s  i n -  
t e n d e d   f u n c t i o n   t o  one i n  which i t  does  not. The something  which  causes 
t h e  change may o r  may no t  be known. A f t e r  t h e  f a i l u r e ,  t h e  d e v i c e ,  compo- 
nent,   etc.  i s  c a l l e d  a f a i l e d  o r  f a u l t y  d e v i c e ,  component, etc.  Any h igh-  
e r  l e v e l  system o f  dev ices ,  e tc . ,  wh ich  cannot  per fo rm i ts  func t ion  be-  
cause a subdevice,   etc.  i s  f a i l e d ,  i s  a l s o  c a l l e d  f a i l e d  o r  f a u l t y .  
A f a u l t  i s  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n d i t i o n  o r  f l a w  i n  a f a i l e d  d e v i c e ,  e t c .  
w h i c h  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  i t  from i t s  u n f a i l e d  s t a t e .  
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When the function or output of a device,  etc.  differs from i t s  intended 
function or output,  that  difference is called the error.  In data  process- 
ing systems, error means  bad or wrong d a t a .  An e r ro r  i s  a l l  t ha t  can be 
detected internally to a computing system. A higher  level system, which 
contains a failed device, etc. emitting errors yet continues to perform 
i t s  function, i s  sa id  t o  be faul t  tolerant .  An accumulation of errors may 
well be the cause of a fa i lure  of a higher level system. 
Thus ,  a physical  device f a i l s  when i t  ''breaks down." Thereafter i t  contains a 
faul t .  A system designer or software programer can create a design o r  sof t -  
ware containing a faul t .  In t h i s  sense the designer or programmer, not the 
design o r  software, failed. A fau l t  may or  may not  be active; when i t  i s ,  one 
or  more errors result .  A fau l t  i s  latent,  transient,  intermittent or permanent 
dependent upon the manner i n  which i t  generates errors. A software bug may not 
surface until some time a f t e r  a system has been in operation; i .e., i t  may be 
latent.  A bug may cause a d a t a  error  only occasionally in response to  spe- 
cific,  infrequent i n p u t  d a t a  patterns and,  thus, may appear intermittent. Cus- 
tomari l y ,  a software bug i s  regarded as a permanent f a u l t ,  remaini ng in the 
system even af ter  the moment of i t s  c rea t ion  by a programmer.  However, i t  i s  
possible f o r  a b u g ,  having  given r i s e  to  a d a t a  error ,  t o  disappear from an 
operational system, i n  which case i t  appears as a transient.  The resulting bad 
d a t a  may o r  may not  be attenuated i n  further processing. 
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APPENDIX I 1  - WORKING GROUP I 1  TASK DESCRIPTIONS 
CONFIRMATION OF SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
Tasks 1-1 th rough 1-3 
Proposed  by 
Prel iminary Working Group I 1  P a r t i c i p a n t s  
J.  Go1 dberg (Chai rman) 
W. C a r t e r  
K. T r i v e d i  
R .  A1 b e r t s  
Tasks  1-4  through 1-11 
Proposed  by 
Working  Group I 1  P a r t i c i p a n t s  As I n d i c a t e d  
TASK 1-1 
T i t l e :   R e l i a b i l i t y   A n a l y s i s  
Ob jec t ives :  
1. Develop and ref ine  mathemat ica l   models  o f  system r e l i a b i l i t y .  
2. E s t i m a t e   r e l i a b i l i t y   c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s   u s i n g  assumed  and 
e x p e r i m e n t a l l y - d e r i v e d  f a i l u r e  s t a t i s t i c s .  
Procedure: 
acqui red  or   developed.  The model should  comprehend a l l  i n t e n d e d   f a u l t -  
hand1 i n g  b e h a v i o r  a t  an a p p r o p r i a t e  l e v e l  o f  a b s t r a c t i o n ,  and i t  should  be 
t r a c t a b l e   f o r   n u m e r i c a l   e v a l u a t i o n .  The f a u l t s  assumed should  be  modeled  by 
t y p e  (e.g., permanent, t r a n s i e n t ,   i n t e r m i t t e n t ) ,   d i s t r i b u t i o n  and r a t e .  The 
f a u l t  h a n d l i n g  b e h a v i o r  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  t i m e ,  f a u l t  l o c a t i o n  
t i m e  and r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  t i m e ,  and o t h e r  a p p r o p r i a t e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  s u c h  as 
the  cove raaes  assoc ia ted  w i th  the  th ree  Dhases. A s e t  o f  svstem  models  and 
A mathematical model o f  system re1 iab i  1 i t y  f o r  a subject  computer wi 11 be 
fau l  t modeis may be needed 
t a t i   o n a l   t r a c t a b i  1i t y  . 
The pr imary  purpose  o f  
g i v e n  s y s t e m  f o r  a r a n g e  o f  
processors)  and f o r  a range 
a c l a i m  f o r  m i s s i o n  r e l i a b i  
used f o r  two  secondary  purposes: 
o r e f 1   e c t   v a k y i  ng t r a d e - o f f s   o f -   f i d e l  i t y  ~ and compu- 
t h e  model i s  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
assumed c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  (e.g., i n i t i a l  number o f  
o f  assumed f a u l t  l e v e l  s, i n  o t h e r  words, t o  s u p p o r t  
i t y .  As a means t o  t h i s  end, t h e  model wil be 
1. s p e c i f i c a t i o n   o f   d a t a   t o   b e   o b t a i n e d   f r o m   e x p e r i m e n t s  on the   ac tua l  
computer  (o r  an  emula t ion  o f  i t )  which wil be  used t o  improve the 
qua l i t y  o f  assumpt ions  on f a u l t  o c c u r r e n c e s  and fau l  t -hand1  ing  cha rac -  
t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  system, 
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2. d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r e q u i r e m e n t s  on t h e  d e s i g n  o f  t h e  c o m p u t e r ,  i n  a form 
t h a t  a l l o w s  p r o o f  t h a t  t h e  d e s i g n  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  
model. 
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  t a s k s  on P roo f  o f  Cor rec tness  and Exper imental  Val  ida- 
t i o n   o f  System Fau l t  Hand l i ng  wil be analyzed t o  d e t e r m i n e  i f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
t h e  model i s  a t r u e   r e p r e s e n t a t i o n   o f   t h e  system. I f  it i s  no t ,   then  the  model 
may need t o  be  rev ised.  The r e s u l t s   o f   t h e   e x p e r i m e n t a l   t e s t s  wil be  analyzed 
by the  Data  Ana lys is  Task (Task  1-3) i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  more r e a l i s t i c  c h a r a c -  
t e r i z a t i o n s  o f  f a u l t s  and system  responses. New r e l i a b i l i t y  p r e d i c t i o n s  wil 
be genera ted  on  the  bas is  o f  these charac ter iza t ions .  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
~" 
1. Computer  Support 
a. I n t e r a c t i v e  computer  system t o   s u p p o r t  model development, i n c l  ud- 
b. Power fu l   sc ien t i f i c   compu te r   t o   suppor t  model e v a l u a t i o n   ( w i t h  
i n g  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  and programming (e.g., TOPS20). 
h i g h  speed and h igh  accuracy)  (e.g., CYBER, DEC 10). 
a. E x i s t i n g   r e l i a b i l i t y   a n a l y s i s  packages, e.g., CARE 111. 
b. Program  development  environment. 
c. S t a t i s t i c a l   n a l y s i s l d e s i g n .  
d. Log ica l   ana lys is   (p roo f   checker ,   theorem  p rov ing) .  
e. Log ic   des ign   ana lys i s   ( s imu la to r ,   t es t   genera to r ) .  
2. Software  Support  
Personnel :  
Re1 i a b i l  i t v   T h e o r i s t  
N u m e r i c a l   h a l y s t - P r o g r a m e r  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
1 @ l / Z - t i m e  c o n t i n u i n g  
1 @ f u l l   - t i m e   c o n t i n u i n g  
P r i o r i t y :   H i g h e s t  
TASK 1-2 
T i t l e :   C o n f i r m a t i o n  and Use o f  Design  Proofs 
Ob jec t ive :  
1. Main ta i  
m o d i f i c  
n the  i n teg r i t y  o f  des ign -co r rec tness  p roo fs  th rough  sys tem 
a t i o n s  and p r o o f  r e v i s i o n .  
2. Use r e s u l t s   o f   e x p e r i m e n t a l   t e s t  on the   sub jec t   compu te r   t o   con f i rm  
3. Use the   p roo f   t o   gu ide   exper imen ta l   t es ts .  
assumptions made i n  t h e  p r o o f .  
Procedure: 
wil be  acqu i red .   Th is   p roo f  wil l i k e l y  have t h e  f o r m  o f  a h i e r a r c h y ,  t h e  t o p  
l e v e l  o f  t h e  h i e r a r c h y  b e i n g  t h e  Val  i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  model s t r u c t u r e .  
E f f o r t s  wil b e  a p p l i e d ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  p r a c t i c a l ,  t o  c o m p l e t e  t h e  p r o o f  w i t h i n  
A fo rmal  p roo f  o f  t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  t h e  d e s i g n  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t  c o m p u t e r  
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i t s  intended  scope. The proof wi 11 be revised to  ref1 ect changes in the system 
design. 
Test results will be analyzed to  confirm  assumptions made in the proof, 
such as the functions performed a t  the lowest level of the proof (e.g., machine 
instructions) and timing characteristics of scheduling,  synchronizations and 
reconfiguration. 
The proof will be analyzed t o  help plan experimental t es t s .  For example, 
classes of faul ts  wil l  be distinguished t h a t  are equivalent with respect t o  
some system state,  in order t o  economize on the number  of t e s t s  needed t o  cover 
system fau l t  behavior. 
Fac i l i t i es :  
1. Computer Support 
a. ' A powerful symbol-mani pul ation computer (e.g. , DEC 10) .  
2. Software  Support 
a.  Proof-checking  tools  (high pr ior i ty) .  
b. Proof-of-correctness  tool s (1 ower pr ior i ty)  . 
Personnel : 
Logician - Program-Correctness Theorists 
- One Senior 
- One Junior 
Level of Effort: 
Full-time - two years each 
Prior i ty:  Highest 
TASK 1-3 
Ti t le :  Design of Experiments and Analysis of Experimental Data 
Objective: 
hand1 ing  behavior. The parameters of interest  are:  
Estimate parameters and distributions of various aspects o f  the fault- 
1. Estimate ( for   those  faul ts  t h a t  are  covered) 
a. mean fault  detection  time, 
b. mean fault  location  time, 
c. mean reconfiguration  time. 
2. Distributions of the above. 
3. Estimate 
a. fault   detection coverage, 
b. f au l t  1 ocation  coverage, 
c. reconfiguration coverage. 
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4. Suggest  changes to the structure on the  parameterization of the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  model according t o  the results of the data analysis. 
Procedure: 
1. Supply experimental designs t o  the  fault  processing  verification 
g roup ,  incl uding the number and . type (factorial ,  block, e tc . )  of 
experiments needed, and the set of d a t a  t o  be obtained from each 
experiment. 
2. After the data i s  received from the fault  processing verification 
group, use s t a t i s t i ca l  procedures t o  perform the above three objec- 
tives.  Objective 1 i s  a mean-value estimation problem. Confidence 
intervals shouid be obtained  using  standard s t a t i s t i c a l  methods. 
Objective 3 i s  the problem  of estimating  proportions. Once again, 
s tandard  s t a t i s t i ca l  methods are  available  for  this purpose. Objec- 
t i v e  2 i s  the problem  of functional  estimation. The usual hypothesis 
t h a t  the respective distributions are exponential can be tested using 
s t a t i s t i ca l  methods such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov t e s t .  
3. Evaluate validity of assumptions made i n  the construction of the 
model,  based on the results of the s ta t is t ical  tes ts .  
Fac i l i t i es :  
1. Hardware - A mainframe computer i s  needed for carrying out the d a t a  
analysis. 
2. Software - Standard  s t a t i s t i ca l  packages are needed: 
- Stat is t ical  tables  of chi-square, normal, student-t and 
other distributions are needed. 
Personnel : 
One Sta t i s t ic ian  
One  Team  Member of the fault-processing verification group 
Level of Effort:  
S ta t i s t ic ian  a t  1/2-time for one year 
Fault-tolerant System Designer a t  full- t ime for one t o  two years 
Pr ior i ty:  Highest 
TASK DESCRIPTION WORK SHEET 
Part ic ipant ' s  Name John M. Myers 
Task Number: 1-4 
Task Ti t le :  "" -Alternati ve - Model i ng Techniques 
Problem: Present modeling of computer re l iab i l i ty  re l ies  pr imar i ly  on s t a t e  
models  (Markov for stochastic or combination for deterministic behavior). 
State m o m a v e  the following shortcomings: 
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a) No p r o v i s i o n   f o r   c o n c u r r e n t   o p e r a t i o n   o f   s p a t i a l l y   s e p a r a t e d   s u b s y s -  
tems;  and  hence, an a r t i f i c i a l  l a r g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  a ' ' s t a t e  space.'' 
b)  Lack of c l e a r  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  t i e  between a l i n k  between  states and 
i d e n t i f i a b l e   s t r u c t u r a l   f e a t u r e s .  
Discuss ion:   Pet r i -net   models   can  por t ray  concurrent   operat ion and r e l a t e   f u n c -  
t i o n  t o  s t r u c t u r e .  U n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  t h e y  have n o t  been   ma themat i ca l l y   t rac t -  
able.  Recent  advances i n   t r a c t a b i l i t y   a r e   d e m o n s t r a t e d   f o r   d e t e r m i n i s t i c  
model ing i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  FTMP c lock  network.  The use o f  n e t s  as a 
s t r u c t u r e  on which t o  c a l c u l a t e  p r o b a b i l  i t i e s  a1 so appears promising. 
P r o p o s a l :   S u r v e y   p a r t i c i p a n t s   f o r   c a n d i d a t e   a l t e r n a t i v e s   t o  (and  views  on) 
Markov models ;  develop Petr i -net -based model ing for  the analys is  o f  computer  
r e l i a b i l i t y .  
Personnel : Sen ior   Ana lys t  
L e v e l   o f   E f f o r t :  1 man-year 
P r i o r i t y :  TB D 
TASK DEFIN IT ION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name J .  F. Meyer 
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 1-5 
Task T i t l e :  Model S o l u t i o n  Methods ..  " .  . ~ 
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R e l i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  X 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Other  (Spec i f y )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
p e r f o r m a b i l i t y  model  (e.g., s t a t e  bump ing ,  decompos i t i on  o f  so lu t i ons  i n  t ime  
and space, approx. sol utions, etc.) . 
Determine methods f o r  s o l v i n g  s t o c h a s t i c  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  r e 1  i a b i l  i t y ,  and 
P roced  ure : 
1) Ident i f y   p rob lem  a reas .  
2) C l a s s i f i c a t i o n   o f   s o l u t i o n   t e c h n i q u e s .  
3 )  I n v e s t i g a t i o n   o f   p a r t i c u l a r  methods. 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
I n te rac t i ve  compu te r  system. 
Program  development  envi  ronment . 
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Personnel : 
here) .  
A t  l e a s t  2 r e l i a b i l i t y  t h e o r i s t s  ( i n t e r a c t i o n  among personnel i s  necessary 
Leve l  o f  E f f o r t :  
2 @ 1 /4  - 1 / 2  t i m e  
P r i o r i t y :  
High 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name Herb ~ ~~ Hecht 
Tasks which you feel  are important and n o t  i n c l  uded i n  t h e  p r e l  imi n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 1-6 
Task T i t l e :   E v a l u a t i o n   o f   R e l i a b i l i t y - R e q u i r e m e n t s  
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R l i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  X 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
O the r   (Spec i f y )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
cu r ren t   t echno logy ,  (2 )  c u r r e n t  r e g u l a t i o n s  , (3) o b s e r v e d  i n c i d e n t s  ( a i r c r a f t  
acc idents  and component f a i l  u r e  p a t t e r n s ) .  
To keep t h e  o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  i n  l i n e  w i t h  ( 1 )  
Procedure: 
i n t o  AIRLAB t a s k s  o r  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o f  these. 
E s t a b l  i s h  a f u n c t i o n  f o r  k e e p i n g  t r a c k  o f  ( 1 )  - ( 3 )  above, t rans1 a te  these 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
O f f i c e  and l i t e r a t u r e .  
Personnel : 
1 Senior System Engineer 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
AIRLAB aga ins t  cu r ren t  requ i remen ts ) .  
F u l l - t i m e  ( t h i s  i n d i v i d u a l  may a l s o  be a b l e  t o  make fo rma l   eva lua t i ons  of 
P r i o r i t y :  
H i  ghest 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name Nicho las  D. Murray 
33 
Tasks  which  you  fee l   are  impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be proposed on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 1-7 
Task T i t l e :   Pe r fo rmance   Con f i rma t ion  .~ - I ~ - ~ . .  = -._ - 
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R l i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  X 
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Other   (Spec i fy )   Per fo rmance  conf i rmat ion  
O b j e c t i v e :  
between  "good"  states and " f a i l e d "   s t a t e s .   T h e r e   a r e   t w o   d r i v e r s   f o r   t h i s  
d e f i n i t i o n :  
Using a s t a t e  model f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s ,  a d e f i n i t i o n  must  be made 
1) The opera t i ona l   behav io r  of the   sys tem  under   fau l t   cond i t ions  
( i .e.  , vot ing,  comparing, etc.) .  
2 )  S u f f i c i e n t   r e s o u r c e s   a v a i l a b l e   t o   s e r v i c e   t h e   f l i g h t - c r i t i c a l   a p p l i c a -  
t i o n s .  
The r e l i a b i l i t y  model  needs t o  be augmented t o  r e f l e c t  s u f f i c i e n t  p e r f o r m a n c e  
( o r  l a c k  of  performance).  For  instance,  the  SIFT  has a model o f  t h e  s c h e d u l e /  
a l l o c a t i o n  r o u t i n e  t h a t  s u p p o r t s  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  model. 
A1 so, i t  would appear  that  AIRLAB cou ld  be a t o o l  t o  f i n d  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  
t h r e s h o l d .  
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name A. Hopkins 
Tasks  which  you  fee l   are  impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 1-8 
Task T i t l e :   Pe r fo rmance   Ana lys i s  
Category  (check):  Re1 i a b i l i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i  z a t i o n  
Other   (Speci fy)   P ormance X 
O b j e c t i v e :  
app l i ca t i ons  requ i remen ts .  
Develop a s t r u c t u r a l  model o f  p e r f o r m a n c e  c a p a b i l i t y  i n  c o n t e x t  w i t h  
Procedure: 
scheduler.  
A n a l y s i s  o f  sample a p p l i c a t i o n  and t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  c o m p u t e r ' s  
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F a c i l i t i e s :  
Computation 
Personnel: 
Computer S c i e n t i s t  - 6 man-months 
F l i gh t  Con t ro l  Eng ineer  - 1 man-month 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Computer S c i e n t i s t  - 6 man-months 
F l i gh t  Con t ro l  Eng ineer  - 1 man-month 
Pri o r i  t y  : 
High 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name M e l l i a r - S m i t h  ~ 
Tasks which you fee l  are impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l  imi n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work sheet. 
Task  Number: 1-9 
Task T i t l e :  E x e c u t i v e  ~~ Implementat-con Proof 
Category  (check): Re1 i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  X 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Other   (Spec i   f y )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
t i o n  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  (and assoc ia ted )  p rog rams  aga ins t  t he i r  spec i f i ca t i on .  
P roo f   o f   h igh - leve l   l anguage  and machine i n s t r u c t i o n  wil be requ i red .  
To e s t a b l i s h  a t  AIRLAB the  capab i l  i t y  t o  f o r m a l l y  v e r i f y  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a -  
Procedure : 
system and t o  become f a m i l i a r  w i t h  i t s  use.  Development o f  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  
i n d u s t r i a l  imp1 ementers t o   f a c i l  i ta te   p roo f .  
C o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i t h  academic and r e s e a r c h  l a b o r a t o r i e s  t o  o b t a i n  a proof 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Large mul t i -access computer ,  preferably  DEC system 20. 
Personnel: 
1 p l  us Computer S c i e n t i   s t  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Cont inu ing  
L 
P r i o r i t y :  
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  r e c r u i t i n g  s t a f f .  
Urgent because of  very 1 i m i t e d  c u r r e n t  c a p a b i l  i t y  o f  NASA and because o f  
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TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name M e l l i a r - S m i t h  
Tasks  which  you  fee l   are  impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be proposed on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 1-10 
Task T i t l e :   A p p l   i c a t i o n   R e q u i   r e m e n t s   A n a l y s i s  - " - -. - . .. . .  
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R l i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  X 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
O the r   (Spec i f y )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
To develop methods f o r  f o r m a l l y  v e r i f y i n g  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  a p p l  i- 
cat ion  tasks  aga ins t  t he  under l y ing  ae rodynamic  and s t ruc tu ra l  requ i remen ts .  
Procedure: 
C o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i t h  academic and research   l abs  and w i t h  NASA and i n d u s t r i a l  
design teams t o  d e v e l o p  c a p a b i l i t y  w i t h i n  a few years. 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Large mu1 t i -access computer.  
Personnel : 
1 p l  us Computer S c i e n t i s t  
1 plus  Mathemat ic ian  wi th   background i n  aerodynamics and s t r u c t u r e s .  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Cont inu ing 
P r i o r i t y :  
because o f  l o n g  l e a d  t i m e ,  p o l i t i c a l  d e l a y s ,  and d i f f i c u l t y  o f  r e c r u i t i n g  
s t a f f .  
Unless a1 ready  underway  e l  sewhere  (a t  requ i red  l eve l  o f  f o rma l  i t y )  , urgent  
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name M e l l i a r - S m i t h  
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l  i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 1-11 
Task T i t l e :   A p p l i c a t i o n   P r o g r a m   P r o o f  
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R l i a b i l i t y   C o n f i r m a t i o n  X 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  - 
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F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
O the r   (Spec i   f y )  
Ob jec t ive :  
To devel op, o r  suppor t  t he  deve lopmen t  o f ,  o r  t o  become f a m i l  i a r  w i t h  
r e s e a r c h  p r o g r a m s  a i m i n g  a t  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  
programs  by  mathematical  analysis. 
Procedure: 
C o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i t h  academic and r e s e a r c h  l a b s  t o  d e v e l o p  c a p a b i l i t y  w i t h i n  
a few years.  Develop  programming  standards t o  a l l o w  p r o o f  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  f l i g h t  
c o n t r o l  programs. 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Large mul t i -access computer ,  preferably  DEC system  20 
Personnel : 
2 p l u s  Computer S c i e n t i s t  
Level  o f  E f f o r t :  
Cont inu ing 
P r i o r i t y :  
s t a f f .  
Urgent because o f  1 ong lead  t ime  and because o f  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  r e c r u i t i n g  
FAULT PROCESSING VERIFICAT 
Tasks  11-1  through  11-13 
Proposed  by 
Pre l  iminary Work ing Group I 1  P a r  
D. Siewiorek  (Chairman) 
J .  Abraham 
J. C1ar.y 
R. Joobbani 
Tasks  11-14  through  11-21 
ON 
i c i   p a n t s  
Proposed  by 
Working  Group I 1  P a r t i c i p a n t s  As I n d i c a t e d  
37 
TASK 11-1 
Ti t le :   In i t ia l  Check-Up (Diagnostic) 
Objective: 
Verify t h a t  the single processor perform s t h  le b asic functi ons. 
Procedure: 
Run the s tandard diagnostic supplied by the manufacturer. 
Fac i l i t i es :  
1. Hardware - single subject processor. 
2. Software - single subject processor diagnostic programs. 
Personnel : 
Software Technician 
Level of Effort:  
Assume the diagnostic t o  be r u n  
5 times a day for  15 days, 
1/2 man-month 
Prior i ty:  High 
TASK 11-2 
Ti t le :  Programmer's Manual  Val idation 
Objective: 
1. To look for  design  errors. To make sure  the machine performs the 
functions according t o  i ts  specification as documented in program- 
mer's manual. 
2. To investigate  incompletely  described machine features and ful ly  
characterize those features (e.g. , I/O, Interface,  Interrupts).  
Procedure: 
1. Perform the  functions documented in  programmer's manual and validate 
their   correctness.  
2. Investigate  the system response t o  si tuations not completely speci- 
f ied in the programer's  manual and record the responses. 
Fac i l i t i es :  
1. Hardware - single  subject  processor  (e.g., BDX-930) 
- any peripheral or devices interfaced t o  the system t h a t  
- test/monitor computer 
might be  used later (e.g., sensors, actuators) 
2. Software - programmer's manual 
- program development envi ronment 
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- on- l ine debugger  
- e x p e r i m e n t a l   r e s u l t s   r e c o r d i n g  and assessment  software 
Personnel : 
Chief  Exper imenter  
Sof tware Technic ian 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Assume 100 i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  each i n s t r u c t i o n  checked with 10 d i f f e r e n t  t e s t  
cases o r  v a l u e s  (e.g., f o r  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s  mode v a l i d  a n d / o r  i n v a l i d ) .  
If there  are  about  10 i n s t r u c t i o n s  p e r  t e s t  and 20 i n s t r u c t i o n s  p e r  day 
can be executed, then a t o t a l  o f  2 t e s t s  p e r  d a y  a r e  done, 
The t o t a l  manpower f o r  i n s t r u c t i o n  t e s t i n g  i s  
100 i n s t r .  * 10 t e s t  cases = 500 man-days 
~"
2 t e s t s l d a y  
"N 1.5 man-years. 
About 6 man-months a r e  a1 so r e q u i r e d  f o r  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e  s y s t e m  r e s p o n s e  
t o  s i t u a t i o n s  n o t  c o m p l e t e l y  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  Programmer's Manual. 
The t o t a l  r e q u i r e d  manpower then wil be  about 2 man-years. 
P r i o r i t l :   H i g h  
TASK 11-3 
T i t l e :   E x e c u t i v e   R o u t i n e ,   I n c l u d i n g   E r r o r  Mangement ( R e c o n f i g u r a t i o n )  
Rout ines,  V a l  i d a t i  on  (Des ign  Er rors )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
1. To v a l i d a t e   t h a t   e x e c u t i v e   r o u t i n e s   r e s p o n d  as s p e c i f i e d .  
2. Search f o r  d e s i g n  e r r o r s  ( o r  l a c k  o f  s p e c i f i c a t i o n )  i n  e x e c u t i v e  
r o u t  i nes. 
Procedure : 
"
1. T r e a t   e x e c u t i v e   r o u t i n e s  as b l a c k   b o x e s   w i t h   o n l y   i n p u t s  and outputs .  - 
Check response t o  
a. expected  data, 
b. ou t -o f -bounds  da ta ,   ind iv idua l  
c. i n c o n s i   s t e n t   d a t a .   r o u t i n e s  
Data may be generated f rom examin ing the sof tware,  f rom speci f icat ion 
o f  t h e  s o f t w a r e  module, o r  randomly. Make sure  every  path  through 
i n d i v i d u a l  r o u t i n e s  i s  e x e r c i s e d  a t  l e a s t  once, i n c l u d i n g  e r r o r  r e t u r n  
pa ths .  Va l  ida te  cons is tency  o f  response by  mu1 t i p l e  experiments. 
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2. Check e x e c u t i v e  r o u t i n e  i n t e r a c t i o n  ( p i  p e l  i ne). Feed a " s t r i n g "  o f  
e x e c u t i v e  r o u t i n e s  w i t h  
a. expected  data, Val i d  
b. out -of -bounds  data , r o u t i n e  
c. i n c o n s i s t e n t   d a t a .  sequences 
3. Determine  (measure)  rout ine  response  t ime. 
4. Check system e r r o r   r e t u r n - r e p o r t i n g   p a t h s   ( i . e .  , through  system 
h i e r a r c h y )  . 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
1. Hardware - s ing le   sub jec t   p rocesso r  
- tes t  mon i to r  compu te r  
2. Software - program  development  envi  ronment 
a. on-1 ine debugger  1 i ke ODT, 6-12 
b. e x p e r i m e n t a l   r e s u l t s   r e c o r d e r  and assessment  software 
c. a u t o m a t e d   e x e c u t i v e   r o u t i n e   e x e r c i s e s   t h a t   o n l y  need t o  know 
inpu t /ou tpu t   a rea  
Personnel : 
Chief  Exper imenter  
Sof tware Technic ian 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Assume 5 inputs ,  5 outputs  per  module - each  module 100 assembly 
1 anguage i n s t r  - 20 PASCAL 1 ines  
1000 1 i nes PASCAL/20 -50 r o u t  i nes 
250 i n p u t s  x 20 experiments each -5000 exper iments 
4 rou t i   nes /day  -3 man-weeks 
c ross  p roduc t  - e a c h  r o u t i n e  t a l k s  t o  2 o t h e r s  
100 rou t ine  combina t ions  -6 man-weeks 
3 man-mont hs 
P r i o r i t y :   H i g h  
TASK 11-4 
T i t l e :   M u l t i p r o c e s s o r   I n t e r c o n n e c t i o n  Va l  i d a t i o n  
O b j e c t i v e :  
1. To Val  ida te   the   in te rconnect ions   be tween  the   p rocessors .  
2. To v a l i d a t e  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  i n t e r -  
connect ion ( i  .e. , communicat ion,  protocol  hand1 i n g  and re1 ated proces- 
s o r  e f f e c t s ) .  
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Procedure: 
1. Design and 
t h e  p r o t o c o  
prov ided by 
r u n  d i a g n o s t i c  r o u t i n e s  t h a t  c h e c k  t h e  i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s  and 
1 ( o b v i o u s l y ,  t h e r e  i s  no need t o  d u p l i c a t e  d i a g n o s t i c s  
the  manufac turer ) .  
2. Run s ing le   p rocesso r   d iagnos t i c  on each  and/or a l l   o f   t h e   p r o c e s s o r s  
and o b s e r v e  t h e  e f f e c t s  on other  processors.  
3. Make  a1 1 t h e  p r o c e s s o r s  t a l k  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  and observe  the  behavior  
(such as bus content ion,  m i  s’si ng messages, p ro toco l  hand1 i ng, p r i o r i t y  
c o n f l i c t s ,  e t c . ) .  
4. Determine  (measure)  response  t ime t o  communication  setup,  messages and 
i n t e r r u p t s  f o r  each  processor. 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
1. Hardware - sub jec t   mu l t i p rocesso r  
- bus monitor hardware 
- tes t  mon i to r  computer  
2. Software - program  development  environment 
- on- l ine debugger 
- exper imen ta l   resu l t s   reco rde r  and assessment  software 
Personnel : 
Chief  Exper imenter  
Sof tware Technic ian 
Hardware Technician 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Assume there  are  s ix   Drocessors  connected t o  each other   ( fu1 l .y   connected) ;  
r u n n i n g  t h e  multiprocessor’diagnostic and o b s e r v i n g  t h e  i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n  on  one 
process  takes  ha l f  a man-month, so s ix  p rocessors  and c ross ,  p roduc t  takes  1 / 2  * 
6 = 3 man-months . 
. -  
TASK 11-5 
T i t l e :  Mu1 ti processor  Execut ive Rout ine,  Inc l  ud i  ng E r r o r  Management 
(Reconf igura t ion)  Rout ines ,  Val  i d a t i o n  
Ob jec t i ve :  
1. To va l i da te   t ha t   t he   execu t i ve   rou t i nes   (mu l t i p rocesso r   sys tem  execu -  
t i v e  and s ing le  processor   execut ive)   respond as s p e c i f i e d .  
2. To s e a r c h   f o r   d e s i g n   e r r o r s   ( o r   l a c k   o f   s p e c i f i c a t i o n )   i n   e x e c u t i v e  
rou t i nes .  
Procedure: 
1. T r e a t   e x e c u t i v e   r o u t i n e s  as b lack   boxes   w i th   on l y   i npu ts  and ou tpu ts .  
Check response to :  
a. expected  data, 
41 
b. out-of-bound data, and 
’ c. inconsistent  data. 
2. Make sure  every  path  through  individual  routines i s  exercised a t  l ea s t  
once,  including  error  return paths.  Validate  consistency of response 
by mu1 t i  pl e experiments. 
3.  Check executive  routines  interaction. 
a. feed a string of executive  subroutines with 
- expected d a t a  
- out-of-bound d a t a  
- inconsistent d a t a  
4. Check the  side  effects of executive  subroutines when running i n  d i f -  
ferent processors a t  t he  same time. 
5. Check the schedul i n g  and task  assignment. 
6. Determine (measure)  routine  response  time. 
7. Check system error return-reporting paths ( i  .e. , t h r o u g h  system 
hierarchy). 
Fac i l i t i es :  
1. Hardware - subject mu1 t i  processor 
- t e s t  monitor computer 
2. Software - software development environment 
- on-1 i ne debugger 




Level of Effort: 
Same as Task 11-3 except t h a t  since the executive runs on different 
processors (assume 6 processors) and the system executive is added,  then 
we need 6*3  man-months = 18 man-months. 
Pr ior i ty:  High 
TASK 11-6 
Title: Application Program Val idation (Design Errors) and Performance 
Base1 i ne 
Objective: 
1. To verify t h a t  application  software  responses  are  as  specified. 
2. Search for  design  errors. 
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3. Measure  system  response  parameters  ( t ime  constants)  wi th  t ime  varying 
i nputs. 
Procedure: 
1. Treat  system  as a b lack  box w i t h   o n l y   i n p u t s  and outputs.  Check 
response t o  
a. expected  data, 
b. out -of -bounds  data,  
c. i ncons is ten t   da ta ,  
d. random data   a t   boundar ies ,  i .e., on   the  edge o f  c o n t r o l ,  where 
f l i g h t  t r a n s i t i o n s  ( o r  t r a n s i t i o n s  t o  o t h e r  s o f t w a r e ) ,  
e. sequences o f   d a t a ,  
- expected 
- out-of-bounds 
- i ncons i   s ten t  
- random. 
2. Make sure  every  path  through  sof tware i s  exercised  (whole  system). 
3. Check s y s t e m   e r r o r   r e t u r n  and r e p o r t i n g .  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
1. Hardware - t o t a l  system  under t e s t  
2. Sof tware - same as Task 11-3 
- e x e c u t i v e  e r r o r  r e p o r t i n g  
Personnel : 
Chief  Exper imenter  
Sof tware Technic ian 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
11-13 i s  4 t imes more complex than executive. 
Approx imate ly  4 t i m e s  Task  11-3,  assuming a p p l i c a t i o n  d e s c r i b e d  i n  Task 
1 man-year 
High P r i o r i  tl: 
T i t l e :  S i m u l a t i o n  o f  I n a c c e s s  
TASK 11-7 "  
i b l  e Phys ica l   Fa i  1 u res  
" Objec t ives :  
1. To enhance   unders tand ing   o f   t he   re la t i onsh ip   be tween   phys i ca l   f au l t s  
and t h e i r  e r r o r  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s .  
2. TO p r o v i d e  a data  base  which may be  used to   supplement /suppor t   phys i -  
c a l  f a u l t  i n j e c t i o n  e x p e r i m e n t s .  
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Procedure: 
I n a c c e s s i   b l  e -+ A c c e s s i   b l  e
S i  n g l  e Processor- Mu1 ti processor  t- 
jDevice~-~Gate-~~-~~-~~PWS'-Interface User 
*uni   processor   and/or  
mu1 t i  processor  
R-T ( R e g i s t e r - T r a n s f e r )  
ISP ( I n s t r u c t i o n  S e t  P r o c e s s o r )  
PMS (Processor Memory Swi tch)  
1. D e v e l o p / o b t a i n   r e q u i r e d   s i m u l a t i o n   s o f t w a r e   w i t h   f a u l t - i n j e c t i o n  capa- 
b i l  i t y  a t  each o f  above 1 evel  s. 
2. Provide  interfaces  between  the  packages so t h a t  p a r t s  o f  system  can 
b e  s i m u l a t e d  a t  d i f f e r e n t  1 evel  s. 
3. S imul   a te  fau l . t - f ree  system a t  v a r y i n g   ( a p p r o p r i a t e )   l e v e l s  of complex- 
i t y  t o  Val i d a t e  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  s o f t w a r e .  
4. S i m u l a t e   s y s t e m   w i t h   i n j e c t e d   f a u l t s .  
5. Observe   re la t i onsh ip   be tween   i n jec ted   f au l t s ,   i npu t   da ta  and f a u l t  
man i fes ta t ion  f rom Step 4. 
6. C h a r a c t e r i z e   r e l a t i o n s h i p s   b e t w e e n   i n j e c t e d   f a u l t s  and t h e i r   m a n i f e s -  
t a t i o n  and a t t e m p t  t o  a b s t r a c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n t o  e q u i v a l e n c e  c l a s s e s .  
7. Repeat  above f o r  mu1 t i p 1  e processor  system. 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
1. Hardware - 1 o r  more computers  (dependent  on  whether  simulat ions  are 
spec ia l l y   deve loped)  - (e.g.,  Nanodata QM-1  p l u s  DEC-10) 
2. Software - s i m u l a t i o n   s o f t w a r e  
- d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t a r g e t  machine a t  a p p r o p r i a t e  l e v e l  
- d i a g n o s t i c  s o f t w a r e  f o r  t a r g e t  m a c h i n e  t o  v a l i d a t e  t h e  
- s i m u l  a t i o n  e x e c u t i v e  w i t h  e v a l u a t i o n  s o f t w a r e  
- m o n i t o r  and a p p l i c a t i o n  s o f t w a r e  o f  t a r g e t  m a c h i n e  
s imu l   a t i on   so f tware  
Personnel :  
4-8 man-years 
1 Engineer, 3 Programmers - (1-2  years ) *  
P r i o r i t y :   H i g h  
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*NOTE: Once required  simulation  software  exists,  additional  experiments  will 
require much less  time. 
TASK 11-8 
Tit le :  Physical  Fault  Insertion:  Single  Processor  Manifestation 
Understanding and Prel iminary Characterization Histograms 
Objective: 
1. Establish  fault  classes  (e.q.,  manifestation number) t o  cut down 
complexity of fault  injection a t  higher system leveis. 
. " 
t 2. Generate "representative" system level  histogram of detection,  isola- 
t ion and reconfiguration times. 
Y 
P roced u re : 
1. Physically  inject  faults on a single  processor implementat 
"sol i d "  
l l i  ntermi ttentll 
"transient" power 
2. Use diagnostics t o  see what po r t ion  of the machine (as  def 
diagnostic) does n o t  work. 
on : 
ned by the 
3. Map physical fau l t s  i n t o  "memory" o r  higher  level  manifestation 
wherever possible. 
4. Automatically  log each experiment and i t s  resu l t s  for  s ing le  proces- 
sor. 
Fac i l i t i es :  
1. Hardware - m o n i t o r i n g  computer 
- mag tape f o r  records 
- high-speed d a t a  logger (if  desperate) 
- t e s t  j i g  for inserting physical faults 
2. Software - diagnostics 
- instruction t o  executive software t h a t  processor i s  ava i l -  
- broken diagnostic analyzer plus state dump 
- modify executive ( i f  necessary) t o  report errors t o  moni - 
- some support from executive to coordinate fault injection 
ab1 e 
tor computer 
with system s t a t e  
Personnel-: 
1-2 Engineers - 3 s h i f t s  of technicians 
10000/50/day = 200 days ( M 1 year) 
worst case-2 times longer 
4-5 man-years 
45 
P r i o r i t y :   H i g h  
TASK 11-9 
T i t l e :   P h y s i c a l   F a u l t   I n s e r t i o n  (Mu1 t i p r o c e s s o r )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
wil reduce  the  number o f  f a u l t  i n j e c t i o n s  r e q u i r e d  a t  h i g h e r  system levels .  
E s t a b l i s h   f a u l t   c l a s s e s  (map p h y s i c a l   f a u l t s   i n t o   m a n i f e s t a t i o n s ) .   T h i s  
Procedure: 
1. Use t h e  memory m a n i f e s t a t i o n   o f   p h y s i c a l   f a u l t s   c l a s s i f i e d   i n  Task 
11-8  as a b a s i s  f o r  i n j e c t i n g  f a u l t s  a t  t h e  m u l t i p r o c e s s o r  l e v e l .  I n -  
s e r t  p h y s i c a l  f a u l t s  f o r  o t h e r  c a s e s  i n  e a c h  o f  t h e  s i n g l e  p r o c e s s o r s  
( i . e . ,   u n c l a s s i f i e d   f a u l t s ) .  
2. I n s e r t   p h y s i c a l   f a u l t s  a t  t h e   i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n  between  each  two  proces- 
sors  
"so1 i d "  
" t r a n s i e n t "  power 
p i n s  
g a t e  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  
l a i n t e r m i t t e n t l 1  $ ~ ~ ~ n ~ ~ ~ ~ e  
3. Map t h e  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  t h e  f a u l t  i n s e r t i o n  i n  s teps  1. and 2. i n t o  
t h e  l'memory'l m a n i f e s t a t i o n  whenever poss ib le .  
4. Automat i ca l l y   l og   each   exper imen t  and i t s   r e s u l t s   ( v e r i f y   t h a t  a l l  
t h e  o t h e r  p r o c e s s o r s  a r e  n o t  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  f a u l t  p r o p a g a t i o n ) .  
5. Repeat the   exper iment  a small  number o f   t i m e s   ( e  
h i s tog rams  fo r :  
- f a u l t  p r o p a g a t i o n  t i m e  
- d e t e c t i o n  t i m e  
- i s 0 1   a t i o n   t i m e  
- r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  t i m e .  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
1. Hardware - moni tor ing  computer  
- mag t a p e  f o r  r e c o r d s  
- h igh-speed data logger  ( i f  desperate)  
- i n s t r u c t i o n  t o  t a r g e t  system  execut ive  sof tware  that  new 
- b r o k e n  d i a g n o s t i c  a n a l y z e r  p l u s  s t a t e  dump 
- m o d i f y  e x e c u t i v e  ( i f  n e c e s s a r y )  t o  r e p o r t  e r r o r s  t o  m o n i -  
- some s u p p o r t  f r o m  e x e c u t i v e  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  f a u l t  i n j e c t i o n  
2. Sof tware - d i a g n o s t i c s  
processor  i s ava i  1 ab1 e 
t o r  computer 
w i t h  s y s t e m  s t a t e  
.g., < 100) t o  c r e a t e  
Personnel : 
1-2  Engineers - 3 s h i f t s  o f  T e c h n i c i a n s  
10000/50/day = 200 days ( M 1 y e a r )  f o r  s i n g l e  p r o c e s s o r  
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Assume 6 processors 
~ 2 5  man-years 
worst  case -2 t i m e s  1 onger 
P r i o r i t y :   H i g h  
TASK 11-10 
T i t l e :   C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n . o f   E x e c u t i v e   R o u t i n e   ( S i n g l e   P r o c e s s o r )  Responses 
Under S i n g l e  P h y s i c a l  F a i l u r e  C o n d i t i o n s  
Ob jec t ive :  
I 1. To c l a s s i f y   e x e c u t i v e   r o u t i n e   r e s p o n s e   t o   h a r d w a r e   f a i l u r e s   ( i . e . ,  
m a n i f e s t a t i o n s )  . 
2. These r e s u l t s  wil be  used t o   a b s t r a c t   f a i l u r e   m a n i f e s t a t i o n s   f o r  
h igher  sys tem leve ls .  
3. Cut down t h e  number o f  and /o r  simp1 i f y  s y s t e m  l e v e l  f a i  1 u re  exper i -  
ments. 
Procedure: 
1. I n j e c t   f a i l u r e s   i n t o   o p e r a t i n g   s o f t w a r e .   F a i l u r e s   c a n  be  manifested 
by : 
a. f a i l u r e   c l a s s e s   i d e n t i f i e d   b y   l o w e r   l e v e l s  (e.g.,  Task 11-8) and 
b. p h y s i c a l   f a u l t   i n s e r t i o n   f o r   t h e   u n c h a r a c t e r i z a b l e   f a i l u r e s ,  
i n j e c t e d  b y  DMA, 
2. F a i l u r e s   i n j e c t e d   i n t o  
a. d a t a   i n p u t ,  
b. temporary  data  dur  
s o r   s e n s i t i v e )  , 
c.  code a t   va r ious  PO 




ng execut ion  ( i f  f a u l t  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  i s  p r o c e s -  
i t i o n s  s e l e c t e d  by 
- s e l e c t i i e l y  (e.g., a t  p rogram  cont ro l   po in ts   s ince   da ta   ins t ruc-  
t i o n  changes can be d i r e c t l y  mapped t o  memory a1 t e r a t i o n s ) .  
3. C o l l e c t   d a t a   a u t o m a t i c a l l y  and c h a r c t e r i z e   i n t o   c l a s s e s  
a. u n c l a s s i f i e d   p h y s i c a l   f a u l t   i n s e r t i o n  
b. memory a1 t e r a t i o n  
- s p e c i f i c  a r e a s  o f  memory 
- randomly 
c .   undetected  or   unrecoverabl  e 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
1. Hardware - s i n q l e   o b j e c t   p r o c e s s o r  
- DMA- 
- moni tor ing computer  
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- mag t a p e  f o r  r e c o r d s  
- h igh-speed da ta  logger  ( i f  desperate)  
- t e s t  j i g  f o r  i n s e r t i n g  p h y s i c a l  f a u l t s  
2. Sof tware - program  development  environment 
- o n - l i n e  d e b u g g e r  l i k e  ODT, 6-12 
- e x p e r i m e n t a l   r e s u l t s   r e c o r d e r  and assessment  software 
- au tomated  execu t i ve  rou t i ne  exe rc i ses  tha t  on l y  need t o  
know i nput /output  area 
Personnel :  
Chief  Exper imenter  
Sof tware '   Technic ian 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Assuming  (.9) x 10,000 maps 1 0  t o  a class-900 classes 
900 c l a s s e s  p e r  e a c h  i n s t r u c  i o n  
- 5 x 1000 1 i n e s  -4.5 x 10 exper iments 
- i f  automated and experiment every 10 seconds 
i5 
"10 ,000  h o u r s  o r  5 man-years 
P r i o r i t y :   H i g h  
TASK 11-11 
T i t l e :   M u l t i p r o c e s s o r  Sys tem  Execut ive ,   Inc lud ing   Er ro r  Management 
(Reconf igura t ion  ) R o u t i n e s ,   F a u l t   H a n d l i n g   C a p a b i l i t i e s  
O b j e c t i v e :  
1. To c l a s s i f y  t h e  mu1 t i  processor system execut ive response to hardware 
f a i  1 ures. 
2.  To measure the system t ime constant  and schedul i n g  a1 g o r i t h m  
Procedure: 
1. I n j e c t   f a i l u r e s   i n t o   t h e   r u n n i n g   s o f t w a r e .   F a i l u r e s  can be mani fested 
by : 
a. f a i l u r e   c l a s s e s   i d e n t i f i e d  b.y l o w e r   l e v e l s  (e.g.,  Task 11-8 and 
b. p h y s i c a l   f a u l t   i n s e r t i o n   f o r   t h e   u n c h a r a c t e r i z a b l e   f a i l u r e s .  
Task 11-9) and i n j e c t e d  b y  DMA, 
1. 
2. F a i l u r e s   i n j e c t e d   i n t o :  
a. i npu t   da ta ,  
b. temporary   da ta   dur ing   execut ion  ( i f  f a u l t  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  i s  f a u l t  
sensi  ti ve) , 
c.  code a t  var ious   pos i t ions   se lec ted   by  
- exhaust ion , 
- randomly, 
- s e l e c t i v e l y  (e.g., a t  p rog ram  con t ro l   po in ts   s ince   da ta   i ns t ruc -  
t i o n  changes can be d i r e c t l y  mapped t o  memory a l t e r a t i o n s ) .  
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3. Insert  the  faults  characterized  in Task 11-10. 
4. Collect d a t a  automatically and characterize the faults into classes: 
a. physical faul t   inser t  
b. memory al terat ion 
c. system crash 
5. Collect d a t a  for  system response: 
a. detection  time, 
b. isolation  time, 
c. recovery  time. 
Fac i l i t i es :  
1. Hardware - - 




si ngle object processor 
D MA 
moni to r i  ng computer 
mag tape for  records 
high-speed d a t a  1 ogger ( i f  desperate) 
t e s t  j i g  for inserting physical faults 
program devel opment envi ronrnent 
on-line debugger l ike  O D T ,  6-12 
experimental results  recorder and assessment  software 
automated executive routine exercises t h a t  only need t o  
k n o w  input/output area 
Level of E f fo r t :  
Assuming ( .9)  x 10,000 maps 10 t o  a c lass  -900 classes 
900 classes per each instruckion 
- 5 x 1000 1 ines -4.5 x 1 0  expgriments 
- i f  automated and experiment every 10  seconds 
Assume 6 processors - 6 ~ 4 . 5 ~ 1 0  = 27x10 experiments 6 
75,000 hours o r  25 man-years 
Personnel : 
Chief Experimenter 
Software'  Technician 
TASK 11-12 
Ti t le :  Appl ication Program Fault Hand1 i ng on Mu1 t i  processors 
Objective: 
1. Classify  application  software  response t o  hardware 
2. Measure system response  parameters  (time  constant) 
tions. 
fai 1 ures. 
i n  fa i lu re  s i t u a -  
Procedure : 
1. Repeat Task 11-11 fo r  e r ro r  handling. 
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F a c i l i t i e s :  
Same as  Tasks 11-6 and 11-11 
Task  11-13 
T i t l e :  Mu1 t i  p l  e Appl i c a t i o n  Programs F a u l t  Hand1 i ng on Mu1 ti processor  
O b j e c t i v e :  
1. Character ize  system  schedul   ing and response  parameters i n  f a i l  u r e  
s i t u a t i o n s .  
2. C l a s s i f y   a p p l i c a t i o n   p r o g r a m  and system  software  response t o  hardware 
f a i  1 ures. 
P roced  u re  : 
Repeat  Task  11-12 when m u l t i p l e  a p p l i c a t i o n  programs  are  running. 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Same as  Task  11-12 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name Herb  Hecht 
Tasks  which  you  fee l   are  impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 11-14 
Task Ti tl e: Software Re1 i abi  1 i t y  Research 
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R l i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  X 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  X 
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Other  (Spec i f y )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
1. To i d e n t i f y   s e v e r i t y   o f   m a n i f e s t a t i o n s   o f   s o f t w a r e   f a i l u r e s .  
2. To measure   so f tware   f u tu re   l abs  as a f u n c t i o n  o f  s t r e s s  ( i n t e r r u p t  
ra te   improper   da ta   hardware   fea tures) .  
Procedure : 
To implement  measurement o f  p e r t i n e n t  p a r a m e t e r s  i n  AIRLAB. 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Normal so f tware  deve lopmen t  fac i l  i t i es  S IFT  and /o r  FTMP. 
Personnel : 
1. Software  Engineer 
2. Computer Techn ic ian  
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" Level  of Effort: 
1 . 1 : y e a r  
2. 1/2 man-year over 2 years 
' (these  levels  are based on running these  tests  concurrent with hard- 
ware re1 i a b i  1 i t y   t e s t s )  
Priority:  
High 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
Par t ic ipant ' s  Name ~ " _  John M. Myers 
Tasks which  you feel are important and not included  in the prel iminary report 
may be proposed on t h i s  work sheet. 
Task Number: 11-15 
Task Title:  Measurement  of Synchronization of Clocks 
Category (check) : Re1 i abi 1 i t y  conf i mat ion X 
Faul t processi ng veri f i cat i  on X 
Fault processing characteri zation 
Other (Specify) 
- Objective: 
Make a preliminary experimental determination of the behavior of 
functioning clocks; develop instrumentation capable of distinguishing rare 
clock failure from instrumentation failure. 
Explanation: 
The svnchronization of a clock network is  essent ia l  t o  faul t - t o 1  erant 
computers. The only  experimental results (available for atomic clocks)  cast 
d o u b t  on the assumption t h a t  functioning clocks have e i ther  a gaussian 
dis t r ibut ion o r  a fixed bound of phase separation. This  assumption i s  c r i t i c a l  
t o  the proofs of faul t-tolerance of the clock networks. 
~., 
." P roced ure : 
Measure and record phase separation of clocks in a four-clock network, 
using redundant phase measurement, w i t h  A/D converters t h a t  are offset  one  from 
another t o  avoid confusing clock f au l t s  with A/D glitch; use guard indicators 
t o  rule out effects due t o  power supply irregularities. Collect frequency 
dis t r ibut ions of phase separation, and see what  indication there is of 
a )  bounded, 
b )  gaussian, or 
c )  broader  (e.g., unbounded) distribution. 
5 1  
I 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Clock  network  from  SIFT  and/or FTMP, coun te rs ,  ana log /d ig i t a l  conve r te rs ,  
magnet ic  tape recorders ,  phase measur ing  c i rcu i ts  ( t imers)  , i :e., e l e c t r o n i c s  
1 a b o r a t o r y   w i t h   r e c o r d i n g   e q u i  pment. 
Personnel : 
Engineer - 2 man-months 
Technic ian - 3 man-months 
Ana lys t  - 2 man-months 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
1 month t o  s e t  up; t h e n  l o w - l e v e l  o f  m o n i t o r i n g  f o r  two  years. 
P r i o r i t y :  
H i  gh 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name M e l l i a r - S m i t h  
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t   i n c l u d e d   i n   t h e   p r e l i m i n a r y   r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 11-16 
Task T i t l e :  F a i  1 u r e  S e v e r i  t v  A n a l  v s i  s 
Category  (check) : Re1 i a b i l i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  X 
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
O the r   (Spec i f y )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
a g a i n s t  t h e  s e v e r i t y  o f  t h e i r  consequences.  This i s  i n t e n d e d   t o   p r o v i d e   i n p u t  
t o  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s .  
To o b t a i n  f r o m  i n d u s t r y ,  o r  d e v e l o p ,  a c a t e g o r i z a t i o n  o f  f a i l u r e  syndromes 
Procedure : 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Personnel : 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
P r i o r i t y :  
Needed as i n p u t  t o  r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s .  
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name K u r t  Moses 
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I- 
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 11-17 
Task T i t l e :   A p p l i c a t i o n   P r o g r a m   V a l i d a t i o n  and Performance  Baseline  on a 
Sys tem-(as  d is t inc t  f rom Task  11-6)  
Category  (check) : Re1 i a b i  1 i t y  conf  i rmat i   on 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  X 
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Other   (Spec i   f y )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
o n l y  V a l  i d a t e  t h e  c o m p u t e r  - a p a r t  o f  t h e  s y s t e m ) .  
V a l i d a t e   a p p l i c a t i o n   s o f t w a r e   f o r   t h e  system.  (Task  11-6,  as wr i t t en ,   can  
Procedure: 
I n t e r f a c e  SIFT/FTMP w i t h  a r e a l - t i m e  s i m u l a t i o n  o f  a s u i t a b l e  a i r c r a f t  , 
a c t u a t o r   c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  and sensor   con f igura t ion .   Per fo rm  the   tasks   o f   11-6  
f o r  d i f f e r e n t  a i r c r a f t  and env i ronmenta l   cond i t ions   (w inds ,   gus ts ,   e tc . )  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
a)  Hardware - S I F T  or  FTMP computer;   host   computer  for   (b) .  
b)  Aircraft/sensor/actuator s imu la t i on ,   i nc lud ing   compu te r   i n te r face .  
Personnel : 
Cobol  System  Engineer 
Sof tware Technic ian 
Chief  Exper imenter  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
3 man-years, min. 
P r i o r i t y :  
H i  gh 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name Bas i l   Smi th  
Tasks  which  you  fee l   are  impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 11-18 
Task T i t l e :  S o f t w a r e  F a u l t  - Containment . -  V e r i f i c a t i o n  
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g   v e r f i c a t i o n  X 
F a u l t  p rocess i  ng c h a r a c t e r i   z a t   i o n  
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Other  (Spec i f y )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
a f f e c t e d   a p p l i c a t i o n  programs. . .  
T e s t  s h o u l d  s t r e s s  t h e  s y s t e m ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t a i n  s o f t w a r e  e r r o r s  t o  
Procedure: 
m a l i g n a n t  b e h a v i o r  " t e s t "  a p p l i c a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  d e s i g n e d  t o  s t r e s s  i t s  
containment mechanisms. 
I n d u c e  f a i l u r e  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n s  code v i a  random  changes and generate  most 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Object  F-T computer system 
Moni tor ing system 
S o f t w a r e  s u p p o r t  f a c i l i t y  
Personnel : 
Analyst/Cl  ever  Programmer 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
6 man-months 
P r i o r i t y :  
High 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name M e l l i a r - S m i t h  
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be proposed on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 11-19 
Task T i t l e :   L o g i c a l   A n a l y s i s  of  Design t o  Reduce S i z e   o f   T e s t   D a t a   S e t s  
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  X 
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
O the r   (Spec i f y )  
Ob jec t  i ve: 
The v e r y  l a r g e  number o f  t e s t  cases  necessary f o r  coverage  can  be  reduced 
b y  l o g i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  d e s i g n ,  i n  f a u l t  f r e e  and f a u l t  p r e s e n t  cases. 
Procedure: 
C o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i t h  academic and i n d u s t r i a l  r e s e a r c h e r s  a1 ready working on 
s y s t e m a t i c  t e s t i n g .  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Large mu1 ti -access  computer. 
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Personnel : . 
1 Computer S c i e n t i s t  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Cont i   nu i   ng 
P r i o r i t y :  
Must  precede t e s t i n g  t a s k s .  
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name D. B. Mulcare 
Tasks  which  you  fee l   are  impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 11-20 
Task T i  tl e: ~ D e f i n i t i o n  - - "- and E x e r c i   s i   n g  o f  Non-Appl i c a t i  on-Dependent 
A p p l i c a t i o n s  -"~"- Software Benchmark  Package* 
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  X 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
O the r  (Spec i f y )  
Ob jec t ive :  
f o r  i n t e g r a t e d  a v i o n i c s / f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  t o  use i n  o t h e r  t a s k s .  
To de f ine ,  eva lua te ,  and employ a benchmark app l ica t ions  so f tware  program 
Procedure: 
i t y ,  t i m e  c o n s t r a i n e d ,  r e p  r a t e ,  e t c . )  w h i c h  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  e x e r c i s e  t h e  m u l t i -  
p r o c e s s o r s  i n  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  manner. Many modules  might  only  be dummy 
modules  occupying a p resc r ibed  t ime  s l i ce .  
Develop an approp r ia te  m ix  o f  so f tware  modul es ( o f  v a r y i n g  s i z e ,  c r i t i c a l  - 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Compi 1 e r  
Personnel : 
System Engineer 
Software  Speci a1 i s t  
Level  o f  E f f o r t :  
6 mos. 
P r i o r i t y :  
Moderate 
*NOTE: T h i s  t a s k  m i g h t  well be ca r r i ed  ou t  as  pa r t  o f  a1 ready  designed 
Task I I o r  I11 experiments. 
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TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name Jacob Abraham 
Tasks which you fee l  are impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l  i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be proposed on t h i  s work sheet. 
Task Number: 11-21 
Task T i t l e :   V e r i f y   t h a t   h e   O p e r a t i o n a l   S y s t e m   D i a g n o s t i c  has a High 
Coverage " ~ 
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  X 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Other   (Spec i   f y )  
Ob jec t ive :  
t i o n s  made i n   r e l i a b i l i t y  model a r e  Val id .  
P e r i o d i c  d i a g n o s i s  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  f l u s h  o u t  l a t e n t  f a u l t s  so t h a t  assump- 
P roced u r e  : 
(a> Research i n to  fau l t  c lasses ,  p rove  cove rage ,  and /o r  
( b )  S i m u l a t i o n  o f  g a t e  1 eve1 - get  coverage number. 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Fau l t  s imu l  a to r  i f  second  avenue  (b) i s  used. 
Personnel : 
(a>- Experienced Researcher 
( b )  Technic ian 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
1 man-year 
P r i o r i t y :  
High 
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FAULT PROCESSING CHARACTERIZATION 
Tasks 111-1 th rough 111-7 
Proposed  by 
Pre l im inary  Work ing  Group I1  P a r t i c i p a n t s  
A. Hopki ns  (Chairman) 
D. Rennel s 
J. Gaul t  
M. Smith 
Tasks 111-8 th rough 111-13 
P r o  po sed by 
Working  Group 11 P a r t i c i p a n t s  As I n d i c a t e d  
TASK 111-1 
T i t l e :   F a l s e   I n p u t   I n f o r m a t i o n  
O b j e c t i v e :  
To de te rm ine  the  fau l t - t o le ran t  compu te r  sys tem 's  response  to  i npu t  i n fo r -  
mat ion  which i s  p l a u s i b l e  (passes  bound  checks)  but   incorrect .   This  task wil 
h e l p  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  damage produced in  output  responses  dependent  upon  the 
e r r o n e o u s   i n p u t s .   I n   a d d i t i o n ,   c a r e f u l   a t t e n t i o n  must  be p a i d   t o   d e t e c t  unex- 
pected d is turbances i n  system behavior  which would not  normal ly  be af fected by 
t h e  i n p u t  e r r o r s .  T h i s  e x p e r i m e n t  wil he1 p t o  e s t a b l  i s h  t h e  s y s t e m ' s  vu1 nera- 
b i l i t y  t o  i n p u t  d a t a  c o r r u p t i o n .  By c a u s i n g   i n p u t   f a i l u r e s   w h i c h   a r e   h a l f  
1 eve1 s , t h e   a b i l i t y   o f   t h e  system t o  a c c u r a t e l y  d e t e c t  and i s o l a t e  s i n g l e  
source  da ta  e r ro rs  i s  charac ter ized .  
Approach: 
i n t e r f e r e n c e  , and  ha1 f values.  For  input  sensor  po ints  , i n j e c t  d a t a  Val  ues 
wh ich   a re   no t   cons is ten t   w i th   the   s imu la ted   env i ronment .  These  values wil be 
s u b t l e  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  w h i c h  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e c t  b y  bounds  checks o r  a n a l y -  
t i c  redundancy. F a u l t y   d a t a   i n j e c t i o n  wil be  var ied  as t o  i t s  d u r a t i o n ,  
s e v e r i t y  ( d e g r e e  o f  i n c o n s i s t e n c y )  , and input  source. The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  t a s k  
wil h e l p  t o  i d e n t i f y  what i n p u t  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e c t  and 
c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  s y s t e m ' s  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  c l a s s  o f  f a i l u r e s .  
Th ree   c lasses   o f   da ta   co r rup t i on  wil be  used: s u b t l e   i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s ,  
1. F o r   v a r i o u s   i n p u t   p o i n t s ,   i n j e c t   n o i s e   o f   v a r y i n g   i n t e n s i t y  and dura- 
t i o n .   T h i s  wil h e l p  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  v a r i a b l e  l e n g t h  
e x t e r n a l   d i s t u r b a n c e s   o n   s y s t e m   b e h a v i o r .   I n   a d d i t i o n ,   c r i t i c a l i t y  
o f  i n p u t s  may be  de tec ted ,  i .e . ,  no ise  a t  one loca l i t y  may be  more 
damaging  than  at  another. 
2. F o r   v a r i o u s   i n p u t   s e n s o r s ,   i n j e c t   h a l f   l e v e l   s i g n a l s .   T h i s   t e s t  wil 
he1 p c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  s y s t e m ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  d e t e c t  and i s o l a t e  f a u l t s  
which may a p p e a r  a s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  v a l u e s  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t s .  
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F a c i  1 i t  i,es : 
computing  system. 
AIRLAB f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  s i m u l a t i o n  o f  d a t a  i n p u t s  t o  t h e  f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
TBD 
TASK 111-2 
Task: Memory A l t e r a t i o n  
O b j e c t i v e :  
S e l e c t i v e  memory a l t e r a t i o n  can  be  used t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  o f  
a f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  s y s t e m  when con f ron ted  w i th  a )  so f tware  and d e s i g n  e r r o r s ,  b )  
1 a t e n t  f a u l t s ,  c )  c o r r e l a t e d  f a u l t s ,  and d)  confus ion by d ivergence.  
Approach: 
I n j e c t  chanqes a t  one o r  more locat ions wi th in  var ious computer  memor ies,  
e i t h e r  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  o r  s e q u e n t i a l l y .  Examples a r e  t e s t s  f o r  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f i  
1. S imple   Sof tware   Er ro rs  - Place an ( i d e n t i c a l )   i n c o r r e c t   v a l u e   i n   i d e n -  
t i c a l  memory loca t ions   w i th in   var ious   redundant   computers .   Tabu la te  
system f a i l u r e s  as a f u n c t i o n  o f  number o f  f a u l t  i n s e r t i o n s  and area 
o f  memory d i s t u r b e d .  
2. Latency - I n j e c t i n g   f a u l t s   i n   v a r i o u s  memories a t   u n c o r r e l a t e d   i n t e r -  
na l   l oca t i ons .   Tabu la te   sys tem  fa i l u res   as  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  r a t e  and 
domain o f  f a u l t  i n j e c t i o n .  
3. Confus ion  by  Divergence - I n j e c t i n g  d i f f e r i n g - v a l u e s  i n  i d e n t i c a l  
l o c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  memories o f   the   var ious   redundant   computers .  Tabu- 
l a t e  system f a i l u r e s  as a f u n c t i o n  o f  f a u l t  i n s e r t i o n s  and a r e a s  o f  
memory d i   s t  urbed. 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
1. M u l t i p l e  DMA o r   e q u i v a l e n t  
2. Revised 1 oca1 execut ives  
3. S p e c i a l   i n t e r f a c e s  and cables 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
TB D 
TASK 111-3 
Task : Conf i g u r a t  i on  Control  Mani pu l  a t  i o n  
Ob jec t ives :  
rep1 aced. 
F i n d  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  t h e  system when r e s o u r c e s  a r e  a r b i t r a r i l y  removed/ 
1. See what  load  shedding i s  done when resources   a re  removed. 
2. Is minimum system response  time met? 
3. Are crit ical   functions (on a pr ior i ty  level)  done? 
4. How quickly  does system recover when resources  are  replaced? 
5. What i s  system response t o  any  syndrome? 
Approach : - 
1. Arbitrari ly remove system resources  (i.e.,  buses, memory) until sys- 
tem response d r o p s  below a m i n i m u m  time; cri t ical  functions are not 
done o r  system dies. 
a. these should be done several  times with different  resources  re- 
b. view the load shedding, i f  any, t o  see if  vital  functions  are 
moved a t  different "times/rates." 
s t i l l  being carried out; who i s  shedded f i r s t ;  when is  decis ion 
made (configuration a t  t h a t  time). 
c. see if  decision maker  works "consistently." 
d .  what  inputs  are ignored as  functionality  degrades; what  alterna- 
t ives are chosen? 
2. Restore  resources  arbitrarily. 
a. what functions  restored  first  (configuration a t  t h a t  time)? 
b. are resources "restarted/init ial  i zed" correctly? 
Outcome : 
1. "Remove/repl ace actions", i .e., configuration should be t abu1  ated 
against 
a .  system response  time. 
b. "c r i t i ca l"   func t ions   s t i l l  i n  operation. 
c. system inputs should be driven a t  a constant maximum rate. 
d .  the approaches need t o  be adjusted t o  each individual system and 
how their reconfiguration management i s  done. 
Fac i l i t i es :  
1. Modified executive 
2. A way t o  measure system response 
3. Means t o  remove/repl ace resources a rb i t ra r i ly  in  any order desi red 
Level of Effort: 
TB D 
TASK 111-4 
Task: Cold and Warm S t a r t  Manipulation 
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O b j e c t i v e :  
Exp lo re  the  
c a p a b i l i t i e s  a r e  
a power-on t r a n s i  
behav io r   o f   t he   sys tem when i t s  " i n s t i n c t i v e "  i n i t i a l  s t a r t  
stressed.  For  example,  what  happens when some modules  perceive 
e n t   w h i l e   t h e   r e s t   d o   n o t ?  More general ly,   wherever  modules 
possess  spec ia l  opera t iona l  modes tha t  can  be  S t imu la ted  apar t  f rom a system 
consensus,  the  consequences o f  v a r i o u s  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  o f  s u c h  modes i s   t o  be 
ex p l   o r e d  .
Approach: 
u n i t s   u n d e r   t e s t .   I n   g e n e r a l ,   t h e   s p e c i a l  modes wil be d i r e c t l y  s t i m u l a t e d  i n  
v a r i o u s  s u b s e t s  o f  m o d u l e s  b y  t h e  t e s t  c o o r d i n a t i o n  u n i t ,  w h i c h  i s  presumed 
here t o  be a minicomputer.   Der ive a g e n e r a l i z e d   b e h a v i o r a l   d e s c r i p t i o n   f r o m  
t h e  r e s u l t a n t  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  d a t a .  
The approach  must  be d e t a i l e d  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
1. Spec ia l   i n te r faces  and cables 
2. Rev ised  loca l   execut ives  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
TBD 
TASK 111-5 
Task: Common  Mode Noise and Margin  Test 
O b j e c t i v e :  
and i n p u t / o u t p u t  b u s e s  t o  common  mode no ise  and signals approaching and/or ex- 
c e e d i n g  t h e i r  b o u n d a r i e s ,  i n  e i t h e r  t h e  t i m e  o r  a m p l i t u d e  domain. 
Character ize  the  responses  of   the  intercommunicat ion  buses,  power  buses 
Approach : 
1. Common  Mode Noise 
a. i n j e c t   n o i s e  on the  buses  (power,  intercommunication, I/O) e i t h e r  
s i n g l y  o r  i n  m u l t i p l e s  and view  the  system's  responses;  i .e. ,  when 
does it d i e ;  w h a t  a r e  i t s  p r e c u r s o r s  t o  d e a t h ?  
- noise can be ra ised/ lowered i n  f requency. 
- noise  can  be  raised/!owered i n  d u r a t i o n .  
- n o i  se can be r a i   s e d / l  owered i n  amp1 i tude. 
- c r o s s t a l k  w i t h i n  a bus. 
Examples - w i t h  what  frequency and durat ion  can  noise  appear  on an i n t e r -  
communicat ion bus before the system gets  confused and c a n ' t  
r e c o n f  i gure? 
- what  s ize  g l i t ches  can power supply support? 
- a t  what amplitude does n o i s e  s t a r t  m a s k i n g  t h e  s i g n a l ?  
2. Marg in   Tes t i ng  
60 
a 
Ex  amp 
. v a r y  t h e  s i g n a l s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  e i t h e r  t i m e  o r  amp1 i t u d e  and 
v iew the system's response;  ascer ta in  "who" f a i l e d  f i r s t  and 
why. 
l e s  - v a r y .  v o l t a g e  u n t i l  some " u n i t s "  a r e  u n a b l e  t o  respond; i n s u f f i -  
c i e n t  power t o  d r i v e  l i n e  d r i v e r .  
a lmost  ' I / O ' ?  
- what  are  responses o f  b u f f e r s / d r i v e r s  t o  s i g n a l s  t h a t  a r e  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
1. Spec ia l   i n te r faces  and cab les  
2. N o i s e   g e n e r a t o r s   f o r  EM1 and  RFI 
3. Of f -board  a ta  recorders 
4. Vo l tage,   cur ren t   genera tors ;  1 og ic   analyzers 
5. Revised  loca l   execut ives 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
TB D 
TASK 111-6 
"- T i t l e :   C l o c k   M o d i f i c a t i o n   T e s t s  
O b j e c t i v e s :  
shape, and s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n   a r e   s t r e s s e d   u n t i l   t h e   s y s t e m   f a i l s .   A f t e r  a 
To cont ro l   the   sys tem  c lock  so t h a t  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  f r e q u e n c y ,  
f a i l u r e  has occurred,  syndrome  data  can  be  analyzed to  de te rm ine  wh ich  fac to rs  
o f  performance  degraded and what u l t i m a t e l y  caused t h e  f a i l u r e .  T h i s  t e s t  wil 
t y p i f y  t h e  c l o c k  o p e r a t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  w h i c h  can  be t o l e r a t e d  and, hence, 
wil i n d i c a t e  t h e  m a r g i n s  i n  t h e  c l o c k  s y s t e m  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  
Approach: 
implementation-dependent.  There  are a number o f  a1 t e r a t i o n s  t o  t h e  c l o c k  
s i g n a l ,  beyond spec i f i ed  va lues ,  wh ich  a re  to  be  appl ied. 
The c l o c k  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  w h i c h  a r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  employed  are 
c l o c k  r a t e :  The c l o c k  r a t e  i s  i n c r e a s e d  and p e r f o r m a n c e  d a t a  c o l l  e c t e d  
u n t i l  a system f a i l u r e  occurs. The behav io r   o f   the   sys tem as i t  
a p p r o a c h e s  t h e  c r i t i c a l  c l o c k  r a t e  wil c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  s y s t e m  f a i l u r e s  
a s   t h e   s p e c i f i e d   c l o c k   r a t e   i s  exceeded. 
synchron iza t ion   (skew) :  The synchronizat ion  (skew)  between  processors i s  
increased u n t i l  system f a i l u r e   o c c u r s .  As i n  t h e   c l o c k   r a t e   e x p e r i m e n t ,  
t h e  b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  a s  t h e  f a i l u r e  s t a t e  i s  a p p r o a c h e d  wil be 
analyzed i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e  o f  skew. 
c lock system noise:  The c l o c k ,  f o r  s i n g l e  o r  mu1 ti p le  p rocessors ,  i s  
per tu rbed by n o i s e   o f   v a r i o u s   d u r a t i o n s  and l e v e l s   ( n o n d e s t r u c t i v e ) .  This 
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a c t i v i t y  wi11 he1 p t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  s y s t e m ' s  vu1 n e r a b i l  i t y  t o   d i s t u r b -  
ance o f   t h i s   t y p e .  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
dromes.  There  are  no  unique f a c i l i t i e s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h i s  e x p e r i m e n t .  
The c a p a b i l i t y  t o  m a n i p u l a t e  t h e  e x i s t i n g  c l o c k  and t o  o b t a i n  s y s t e m  syn- 
TASK 111-7 
T i t l e :   M u l t i p l e   F a u l t   I n j e c t i o n s  
Ob jec t i ve :  
T h i s  t e s t  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  " b r e a k i n g  p o i n t "  o f  a f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  s y s t e m  u n d e r  m u l t i p l e  f a u l t s .  P a r a m e t e r s  o f  i n t e r e s t  a r e  t h e  number 
o f  i n s e r t i o n  p o i n t s ,  t h e  f a u l t  r a t e s  and d u r a t i o n s ,  and e f f e c t s  when p o i n t s  a r e  
e x c i t e d  w i t h  f a u l t s  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y .  
Approach: 
number o f  f a u l t s  b e i n g  i n s e r t e d  ( l < i < N ) .  The t i m e  o f  i n s e r t i o n  i s  g e n e r a t e d  
randomly  (Poisson) f o r  each p o i n t  a t  a r a t e  R. Fo r   each   se t   o f   t es ts   sys tem 
f a i l u r e s   a r e   t a b u l a t e d  as a f u n c t i o n  o f  i and R. S e n s i t i v e   p o i n t s   a r e   i d e n t i -  
f i ed  a t  wh ich  sys tem fa i l  u res  occu r  a t  bel ow-average f a u l t   a r r i  Val rates. 
Each o f  N s e t s  o f  t e s t s  examines the system performance with a d i f f e r e n t  
" 
A d d i t i o n a l  t e s t s  may be i nc luded  wh ich  va ry  the  fau l t  du ra t i on ,  o r  wh ich  
i n s e r t  f a u l t s  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  a t  s e l e c t e d  p o i n t s .  
F a c i l i t i e s :  Same as f o r   F a u l t   I n j e c t i o n   ( m u l t i p l e   c o p i e s )  
L e v e l   o f   E f f o r t :  Arduous 
TASK DEFIN IT ION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name G. Masson 
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l  i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task  Number: 111-8 
Task T i t l e :   M u l t i p l e ,   b u t   s e q u e n t i a l ,   i n j e c t i o n   o f   a u l t s   a t   p o t e n t i a l l y  
vu1 nerabl  e t imes  
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
Faul t process i  ng character i  zat i  on X 
Other (Spec i fy) 
- 
- 
Objec t i ve :  
example, i n  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  modes o f  o p e r a t i o n ?  F o r  example, a f a u l t  i s  
What i f  i n  "S IFT o r  FTMP" types  o f  systems, f a u l t s  were i n j e c t e d ,  f o r  
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in jected,   the  system  responds;   but   as it responds,   another   fau l t  i s  i n j e c t e d ,  
and so f o r t h .  
Procedure: 
Task  111-7 
Faci  1 i t i e s  : 
Task  111-7 
Personnel : 
Task  111-7 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Task  111-7 
P r i o r i t y :  
10 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name John M. Myers 
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l  i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 111-9 
Task T i t l e :   S u r p r i s e  Assessment  Methodology and Examples 
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R l i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  X 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  X 
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  X (cu ts  across  a1 1 
Other (Spec i f y )   t h r e e )  
Ob jec t ive :  
new approaches  by  ac t i ve  "ha rves t i ng "  o f  su rp r i ses .  
Avoid some c a t a s t r o p h e s  b y  e a r l y  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  s u r p r i s e s ,  and promote 
Procedure: 
Seek ( a t  NASA, S R I ,  Draper ,   Bend ix ,   Co l l ins ,   e tc . )   surpr ise   inc idents .  
D e v e l o p   P e t r i - n e t s   t o  show system  as  perceived  before and a f t e r  s u r p r i s e .  Show 
a l te rna t i ve .  Deve lop  concer t  o f  mapp ing  f rom one n e t  t o  a n o t h e r  as a measure 
o f  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  a surpr ise.   Disseminate.  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Access t o  computer  w i th  g raph ics  des i rab le .  
Personnel : 
Two Sen ior  Ana lys ts  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Q u a r t e r -  t o  h a l f - t i m e  - two years each 
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" . . .. . 
P r i o r i t y :  
TBD 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name .A. H. L i n d l e r  
Tasks which you fee l  are impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l  i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: 111-10 
Task T i  tl e :   E v a l u a t i o n   o f   S t r a t e g y   f o r   H a n d l i n g   T r a n s i e n t   a n d / o r  
I n t e r m i t t e n t   F a u l t s  
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  X 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  X 
Other   (Spec i   f y )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
Ver i fy  predicted  system  response. 
Characterize system performance. 
Procedure : 
I n s e r t  t r a n s i e n t s  and i n t e r m i t t e n t s  and record  system  response. 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Same as  Task  11-9. 
Personnel : 
TB D 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
TBD 
P r i o r i t y :  
8 
TASK D E F I N I T I O N  WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name C. L. Seacord 
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be proposed on t h i  s work sheet. 
Task Number: 111-11 
Task T i t l e :   A n a l y s i s / t e s t i n g   t o   d e t e r m i n e   t h e   t o l e r a n c e   o r   s e n s i t i v i t y  
hardware  parameter   var i   a t  i on 
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Category  (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  X 
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  X 
Other  (Spec i fy )  
- 
O b j e c t i v e :  
wil accompany t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  h a r d w a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  d u e  e i t h e r  t o  p i e c e  
p a r t  t o l e r a n c e  o r  e n v i r o n m e n t .  
Determine  the  change i n  performance o r  (more l i k e l y )  f a u l t  r e a c t i o n  t h a t  
Procedure : 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Personnel : 
1 Computer Designer/Analyst 
1 Technic ian 
1/2- t ime Sof tware Engineer  
- 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
3-6 months elapsed t ime and about 25% hardware a v a i l a b i l i t y  
P r i o r i t y :  
H i g h  t o  Medium 
TASK DEFIN IT ION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name A. H. L i n d l e r  
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l  i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be proposed on t h i  s work sheet. 
Task Number: 111-12 
Task T i t l e :   S e n s i t i v i t y   o f   s y s t e m   t o  phase l a g  
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
Faul t process i  ng v e r i  f i c a t i  on 
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   c h a r a c t e r i   z a t i o n  X 
O the r  (Spec i f y )  
O b j e c t i v e :  
Determine maximum phase lag   the   sys tem wil t o l e r a t e  ( p h a s e  l a g  a t  w h i c h  
g i v e n  f u n c t i o n  i s  n o t  performed-satisfactorily). 
. .  
Procedure: 
S e l e c t  a se t   o f   "h igh"   f requency   tasks ,   fo rce   g rea ter   than  normal  phase 
1 ag. 
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Level of Effort: 
TBD 
Pri  ori  ty : 
8 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
Participant 's  Name Pi0 De Feo 
Tasks which  you feel are important and not  incl uded in the prel iminary report 
may be proposed on t h i s  work sheet. 
Task  Number: 111-13 
Task Title:   Effects of Massive Failures 
Category (check):  Reliability  confirmation 
Fault  processing  verification 
Fault  processing  characteri  zation X 
Other  (Specify) 
- 
Objective: 
m i g h t  be generated by 1 ightni ng s t r ikes  , etc.  
Analyze effects  of massive fai lures  l ike cracked PC boards, failures which 
Procedure : 
connectors , etc.  
Physically insert solid massive fa i lures  which involve several chips, 
Fac i l i t i es :  










Tasks IV-1 through IV-11 
Proposed  by 
Working  Group I 1  P a r t i c i p a n t s  As I n d i c a t e d  
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name John M. Myers 
Tasks  which  you  fee l   are  impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be proposed on t h i s  work sheet. 
Task Number: IV-1 
Task T i t l e :   T h e o r e t i c a l   L i m i t a t i o n s   o f   F a u l t   T o l e r a n c e  
"_ 
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R e l i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
O t h e r   ( S p e c i f y )   T h e o r y   o f   f a u l t   t o l e r a n c e  
O b j e c t i v e :  
t o l e r a n t  c o m p u t e r  -- i n  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  thermodynamic l i m i t s  o r  e f f i c i e n c y .  
Show t h e o r e t i c a l  l i m i t s  t o  what f a u l t s  can  be t o l e r a t e d  b y  a f a u l t -  
P roced u r e  : 
F a u l t  d e t e c t i o n  i s  a n a l o g o u s  t o  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  n o n - t h e o r e m s  o f  a formal 
system.  From the   mathemat ica l   resu l ts   o f   Gode l ;   Tur ing ;   Jausk i  and Church, we 
know tha t  there  are  fundamenta l  1 i m i t a t i o n s  t o  t h e  a b i l  i t y  o f  any r e a l  i z a b l  e 
procedure t o  d e t e c t  non-theorems. I n  t h i s  t a s k  one  would  attempt t o  t r a n s f o r m  
t h e i r  f o r m a l  r e s u l t s  so as t o   i l l u m i n a t e   f u n d a m e n t a l  bounds  on  what f a u l t -  
to le ran t  computers  can mask and/or  detect .  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Penc i l  and Paper 
Personnel-: 
Senior  Analyst  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
H a l f - t i m e  f o r  one y e a r  
P r i o r i t y :  
High 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name John M. Myers 
67 
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be proposed on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: IV-2 
Task T i t l e :   P rov ing   T im ing   Cor rec tness  
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
O t h e r   ( S p e c i f y )   R e l i a b i l i t y   t h e o r y  
- 
O b j e c t i v e :  
Provide programming and c h e c k i n g  d i  s c i p l  i n e s  t o  g u a r a n t e e  c o r r e c t  t i m i n g  
o f  program execution. 
Procedure : 
s i g n i f i c a n t  a s p e c t  i s  more t r a c t a b l e .  P e t r i - n e t  a n a l y s i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  used 
t o  analyze  the FTMP c lock  network i s  f e a s i b l e  and can show t h e  m i n i m a l  r e s t r i c -  
t i o n s  on  programming  such tha t  bo th  sys tems and applications  programs  can  be 
guaranteed t o   r u n  on t ime. The same a n a l y s i s  wil produce a checking  procedure 
t o  gua ran tee  tha t  p rog rams  a re  wr i t t en  sub jec t  t o  the  necessa ry  res t r i c t i ons .  
A l though prov ing  the  cor rec tness  o f  s o f t w a r e  i s  e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t ,  one 
Personnel : 
Sen ior  Ana lys t  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
1 man-year 
P r i o r i t y :  
TB D 
TASK DEFIN IT ION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name A. H. L i n d l e r  
Tasks  which  you  feel  are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l  i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work sheet. 
Task  Number: IV-3 
Task T i  tl e :  T rade-o f f  o f  D i  agnost ic/Mai ntenance/Fai  1 ure Low-Level 
I s o l a t i o n  V e r s u s  D e c r e a s e d  R e l i a b i l i t y  
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Other  (Speci fy)  Research Task 
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Objec t ive :  
Prov ide  a genera l  idea  o f  sys tem re1  iab i l  i t y  degrada t ion  resu l t i ng  f rom 
i n c r e a s e d  v i s i b i l i t y  o f  d e t a i l s  o f  f a i l u r e s  ( s e n s i n g  r e q u i r e s  a d d i t i o n a l  
c o m p l e x i t y  i n  t e r m s  o f  t e s t  p o i n t s  w h i c h  i n c r e a s e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  system t o  
f a u l t s  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  e x t r a  hardware and sof tware) .  
Procedure: 
Analys i  s 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
None 
Personnel : 
Systems Analyst and/or Re1 i a b i l  i t y  Analyst  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
TB D 
P r i o r i t y :  
8 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i  p a n t ' s  Name Hopki ns 
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be proposed on t h i  s work sheet. 
Task Number: IV-4 "- 
Task T i t l e :   I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n   f o r   T i m i n g   T e s t s  
Category  (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  
Fau l t   p rocess i  ng c h a r a c t e r i   z a t i o n  
O the r   (Spec i f y )   Fac i  1 i t y  devel  o p m e n r  
O b j e c t i v e :  
bas i  s (Hei  senberg notwithstanding).  
Develop methodology t o  o b s e r v e  t i m i n g  r e 1  a t i o n s h i  ps on a n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  
Procedure: 
Evo lve   phys i ca l   p r i nc ip les .  
Design  hardware  experiments. 
Design  inst rumentat ion.  
B u i l d  and t e s t .  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
TBD 
Personnel : 
Phys ic i   s t /Eng i   nee r  
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E l e c t r o n i c  T e c h n i c i a n  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
5-10 man-months 
P r i o r i t y :  
Highest 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name G. Masson 
Tasks which you feel  are important and n o t  i n c l  uded i n  t h e  p r e l  i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task  Number: I V - 5  
Task T i t l e :   S e n s i t i v i t y   A n a l y s i s / M e a s u r e m e n t   o f  a System t o   F a u l t s  
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R e l i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Other   (Spec i fy )   Bas ic   research  
- 
Object  i ve: 
s e n s i t i v e  a system i s  t o  f a u l t s ?  I n  o t h e r  words, can I measure a minimal 
i n j e c t i o n  f o r  system f a i l u r e ?  
What are  the  measures o f  f a u l t  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  we can desc r ibe  how 
Procedure: 
Tasks 111-5 t o  7 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Tasks 111-5 t o  7 
Personnel : 
Tasks  11-5 t o  7 
Level o f  E f f o r t :  
Tasks 111-5 t o  7 
P r i o r i t y :  
10 
TASK DEFIN IT ION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name G. Masson 
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed on t h i s  work sheet. 
Task Number: IV-6 
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Task T i t l e :   F a u l t - T e s t   I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p   C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
Fau l t   p rocess i  ng c h a r a c t e r i   z a t   i o n  
Other   (Speci fy)   Bas ic   research 
O b j e c t i v e :  
I n  o r d e r  t o  p e r f o r m  d i a g n o s t i c a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  o n  "SIFT/FTMP" ' t y p e s  o f  
systems, i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  t h e  c o m p l e x  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among f a u l t s  and 
t e s t s  be  mentioned. I n  o t h e r  words, what f a u l t s   d o   t e s t s   c o v e r / d e t e c t ,  and 
what f a u l t s  i n v a l   i d a t e   t e s t s ?  
Procedure: 
I n j e c t i o n  o f  m u l t i p l e  f a u l t s  ( b o t h  permanent and i n t e r m i t t e n t )  i n  subsys- 
tems  be ing   tes ted  and subsys tems  do ing   the   tes t ing .   Genera t ion   o f  an  extended 
ou tcome mat r i x  wh ich  desc r ibes  the  p robab i l i t y  t ha t  a f a u l t ' s  subsystem detects 
f a u l t s  i n  a f a u l t ' s  sybsystem. 
"
F a c i l i t i e s :  
"_I_- 
Tasks  111-5 t o  7 
Personnel : 
Tasks  111-5 t o  7 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Tasks  111-5 t o  7 
P r i o r i t y :  
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TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name G. Masson 
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: IV-7 
Task T i t l e :   C o m p o s i t e   V a l i d a t i o n  
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R e l i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  
Faul t process i   ng  ver i  f i  c a t i  on 
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Other   (Spec i fy )   Bas ic   research  
I O b j e c t i v e :  
F i r s t  , everyone should accept the 
nique  which wil y i e l d  a s i n g l e  number 
t h e   r e 1   i a b i l  i t y  o f  a system. Instead, 
f a c t  that  $here wil never  be a tech- 
(i.e., 10' ) w i t h  w h i c h  t o  e v a l u a t e  
t h e  Val i d a t   i o n  w i  11 have t o  be based on 
7 1  
many c o n t r i b u t i o n s  w h i c h  when c o l l e c t e d  t o g e t h e r  p r o v i d e  s t r o n g  ( i r r e f u t a b l e )  
d a t a / e v i d e n c e  r e g a r d i n g  r e l i a b i l i t y .  
Procedure : 
c a l  l y  be developed which ut i1  i ze t h i s   d a t a   t o   f o r m  a composi te  e lement  for  the 
Val i da t i on   p rocess?  
What data bases can be generated by AIRLAB exper iments and can t h e o r e t i -  
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Exposure t o  AIRLAB proposals,  ongoing exper iments , growth  p lans  o f  
AIRLAB. 
Personnel : 
1 Ph.D. O p e r a t i o n s   R e s e a r c h / S t a t i s t i c i a n  
1 Assist ing Analyst /Programmer 
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
Continuous 
P r i o r i t y  : 
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TASK D E F I N I T I O N  WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name G. Masson 
Tasks  which  you  feel   are  important and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be  proposed  on t h i s  work  sheet. 
Task Number: IV-8 
Task T i t l e :  E r r o r  P a t t e r n  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  G e n e r i c  A n a l o g / P h y s i c a l  F a u l t  
Mechanisms 
Category (check):  Re1 i a b i l  i t y  c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t  p r o c e s s i n g  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
Other   (Spec i fy )   Bas ic   research  
O b j e c t i v e :  
systems a c t u a l l y  d o  when so d i s t r i b u t e d ?  Does a subsystem  do  anything  each 
t i m e  o r  does i t  f a l l  i n t o  c e r t a i n  modes o f  f a u l t y  o p e r a t i o n  t h a t  o v e r  many 
r e p e t i t i o n s  o f  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  a r e  seen many t imes? Can these modes be c l a s s i -  
f i e d  b y  e r r o r  p a t t e r n s  as t h e  bus  (address,   data,   cont ro l )?  
Given  111-5, an i m p o r t a n t   q u e s t i o n   i s   t h e   f o l l o w i n g :  What do  var ious sub- 
Procedure: 
T a s k  111-5 t o  7 
F a c i l i t i e s :  








TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
Participant 's  Name "G. Masson 
Tasks which  you feel  are  important and not included  in  the  preliminary  report 
may be proposed on t h i s  work sheet. 
Task  Number: IV-9 
Task Ti t l   e :  Establ i shi n-g Generic Fault C 1  asses 
Category (check):  Reliability  confirmation 
Fault  processing  verification 
Fault processing characterization 
Other (Specify) Basic  research 
Objective: 
faults operation? For example, memory errors a bus patterns. 
To what level do we coll apse faults operation and how do  we describe this 
Procedure : 
terns.  Develop generic  ategories. 
Inject ranges of analog fau l t s  and observe, for example, bus error  p a t -  
Faci 1 i t i e s :  
Task 11-7 and Tasks 111-5 t o  7 
Personnel-: 
Same 
Level  of Effort:  
Same 
P r i   or i  ty: 
10 
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
Name: John Myers 
Task Number: IV-10 
Research  Topics: Instrumenting  Fault-Tolerant Computers 
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A. What s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  a r e  needed f o r  SIFT  and FTMP so tha t   t hey   can   be  
e f f e c t i v e l y   m o n i t o r e d ?  
1 )  Can m o n i t o r i n g   b e   d o n e   w i t h o u t   d e c r e a s i n g   r e l i a b i l i t y ?  
2) What needs t o   b e   m o n i t o r e d ?  
B. Ins t rumenta t ion   Requ i rements  
1 )  What ( f r o m  i t e m  2 above)  needs t o  be  moni tored? 
2) What bandwidth i s  requ i red? 
3 )  How much para1  le1  ism?  Concurrenc 
4)  How t o   p r o v i d e   f o r   f l e x i b  +? y - c o n t r o l l e d   e x t r a c t i o n   o f   s i g n i f i c a n t   f e a -  
t u r e s ,  t o  a v o i d  b e i n g  d e l a y e d  w i t h  u n i n t e r e s t i n g  d a t a ?  
Personnel :  
Engineer ,   Technic ian,   Analyst  
L e v e l  o f  E f f o r t :  
S ix  man-months each 
P r i o r i t y :   H i g h  
TASK DEFINITION WORK SHEET 
P a r t i c i p a n t ' s  Name G. Masson 
Tasks  which  you  fee l   are  impor tant  and n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  
may be proposed on t h i  s work sheet. 
Task Number: IV-11 
Task T i t l e :   E r r o r   P a t t e r n s  on  Buses as a H igh-Leve l   Fau l t   Man i fes ta t ion  
C a t e g o r y   ( c h e c k ) :   R e l i a b i l i t y   c o n f i r m a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i n g   v e r i f i c a t i o n  
F a u l t   p r o c e s s i  ng c h a r a c t e r i   z a t i o n  
Other   (Spec i fy )   Bas ic   research  
- 
O b j e c t i v e :  
Above fau l t /changed memory l o c a t i o n s  i n  a h i g h - l e v e l  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  we 
cou ld  cons ide r  e r ro r  pa t te rns  on  buses  i n  the  sense  tha t  even  i f  memory words 
a r e  bad, when I r e a d / w r i t e ,  I see  the  fau l t s  as  an e r r o r  p a t t e r n  on  the  bus 
l i n e s .  
Procedure: ~- 
Tasks 11-8 and 9, Tasks  111-5 t o  7 
F a c i l i t i e s :  
Bus i n jec to r   ha rdware  
Personnel : 
Tasks  111-5 t o  7 
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Level o f  Effort: 




APPENDIX I11 - TASK  RATING  RESULTS  FROM WORKING GROUP I 1  
RELATIVE ASSESSMENT  OF INITIAL PROPOSED VALIDATION TASKS 
FOR FAULT-TOLERANT  COMPUTER  SYSTEMS 
Working  Group I 1  p a r t i c i p a n t s  were  asked t o  assess  the  re la t i ve  impor tance  
o f  t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  t a s k s  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  w o r k i n g  g r o u p  m e e t i n g  
h e l d  i n  September. The r e s u l t  o f  these  assessments i s  summarized i n  F i g u r e  
D. l .  
P a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  W o r k i n g  Group I I  were t o l d  t o  c o n s i d e r  each  task  presented 
and r a t e  them  on a s c a l e  o f  1 t o  10. They were f u r t h e r  t o l d  t h a t  a s c o r e  o f  1 0  
was t h e  h i g h e s t  r a t i n g  a p roposed  task   cou ld   rece ive  and t h a t  1 i n d i c a t e d  t h e  
l o w e s t  r a t e d  t a s k s .  
It should  be  noted  that  Task  1-3 rece ived   t he   h ighes t  mean score of 9.4. 
Task  11-10 rece ived   t he   l owes t   sco re   o f  5.7. O f  the   23   p roposed  tasks ,   on ly  4 
rece ived a 1 - the  lowest  possible  score.   These  were  Tasks 1-2,  11-6, 11-8 and 
11-10. 
The t a s k  e v a l u a t i o n  r e s u l t s  s h o u l d  b e  t a k e n  o n l y  as  an i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
d e s i r a b i l i t y   o f   t h e  proposed  tasks. It i s  c l e a r  t h a t  a much more i n - d e p t h  and 
p r e c i s e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  o b j e c t i v e s  and methods o f  t h e s e  t a s k s  wil be requ i red .  
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D r .  Steve  Crocker 
USC/ In fo rmat ion  Sc iences  Ins t i tu te  
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Marina  Del Rey, CA 90291 
Phone: (213)  822-1511 
D r .  P i 0  De Feo 
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Phone: (41 5) 965-  5048 
M r .  B i l l y  L. Dove 
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Mai l   Stop 477 
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Phone: (804)  827-3681 
Mr. Robert G. F lynn  
The Boeing Company 
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Phone: (206)  773-1786 
D r .  James W .  Gaul t  
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77 
D r .  A1 b e r t  L. Hopkins, Jr. 
C. S. Draper  Laboratory,  Inc. 
Ma i l  S ta t i on  35  
555 Techno1 ogy Square 
Cambridge, MA 02139 
Phone: (617)  258-1451 
*Mr. Rostam Joobbani 
R e s e a r c h  T r i a n g l e  I n s t i t u t e  
Systems and Measurements D i v i s i o n  
P.O. Box 12194 
Research  Tr iangle  Park,  NC 27709 
Phone: (919)  541-6830 
Dr .  Wi l l iam Kautz  
S R I  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
333  Ravenswood  Avenue 
Men1 o Park, CA 94025 
Phone: (415)  326-6200 
Mr .  A1 b e r t  H. L i   n d l e r  
NASA-Langley  Research Center 
M a i l  Stop 477 
Hampton, VA 23665 
Phone: (804)  827-3681 
Mr.  Br ian  Lupton 
NASA-Langl ey Research Center 
Mai  1 Stop 477 
Hampton, VA 23665 
Phone: (804)  827-3681 
D r .  Gerald Masson 
E l  ect r ica l  Engineer ing Depar tment  
Johns Hopki ns U n i v e r s i t y  
Barton Ha l  1 
Charles & 34 th  S t r e e t s  
Bal t imore, MD 21218 
Phone : (301)  338-7013 
M r .  Jack D. McDonnell 
McDonnell Doug1 as Corpora t ion  
3855  Lakewood Boulevard 
Mai l  Code 36-49 
Long Beach, CA 90846 
Phone: (213)  593-5616 
Mr. Peter   Michael  Me1 1 i ar-Smi t h  
S R I  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
333 Ravenswood  Avenue 
Menlo  Park, CA 94025 
Phone: (415)  326-6200  Ext. 2336 
D r .  J. F. Meyer 
2523 E l  e c t r i c a l  E n g i n e e r i n g  B u i l d i n g  
The U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Michigan 
Ann Arbor, M I  48109 
Phone : (31 3) 763-0037 
Mr .  G. Earl  Migneaul t 
NASA-Langl ey Research Center 
M a i l  Stop 477 
Hampton, VA 23665 
Phone: (804)  827-3681 
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Table 1.1 P r o p e r t i e s  Which Make U1 t r a - R e 1  i a b l e  Systems 
D i f f i c u l t  t o  V a l i d a t e " " =  _ _  . . . .  .. _.i ~ ~i ~ __-_ 
1. L i f e t e s t i n g   i s   i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  
2. System  design  complexi ty makes it d i f f i c u l t  t o :  
a p e r f o r m  f a i l u r e  e f f e c t s  a n a l y s i s ,  
0 i ns t rument  and measure a1 1 re1 evant parameters, 
0 use t e s t i n g  approaches since so many s t a t e s  and 
f a i l   u r e  modes are  poss ib le .  
3. Large-scal  e i n teg ra t i on  techno1  ogy r e a l  i z a t i o n  makes i t  
d i f f i c u l t  t o :  
0 access   impor tan t   con t ro l  and obse rva t i on   po in ts ,  
0 i n j e c t  f a u l t s  a t  a l e v e l  where f a u l t  models  are  best 
0 determine a con f idence  leve l  f o r  f au l t  cove rage .  
understood , and 
Table 1.2 C a t e g o r i e s  f o r  S t a t e  o f  t h e  A r t  in-Validati .on.Met.hods 
Category i n  Category i n  
"" . 
Working  Group I1  ~ ~ .~ - "Worki?g..GrouP -~ ~ _ ~ _  ~ 
1. Logica l   Proofs   Formal   Proofs  
2. A n a l y t i c a l  Model s 
3. Exper imenta l   Tes t ing  
Anal y s  i s 
Re1 i a b i l  i t y  Model i n g  
T e s t i n g  
Si mu1 a t i  on/Emul a t i  on 
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I 
Table 3.1  Proposed Validation Task Summary - Category I :  Confirmation of System Reliability 
WG-I I 
Task No. Rating Task Ti t le  
1-1 8.4 Re1 i abi 1 i t y  Anal ysi s 
1-2 8 .O Confirmation and Use of 
Design Proofs 
1-3 9.4 
1-6 (* 1 
(Hecht) 
Design of Experiments and 
Analysis of Experimental 
Data 
A1 ternative Model i ng Tech- 
n i  ques 
Model Sol ut ion Methods 
Eva1 uati on of Re1 i a b i  1 i t y  
Requi rements 
Task Objective 
1- To devel op improved mathematical models of 
2- To estimate reliability characteristics 
system  re1 iabil i t y .  
based upon assumed and experimentally- 
derived fai lure  s ta t is t ics .  
1- To maintain the integrity of design 
2- To use experimental results t o  confirm 
3- To use proofs t o  guide experimental tests.  
correctness  proofs. 
proof assumptions. 
Estimate parameters and distributions of 
various aspects for f a u l t  hand1 ing 
behavi or. 
Identify and assess alternative models for 
computer re1 i ab i  1 i t y  assessment, such as 
Petri  nets. 
To determi ne methods for solving stochastic 
performance re1 i abi 1 i t y  and perform- 
ab i  1 i t y  model s. 
To i nsure compati  bi 1 i t y  of re1 i abi 1 i t y  
confirmation w i t h :  
a )  current techno1 ogy , 
b )  current  regulations and 
c )  observed incidents. 
Table 3.1  Proposed Validation Task Summary - Category I :  Confirmation of System Reliability 
(concl uded) 
WG-I I 
Task No. Rating Task Ti t le  Task Objective 
1-7 (*> Performance Confirmation To develop a s ta te  model for re1 iabi l   i ty  
(Murray) analysis which  can di s t i  ngui sh between 
"good" s ta te  and "failed" state.  
1-8 (*> Performance Analysis 
(Hopki ns) 
To develop a structural model of 
performance capabi 1 i t y  . 
1-9 (*> Executive Imp1 ementati on Proof To establish a t  A I R L A B  the  capability t o  
(Me1 1 i ar-Smi t h )  formally  verify  the implementation of the 
executive (and associated programs) 
aga i  nst  thei r specification. 
1-10 (*> Appl i cati  on Requi rements 
(Me1 1 i ar-Smi t h )  Anal ysi s 
To develop methods for formally verifying 
the specifications of the application 
tasks agai nst the underlyi ng aerodynamic 
and structural requirements. 
1-11 (* 1 Application Program Proof  Develop  methods for  verifying  the  correct- 
(Me1 1 i ar-Smi t h )  ness of appl i cati  on programs by 
mathematical analysis. 
(*) Indicates  task not rated by Working Group 11. 
a3 w 
Table 3.2  Proposed Va l i da t i on  Tasks Summary - Category 11: Fau l t  P rocess ing  Ver i f i ca t i on  
WG-I I 
Task No. Ra t ing  Task T i t l e  Task Ob jec t ive  
11-1 8.2 I n i  ti a1 System  Check-Out Ver i fy   tha te   s ing le  p rocessor   per fo rms 
(d iagnos t ic )   bas ic   func t ions .  
11-2 8 .O P rog ramer ' s  Manual Va l i da t i on  1- To i den t i f y   des ign   e r ro rs .  To ensure  the 
machine  performs  functions  according t o  
speci f i c a t  i ons i n p rog ramer ' s  manual . 
completely described machi ne features.  









S i  ngl e Processor  Executive 1- To determine i f  execut ive  rout ines  respond 
2- To i d e n t i f y  d e s i g n  e r r o r s  and incomplete ly  
Val i d a t i o n .  as speci f i  ed. 
spec i f i ed  execu t i ve  rou t i nes .  
Mult iprocessor  Interconnec- 1- To Val i da te   t he   i n te rconnec t ions  between 
ti on  Val i da t  i on  processors. 
2- To Val i d a t e  mu1 ti processor  funct ional  i t y .  
Mu1 ti processor  Executive 1- To determi ne i f  mu1 ti processor and s i n g l e  
and E r r o r  Management processor  executives  respond as 
Val i dat  i on speci f i  ed. 
2- To ident i f y  des ign  er ro rs  o r  incomple te  
spec i f i ca t i on .  
App l i ca t i on  Program  Val i d a t i o n  1- To v e r i f y   t h a t   a p p l i c a t i o n   s o f t w a r e  
responds as spec i f ied .  
2- To i d e n t i f y  d e s i g n  e r r o r s .  
3- Measure  system  parameters wi th  t ime vary-  
i ng inputs .  
03 
P Table 3.2 Proposed V a l i d a t i o n  Tasks Summary - Category 11: F a u l t   P r o c e s s i n g   V e r i f i c a t i o n  
(cont  i nued) 
WG-I I 
Task No. R a t i n g  Task T i t l e  
11-7 7.1 S imu la t i on   o f   I naccess ib le  
Phys ica l   Fa i  1 ures 
11-8 8 .O P h y s i c a l   F a u l t   I n s e r t i o n :  
S i  ng l  e Processor Mani f e s t a -  
t i on  Unders tand ing  and 
P r e l i m i n a r y  C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
H i  stograms 
11-9 8.4 P h y s i c a l   F a u l t   I n s e r t i o n :  
Mu1 t i  processor 
11-10 5.7 Execut ive  Rout ine Response 
Charac ter iza t ion  Under  
S i  ng l  e Phys ica l   Fa i  1 ure 
Condi t ions 
11-11 8.2 Mu1 ti processor  Execut ive 
Faul t Hand1 i ng Capabi 1 i ti es 
Task Ob jec t ive  
1- To enhance understanding of  re la t ionship 
between  phys ica l   fau l ts  and t h e i r  e r r o r  
man i fes ta t ions .  
s u p p o r t   p h y s i c a l   f a u l t   i n j e c t i o n  
experiments. 
2-  To prov ide  a data base t o  supplement/ 
1- To estab 
reduce 
h igher  
2- Generate 
h i   s t o g  
t imes. 
1 i s h  f u n c t i o n a l  f a u l t  c l a s s e s  t o  
number o f  f a u l  t s  i n j e c t e d  a t  
system 1 eve1 s. 
" r e p r e s e n t a t i  vel' system l e v e l  
rams o f  d e t e c t i o n  and i s o l a t i o n  
E s t a b l   i s h   f a u l t   c l  asses f o r  mu1 ti proces- 
so r s  . 
1- To c lass i f y  execu t i ve  rou t i ne  responses  
2- To a b s t r a c t  f a i l u r e  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  f o r  
t o  hardware f a i  1 ures . 
higher system level  s i n  o r d e r  t o  r e d u c e  
number o f  f a u l t  i n s e r t i o n  e x p e r i m e n t s .  
1- To c l a s s i f y  mu1 ti processi  ng response t o  
2- To measure  reconf i g u r a t i  on schedul i ng 
hardware f a i  1 ures. 
a1 g o r i  thm  t ime  constant. 
Table 3.2 Proposed V a l i d a t i o n  Tasks Summary - Category 11: Fau l t   P rocess ing   Ve r i f i ca t i on  
(cont inued) 
WG-I I 
Task No. Rat ing  Task T i t l e  Task Object ive 
11-12 7.3  Mu1 ti processor Appl i c a t i o n  1- To c lass i fy   app l i ca t ion   so f tware   response 
Program F a u l t  Handl i ng t o  hardware f a i  1 ures. 
2- To measure  system  response  parameters f o r  
f a i  1 u r e  s i  t u a t i  o m .  
11-13 7.1 
11-14 (* 1 
(Hecht) 
11-16 (*I  
(Me1 1 iar -Smi th)  
11-17 (*I  
(Moses) 
Mu1 ti processor Mu1 ti appl i ca- 1- To character ize system scheduler i n  f a i l u r e  
2- To c l a s s i f y  a p p l i c a t i o n  programs and system 
t i o n  Program F a u l t  Handl i n g   s i t u a t i o n s .  
so f tware   to   hardware   fa i  1 ures. 
Software Rel, i ab i  1 i t y  Research 1- To i d e n t i f y  s e v e r i t y  o f  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  of 
s o f t w a r e   f a i  1 ures. 
o f  s t r e s s .  
2- To measure so f tware  fa i l u res  as a funct ion 
Measurement o f   Synchron iza t ion  1- To  make an exper imental   determinat ion  of  
o f   C locks   the   behav io r   o f   func t ion ing   c locks .  
2- To develop instrumentat ion capable o f  
d i   s t i   n g u i   s h i  ng r a r e   c l o c k   f a i  1 ures  from 
ins t rumen ta t i on  fa i l u res .  
Fai 1 ure  Sever i ty   Analys i  s 
App l i ca t i on  Program V a l i d a t i o n  
and Performance Base1 i n e  f o r  
a System 
To ob ta in  o r  deve lop  a c a t e g o r i z a t i o n  o f  
f a i l u r e  syndromes aga ins t  t he  seve r i t y  o f  
t h e i r  consequences. 
To v a l i d a t e  a p p l i c a t i o n  s o f t w a r e  f o r  t h e  
system. (Note: Task 11-6 addresses 
computer-only validation.) 
: 
a3 cn Table 3.2 Proposed V a l i d a t i o n  Tasks Summary - Category 11: F a u l t   P r o c e s s i n g   V e r i f i c a t i o n  
(concl  uded) 
WG-I I 
Task No. R a t i n g  Task T i t l e  Task O b j e c t i v e  
11-18 (* 1 Software  F ult-Containment To s t r e s s   s y t e m ' s   a b i l i t y   t o c o n t a i n  
(B. S m i t h )   V e r i f i c a t i o n   s o f t w a r e   r o r s   t o   a f f e c t e d   a p p l   i c a t i o n  
programs. 
11-19 (*) Log ica l   Ana lys is   o f Des ign  To reduce  by   log ica l   an lys is   o f the  
(Me1 1 i ar-Smi t h )   t o Reduce S ize   o f   Tes t   des ign ,   t he   l a rge  number o f   t e s t  cases 
Data  Sets  necessary f o r  coverage  ver i  f i c a t  i on. 
11-20 (*I D e f i n i t i o n  and Use o f  Appl i c a -  To def ine,   eva luate and employ benchmark 
(Mu1 c a r e )   t i o n  Benchmark Programs a p p l i c a t i o n s   s o f t w a r e   f o r   i n t e g r a t e d  
a v i o n i c s  and f l i g h t  c o n t r o l .  
11-21 (*I Ver i  f i c a t  i on o f   Opera t i ona l  To v e r i f y   t h a t   f a u l t s   a r e  d t e c t e d   w i t h  
(Abraham)  Syste  D iagnost ic  Coverage pe r iod i c   d i   agnos i s .  
(*) Ind ica tes  task  no t  ra ted  by  Work ing  Group 11. 
Table 3.3 Proposed V a l i d a t i o n  Task Summary - Category 111: Faul t   Process ing  Character izat ion 
WG-I I 
Task No. R a t i n g   T a s k .i l e  
I 11-1 7.3  Fa1 se Input   In fo rmat ion  
I 11-2 6.7 
111-3 8 .O 
I 11-4 6.6 
111-5 7.9 
I 11-6 7.5 
Memory A1 t e r a t  i on 
Conf igurat ion Contro l  
Mani pu l   a t i on  
Cold and Warm S t a r t  
Manipulat ion 
Common  Mode Noise and Margin 
Tests 
Clock Modif icat ion Tests 
Task Ob jec t ive  
To determi ne the   f au l   t - t o le ran t   compu te r  
system's  response t o  i n p u t  i n f o r m a t i o n  
which i s  p l a u s i b l e  (e.g., passes  bound 
checks)   but   incorrect .  
Se lec t i ve  memory  a1 t e r a t i o n  c a n  be used t o  
character ize the robustness of  a f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  system when con f ron ted  w i th  
a)  sof tware and des ign  er ro rs ,  b )  la ten t  
f a u l t s ,  c )  c o r r e l a t e d  f a u l t s ,  and 
d)  confus ion by divergence. 
To f i n d  t h e  1 i m i t s  o f  t h e  system when 
responses  are  arb i   t rar i  l y  removed. 
To exp lo re  the  behav io r  o f  the  system when 
i t s  " i n s t i n c t i v e "  i n i t i a l  s t a r t  capa- 
b i  1 i ti es are  stressed. 
Characterize the responses of i ntercon- 
nec t ion  buses and input /ou tpu t  buses t o  
common  mode noise and signals approaching 
and/or exceeding t h e i r  boundaries i n  
e i t he r  the  t ime  o r  amp l i t ude  domain. 
To determine the clock frequency, shape  and 
synchron iza t ion  po in ts  a t  wh ich  the  
system f a i  1 s. 
co aY Table 3.3 Proposed V a l i d a t i o n  Task Summary - Category 111: Fau l t   P rocess ing   Charac te r i za t i on  
WG-I  
Task No. R a t i n g  Task T i t l e  Task O b j e c t i v e  
I 1  1-7 7.6  Mu1 t i p l e   F a u l t   I n j e c t i o n s  To c h a r a c t e r i z e   t h   " b r e a k i n g   p o i n t "   o f  a 
f a u l   t - t o 1   e r a n t  system  under mu1 ti p l  e 
f a u l t s .  




I 11-10 (*> 
( L i   n d l   e r )  
I 11-11 (* 1 
(Seacord) 
Mu l t i p le ,   Sequen t ia l   I n jec -  To d e t e r m i n e  t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  f a u l t -  
t i o n  o f  F a u l t s  a t  P o t e n t i a l l y  t o l e r a n t  systems t o  s e q u e n t i a l  f a u l t s  a t  
Vu1 nerabl  e Times c r i t i c a l  t i m e s ,  such as dur ing  recon- 
f i g u r a t i  on. 
Surpr i  se  Assessment Methodology To avoid some ca tas t roph ies   by   ear ly  
a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  s u r p r i s e s  and t o  promote 
new approaches  by a c t i v e  ' ' h a r v e s t i n g "  o f  
s u r p r i  ses. 
E v a l u a t i o n   o fS t r a t e g y   f o r  1- V e r i f y   p r e d i c t e d  system  response. 
Hand1 i ng Transient   and/or  2- Characterize  system  performance. 
I n t e r m i t t e n t  F a u l t s  
T o l e r a n c e  o f  S e n s i t i v i t y  t o  Determine  the  change i n  performance or 
Hardware Parameter (more l i k e l y )  f a u l t  r e a c t i o n  t h a t  wil 
V a r i  a t  i on accompany d i  f f e r e n c e s  i n  hardware 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  due t o  e i t h e r  p i e c e - p a r t  
to1 erance or environment. 
Table 3.3 Proposed V a l i d a t i o n  Task Summary - Category 111: Faul t   Process ing  Character izat ion 
(concluded) 
WG- I  I 
Task No. Ra t ing  Task T i t l e  Task Ob jec t ive  
I 11-12 (*I S e n s i t i v i t y   o f  System t o  Determi ne  maximum phase 1 ag the  system wil 
( L i   n d l e r )  Phase Lag  to1 er nt (i .e., phase lag   a t   wh ich   g iven  
func t i on  i s  no t  pe r fo rmed  sa t i s fac to -  
r i  l y )  . 
I 11-13 (*> Ef fec ts   o f   Mass ive   Fa i l u res  To ana lyze   e f fec ts   o f   mass ive   f a i l u re  1 i k e  
(De Feo)  cracked PC boa rds ,   l i gh tn ing s t r i kes ,  
e tc .  
(*)  Ind i ca tes  tasks  no t  ra ted  by  Nork ing  Group 11. 
a 
0 Tab1 e 3.4 Proposed Val idati  on Task Summary - Category IV: Other Tasks 
Task No. 
I V-3 








Rat i  ng 
(*I  
Task Ti t le  
Theoretical  Limits of  F a u l t  
To1 erance 
Proving Timing Correctness 
Trade-off o f  Diagnostic/ 
Mai ntenance/Fai 1 ure Low- 
Level Is01 a t i o n  Versus 
Re1 i abi 1 i t y  
Instrumentation for Timing 
Tests 
Sensitivity Analysi s/Measure- 
ment  of a System t o  Faults 
Fault-Test  Interrelationship 
Characteri z a t i  on 
Task Objective 
Demonstrate theoretical limits t o  what 
faul ts  can be tolerated by a fault-  
to1  erant computer. 
Provide programmi ng and checki ng di sci - 
plines t o  guarantee correct timing o f  
program execution. 
To provide a general  idea of system 
re1 i abi 1 i t y  degradation  resulting from 
increased visibility of detai ls  of 
f a i  1 ures . 
Develop methodology t o  observe timing 
re1 a t i  onshi ps on a non-i nterferi ng basi s. 
To determine if there are measures of fau l t  
manifestation t h a t  can  be  used t o  
describe how sensitive a system i s  t o  
faul ts .  
To understand compl ex i nterrel  ati onshi ps 
among faul ts  and tes t s .  To determine 
what faults tests cover/detect and what 












Table 3.4 Proposed V a l i d a t i o n  Task Summary - Category IV: Other Tasks 
(concl  uded) 
t a t i o n  
Task T i t l e  
Composite  Val i d a t i o n  
E r r o r  P a t t e r n  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
of  Generic Anal  og/Physi  cal 
Fau l t  Mechanisms 
Establ i shi  ng Generic  Fault 
C1 asses 
Instrument i  ng Faul  t-Tolerant 
Computers 
E r ro r  Pa t te rns  on Buses as 
a H i  gh-Level Fault Manifes- 
Task Object ive 
To i d e n t i f y  and assess va l i da t i on  tech -  
niques which when co l l ec ted  toge the r  
p rov ide  s t rong ( i r re fu tab le )  da ta /  
evidence  regardi ng re1 i abi 1 i t y  . 
To determine what var ious subsystems 
a c t u a l l y  do when disturbed. To determine 
i f  c e r t a i n  modes o f  f a u l t y  o p e r a t i o n  a r e  
consistent.  
To determine the leve l  t o  which we c o l l  apse 
fau l ts   opera t ion .  To d e s c r i b e   t h i s  
fau l ts  opera t ion .  
To determine speci f icat ions and i n s t r u -  
mentation requirements so t h a t  f a u l t -  
t o l e r a n t  computers can be e f f e c t i v e l y  
monitored. 
I 
To determi ne h i  gh-1 eve1 f a u l t  mani fes ta -  
t ions ,  such  as e r ro r  pa t te rns  on buses. 
( * )  Indicates task not rated by Working Group 11. 




I- Functional Specifications +- Design Specifications 
Does functional specification 
meet the goals  and  requirements? 
Does the design meet the 
functional specifications? 
Implementation 




Remainder of Life Cycle 
Figure 1.1.- Digital 
Does the  production system 
agree with the prototype? 
Does the  fielded system's 
behavior agree with the 
production system  behavior? 
system l i fe  cyc le .  
92 
Goals and 
I I Design Bench Test, Simulation, Specifications  Eng neeri g Model Analysis 
Implementation "Hot-Bench" Tests, Ground Tests 
in the Aircraft, Experimental 
Flight Tests 
System 
*-, Certification Procedures 
Well-Defined Maintenance, 
Logging Procedures 
Fielded System Trouble Reporting, and 
J 
Remainder of  Life Cycle 
Figure 1 .2 . -  Digital system l i fe  cycle  appl ied to  a i rcraf t  systems. 
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V A L I D A T I O N  
SYSTEM  RELIABILITY 
- 
- ULTRA-HIGH RELIABILITY 
Figure 2.1.- Cost o f  validation as  a  function o f  system  reliability 
assuming  a conventional lifetesting approach. 
94 
x 
"Good" State "Failure" State 
Figure 2 .2 . -  A two-state Markov  model 
o f  re1 iabi l  i ty.  




e.. e e. 
fd 
e.. e e. 





fd t --- fault occurrence & 
fault  detection 2.22 e.. v 
double  fault 
Figure 2.4.- A Markov  reliability  model o f  S I F T  system. 
fh --- fault handling 








PROOF THAT  RELIABILITY SCHEOULER 
MOOEL IS A PROPER 







ANALYTICAL  EXPERIMENTAL 
TESTING 
(SIMULATION/EMULATION/PHYSICAL) 
VALIOATION VALIDATION VALIDATION 
OCCURRENCE HANOLING FREE BEHAVIOR 
OF FAULT- OF FAULT- OF FAULT- 
BEHAVIOR  BEHAVIOR 11-1, 11-6 
Lifetesting 11-7, 11-13 1-2 
of Subsystems 1-3 
kg., processors, EXPLORATORY 
memories) TESTING 
Ill 
*Notation refers to  validation tasks  summarized in Section 3.0 of this report. 
Figure 2.5.  - The proposed Val idation taxonomy: Tree form. 
I LIFETEST  ON  SUBSYSTEMS, 
I 
EXPERIENCE, 


















F A U L T  
EXPLORATORY 
TESTING 
1.2 I 111 
STRUCTURE 





11-7 TO 11-13 
I '  
1 MOOELSOLUTION I 1-1 I 
RELIABILITY *Notation refers to  validation 
PREOICTION tasks summarized in  Section 
NO 3.0 o f  this report. 
1 




ASSUMPTIONS  ON 
FAULT OCCURRENCE 
AND  RECOVERY 
1 - Construct  and  Refine  Reliability  Model 
2- Validate  Consistency of  Model and Design of  Computer 
3- Observe Recovery Behavior 
4- Predict Reliability 
*-I LOGICAL PROOF 1-1 EXPERIMENTAL PROOF I J. I 
P- 
FAULT 
CHARACTERIZATION 1 I 
THAT COMPUTER IS 
CONSISTENT WITH I CONSISTENT WITH THAT COMPUTER IS I 






OBSERVATION  BEHAVIOR 
Figure 3.1.- General  scheme  for  confirmation o f  fault  tolerant  computer  reliability. 
I 
I I1 
. . ~ . . . . - . . . 
IMPORTANCE TOTAL 
Figure D . l . -  Working  group I 1  assessment o f  the  preliminary  validation  tasks. 
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